Present: Muhammad Afial Zullah, CJ (PLP)

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C J.--This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal; whereby, an order of removal from service passed against the appellant on ground of misconduct was upheld. The appellant had levelled serious charges against his superiors. An enquiry was held in that case in which the, appellant could be treated as a complainant and as a result thereof the accused/respondents therein were exonerated. This led to a punitive action against. the appellant in having levelled such charges against his superiors which were not substantiated. It was also treated as a case of indiscipline on the part of the appellant and lastly some allegations of corruption were also noticed against him. As a result of .all this he was removed from service. His appeal before the Service Tribunal having failed leave to appeal was granted to examine the validity of the order of removal. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the inquiry conducted against other persons was not an inquiry against the appellant; therefore, the results of the other inquiry could not be used against him. In this very context he advanced a multiple argument that the appellant had not been associated in the earlier inquiry so as to afford him opportunity of proving the case against whom he had made the complaint. The Tribunal while disposing of the appeal and keeping in view similar circumstances as above observed as follows:- "The learned counsel for the State and also the departmental representative contended that detection of cases by the Customs Officer , is a matter of routine duty by all officials of respondent department. The case so detected in the. past cannot be cited as a defence against the irregularities of the future. In this particular case, the appellant had made general complaint against M/s. Allied Cosmetics for evasion of excise duty. Since there was no specific case giving details of evasion of excise duty, the competent authority had considered it appropriate to investigate the matter. If, however, a specific complaint was made against the Assistant Collector Incharge, the competent authority would have certainly detailed an officer senior to him to look into the matter. However, as a result of this enquiry the facts were proved otherwise. It was found that the appellant was in fact the one who was coercing the firm to get bigger share as monthly payment from the firm. It was also brought out by the Enquiry Officer that the Inspector Mr. Naqvi was performing, his duties to the satisfaction of his superiors. He only happened to be the hurdle in the way of the appellant in his coercive methods against the firm. The learned counsel for the State referred to Rule 5(1)(iii)(a) -- show cause notice procedure -- dispensing with enquiry and contending that in this case there was no requiremnt of holding enquiry because there was sufficient proof against the appellant to adopt the procedure under Rule 6 of Government Servants (E&D) Rules, 1973. The explanation given by the appellant in reply to the show-cause notice was not substantiated by facts." In so far as the above observations of the Tribunal are concerned they, do indicate that second inquiry (against the earlier set of accused) in the present case was not necessary. It would have amounted to double jeopardy though the earlier accused could have been examined against the present appellants in support of the proposition that he had falsely accused them. We also do not agree with the learned counsel that in the first inquiry it was an absolute necessity to associate the appellant as a complainant. He had no such right. Of course in the second case against him it was open to the authority concerned either to adopt the shorter procedure or detailed inquiry procedure The selection of one or the other, in the circumstances like those of the present case would not call for interference by this Court. Apart from the debatable question as to whether the appellant himself was found guilty of corruption and thus his removal partly is based on this charge; there is intrinsic evidence in his own writings and complaints against his superiors wherein in addition to making complaint he in emotional upsurge sat in judgment over the alleged acts of his superiors and tried to convict them and that also in absentia. It could and rightly has been treated as an act of indiscipline if a charitable view could be taken it was that the appellant although permitted to complain even against his superiors, was absolutely insolent besides being tactless. Thus in so far as the finding of guilty is concerned there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the impugned judgment as in this behalf. There is no other question of law of public importance which could be the basis for interference. However, on the question of the charge of corruption which the Tribunal assumed had also been established against the appellant, there was no clear material before the Tribunal to reach this conclusion and in a way it amounted to going beyond what the departmental authorities had found against the appellant. The observation in para. 5 of the impugned judgment that there was finding against the appellant that he had coerced the firm in question to get bigger share as monthly payment, was without any supporting material because the learned Deputy Attorney-General despite having been afforded fair opportunity of producing any such finding, has failed to do so. We, therefore, while upholding the finding of guilty on other charges, hold that the charge of corruption in para. 2 of the charge-sheet should not have weighed with the Tribunal. As a result of the afore-rendered finding it becomes necessary to remand the case to the Tribunal to examine the effect of the exclusion of one basis for the finding of guilty which related to corruption. Both the learned counsel agreed that if such a situation arises, this Court instead of remanding the case may make proper modification in the punishment. Thus .we consider it a fit case in which the punishment of compulsory retirement could have met the ends of justice. Accordingly, while partly allowing this appeal we order the substitution of the punishment to compulsory retirement as agreed. M.BA./G-351/S? Appeal partly allowed.