1968 PLP 18 (PTD)
DAVIDSON Versus DESKS (INSPECTOR OF TAXES)
| Citation | 1968 PLP 18 (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | Chancery Division |
| Bench Members | Danckwerts, J |
| Parties | DAVIDSON Versus DESKS (INSPECTOR OF TAXES) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1968 PLP 18 (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1968 PLP 18 (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Chancery Division bench comprising: Danckwerts, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1968 PLP 18 (PTD) (DAVIDSON Versus DESKS (INSPECTOR OF TAXES)). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Headnotes / Summary
Income‑tax‑Schedule A‑ Deductions‑"Maintenance, repairs, insurance and management" Relief claimed by owner of adjoining land in respect of sum paid for road works carried out by local authority‑Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57) --Income‑tax Act, 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2. c.10), Ss. 94 & 101 (1) (2). A taxpayer claimed to be entitled to an allowance under section 101 of the Income‑tax Act, 1952, in respect of a sum paid by him for road works carried out by a local authority on a road on which his property abutted. He appealed from a decision of the general commissioners, who held that he was not entitled to claim maintenance relief under that section, on the grounds (a) that he was not the owner (or lessee) of the land on which the expenditure was incurred, (b) that the land was not assessed to tax under Schedule A and (c) that the expenditure was incurred by virtue of the taxpayer being the owner (lessee) of land fronting and abutting on the roadway and assessed to tax under Schedule A: Held, dismissing the appeal, that, on the terms of the Act, an allowance could not be claimed for expenditure which was on other land, though the taxpayer had been charged, by virtue of his ownership or occupation of the particular land. Appeal from the Commissioners for the General Purposes of the Income‑tax for the Division of Howes in the County of Cambridge. The question for the determination of the Commissioners was whether the appellant was entitled to an allowance under section 101 of the Income‑tax Act, 1952, in respect of a sum of 70 6s. 11d. paid by him for road works carried out by the Cambridge City Council under the Private Street Works Act, 1892. The appellant was the lessee of a plot of ground and dwelling‑house known as 32, Sedley Taylor Road, Cambridge, having a frontage of approximately 60 feet to Sedley Taylor Road, under a lease granted by Trinity College, Cambridge, for 99 years at a rent of 11 a year. The road was constructed in 1926 and 1927 by the college on land of which the college was the freehold owner. It was taken over in 1950 by the corporation under the Private Street Works Act, 1892, and the work of making it up was begun in 1951 and finished in 1952. On April 8, 1953, the council gave notice to the appellant of its final apportionment of the cost of the works, the appellant's liability thereunder being the said sum of 70 6s. 11d. The appellant claimed to be entitled to an allowance under section 101 of the Income‑tax Act, 1952, in respect of that sum. He was assessed to Schedule A tax in respect of the plot of ground and dwelling house for the year ending April 5, 1954, and was the "owner" thereof for the purposes of that section. The case, after setting out the facts, stated as follows :
4. The appellant contended that as owner of his house he was made to pay for works of repair and maintenance carried out on the road under the Private Street Works Act, 1892, which statute refers to frontagers as owners without distinction between freehold and leasehold owners and he claimed that as he had to pay for the work as owner of the house he should be similarly regarded when seeking relief. Further, the expense incurred was on account of extensive repairs to the road by which access is obtained to the house (without the road free access 'is not possible) and was an expenditure allowable as any other expenditure relating to the house and land under section 101 of the Income Tax Act, 1952. The appellant stated that he had been unable to find anything which said that the works on which relief was claimed must be on or limited to the actual property. He quoted section 94, relating to relief on expenditure on draining, fencing, embanking and sea walls. The appellant also quoted section 101 (2) and suggested that `and other works' would bring his claim within the section. "The owner of a house site was liable to pay in certain cases for works outside the actual house site as m the case of repairs and maintenance to communicating pipes for the water supply from the water main and to the connecting drain from the house drain to the public sewer.
5. It was contended for the Crown : (1) An allowance under the said section 101 was to be granted only if the road was charged under Schedule 'A' ; as there was no such charge no relief could be given ; (2) an allowance under the said section 101 could only be granted (if at all) to the owner of the road and not to the owner of adjoining land ; (3) the claim should be refused.
6. We, the Commissioners who heard this appeal determined as follows: That the appellant was not entitled to claim maintenance relief under section 101 of the Income‑tax Act, 1952, in respect of the amount paid by him for road making on the grounds (a) that he was not the owner (or lessee) of the land upon which the expenditure was incurred ; (b) that the said land was not assessed to tax under Schedule 'A'; and (c) that the expenditure was incurred by virtue of the appellant being the owner (lessee) of land fronting and abutting upon the roadway and assessed to tax under Schedule 'A'. Accordingly we disallowed the appeal.
7. The appellant immediately after the determination of the appeal expressed his dissatisfaction with our determination and in due course we were required to state a case for the opinion of the High Court .........
8. The question of law for the opinion of the High Court is whether on the evidence and facts before us our decision as set out in paragraph 6 above was correct in law." Appellant in person: B. L. Bathurst Q. C. and Sir Reginald Hills for the Inspector of Taxes. Solicitor : Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
Judgment & Decree
Accordingly we disallowed the appeal.
7. The appellant immediately after the determination of the appeal expressed his dissatisfaction with our determination and in due course we were required to state a case for the opinion of the High Court .........
8. The question of law for the opinion of the High Court is whether on the evidence and facts before us our decision as set out in paragraph 6 above was correct in law." Appellant in person: B. L. Bathurst Q. C. and Sir Reginald Hills for the Inspector of Taxes. Solicitor : Solicitor of Inland Revenue. This is an appeal by Mr. Walker Wheatley, Davidson, who appears in person, against the dismissal of an appeal by him to the Commissioners for the General Purposes of the Income Tax for the Division of Howes in the County of Cambridge relating to a claim for relief which he made. Mr. Davidson is tenant of the land and house known as 32, Sedley Taylor Road, Cambridge, under lease for some 99 years from 1929, at a rent of 11 a year, and he claims to be entitled to relief against Schedule A tax in respect of a sum of 70 6s. 11d. which he had to pay for road works carried out by the City Council of Cambridge under the Private Street Works Act, 1892. The land in question of which he is tenant apparently is assessed to Schedule A tax at 68 per annum gross and 54 5s. per annum net. He has to pay Schedule A tax, and is unable to recover it from his landlord because he is paying less than the rack‑rent of the property. He claims that he is entitled to an allowance in respect of the sum of 70 6s. 11d. by reason of the provisions relating to allowances for repairs contained in section 101 of the Income‑tax Act, 1952, which re‑enacts the provisions of Rule 8 of No. V of Schedule A to the Income‑tax Act, 1918. He claims that he has paid this by reason of his occupation of the land in question, and, therefore, it ought to be an allowable claim under section 101 for maintenance under the provisions of that section. The case put against him is that it is not maintenance of the land of which he is tenant, but maintenance, if it is maintenance at all, of the land representing the site of a road on which his property fronts, and, therefore, it is not within the terms of section
101. That, very shortly, is the issue. When one looks at the Private Street Works Act, 1892, under which the work was done by the local authority and under which the charge on the appellant arises, it is plain that he is not assessed with the sum which he has had to pay by reason of any ownership of the road, or as owner of the road in any way whatever, but simply because he is owner of the land of which he is tenant and the fact that the land fronts on the road in question. It is plain that the charge against him has been made by apportionment under the terms of that Act of 1892 by the local authority, and he is charged as owner of the land occupied by him and in respect of which he is assessed to Schedule A tax. I have, therefore, considerable sympathy for the appellant in his claim that he ought to receive relief in respect of this payment, which obviously affects the land and the amenities and value of his land, but, of course, I have to find whether it is within the terms of the statute, bearing in mind that this is not a claim by the Revenue to tax, but a claim by the subject for exemption or relief in respect of tax. I have to find whether it is within the terms of the section to enable him to make the claim. In other words, the onus is on the appellant' to show that the words of section 101 do confer upon him aright to claim a further allowance against Schedule A tax. Turning to section 101 the only subsections which I need read are subsections (1) and (2). [His Lordship read subsections (1) and (2) and continued: ] . The appellant says that the words "and other works" in particular in subsection (2) are apt words to refer to the works which have been done by the local authority, the cost of which, in part at any rate, has been charged against him, and, therefore, he comes within the words of that subsection. One has, however, to read the section as a whole, and, although the opening words are vague enough, "If the owner of any land," it is plain, I think, from the terms of the whole subsection that what it is referring to in those words is the owner of any land which is the subject of Schedule A tax and who is making a claim for a further allowance in respect of repairs. Having received some relief already under sections 99 and 100 he is here being given some further relief in respect of the expenses of the maintenance, repairs, insurance and management. I think it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that all those words must relate to maintenance, repairs, insurance and management in respect of the land which is under consideration and is charged to Schedule A. Therefore it is maintenance of that land, repairs of that land, and insurance and management of that land only which is being referred to ; and in the same way I think it is 'fairly plain that in the enlarged meaning given to "maintenance" in sub section (2)‑"farmhouses, farm buildings, cottages, fences and other works" it must all relate to the Schedule A tax, the piece of land on which the owner is claiming that, as he is assessed to Schedule A, he should receive further relief. Therefore, prima facie, any other sum expended on land which is not the subject of the particular assessment is not material. The appellant has pointed out, quite correctly, that in section 94 of the Act there are certain reliefs given which plainly will include works done on other lands apart from that which is the subject of the Schedule A assessment in question ; for instance, "the amount charged on lands, tenements, hereditaments and heritages by a public rate or assessment in respect of draining, fencing or embanking" may well include charges in respect of other land. Embanking is something which may be necessary to preserve the land which is subject to Schedule A tax and which may be done on different land. In the same way at (c) there is an allowance given in respect of the amount expended by the, landlord or owner of the land on an average over 21 years in making or repairing sea walls or other embankments necessary for the preservation or protection of the lands against the encroachment or overflowing of the sea or any tidal river, although the sums expended may not have been charged on the lands by a public rate or assessment. That is relief in respect of expenditure by him which may well, in the case of a sea wall, be on land which is some distance from the land in question charged to Schedule A, but necessary for the preservation of that land. Of course, the natural observation made by the Revenue with regard to that section is that there one finds specific cases of relief being given by the Taxing Act, though the expenditure has in fact been made on other land: Therefore, the fact that the Act has allowed a specific case to be brought into consideration in regard to Schedule A tax, though the expenditure is on other land, is not necessarily any argument for the construction of section
101. I have been referred to two cases, neither of which are really of great assistance to me. But there is an observation of Atkinson, J. in Pearce v. Doulton ((1947) 1 All E R 378) that the provision about "maintenance, repairs, insurance (which was the point in that case) and management" obviously relates to the land subject to the assessment to Schedule A, and that does seem to me to be the principle which has to be applied in the present case. The other case was Inland Revenue v. Wilson's Executors ((1934) 18 T C 465 (476)), which is a case showing that expenditure of a capital nature in any case cannot be the subject of relief against an income claim under Schedule A under the terms of those provisions at all. That may be so, and it may be that possibly the making up of a road, even though it is, in a sense, maintenance, is a charge once and for all which is of a capital nature ; but it is unnecessary for me to decide that point, because I am reluctantly brought to the conclusion that on the terms of the Act an allowance cannot be claimed for expenditure which is on other land, though the appellant has been charged by virtue of his ownership or occupation of the particular land, for the purposes of section 101 of the Income‑tax Act, 1952. Accordingly, it seems to me that the appellant's appeal must be dismissed, although, as I have said, I think there is some sympathy certainly to be felt for him, as it is expenditure which he has to make by reason of his occupation of the land in question. The appeal will be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.