1981 PLP 237(2) (SCMR)

Sh. Riaz Ahmad, Assistant Advocate-General (Punjab) for the State. Sh. Mansur Akhtar, Advocate-on-Record (absent) Jar Respondent No.

2. Date of. hearing : 9th December, 1972. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.--The appellant Muhammad Shafi is facing prosecution under section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code at the instance of' his second wife Mst. Rant, on the allegations that he practised fraud upon her in collusion with one Muhammad Tufail, and got executed power of attorney in favour of his own brother Muhammad Yaqoob, and then he forged a sale deed in respect of a shop owned by the complainant in Okara. The appel lant approached the High Court for quashing these proceedings on the ground that earlier the lady had also filed a civil suit against the appellant in which the genuineness of the same documents 'had been brought under ques tion. It may be stated that the suit was instituted by the respondent on 1-6-1970, whereas the criminal complaint was made on the 17th of November, 1970, on the basis of which a formal F. I. R. was registered on the 18th of November, 1970. A learned Judge of the Lahore High Court, however, refused to grant relief to the appellant, observing in his order dated the 16th of May, 1972, that this was not a case in which the criminal proceedings should be held up until the decision of the civil suit, as the relief claimed in the suit was only confined to a declaration as to the forged nature of the power of attor ney which was presumably in the possession of the appellant. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court to examine the question of law as to whether a party can be allowed to resort to different remedies through different forms at the same time, and whether in such circum stances the subsequent proceedings would not amount to an abuse of the pro cess of the Court. We find that the question- raised in the present appeal has been considered on several previous occasions by this Court, namely in Muhammad Akbar v. The State and another (PLD1968SC281), N. Manak Ji v. Fakhar 1qbal and another (1969SCMR198), Syed Muhammad Ahmad v. The State (1972 S C M R 85) and Abdul Hayee v. The State (1972 S C M R 473). It is , therefore, not necessary for us to embark upon any elaborate examination of the legal position except to respectfully adopt the view pre viously taken, namely, that normally criminal proceedings should not be postponed pending the disposal of civil litigation connected with the same subject-matter ; but where it is clear that the criminal liability is dependent upon the result of the civil litigation, or is so intimately connected with it that there is a danger of grave injustice being done in the case if there be a conflict of decision between the civil Court and the criminal Court, then in such event, the criminal Court should stay its hands until the civil litigation is disposed of, for, it is not desirable that when title to property itself is in dispute, the criminal Court should give a finding in respect of the same question ; and further, as observed in the case of Muhammad Akbar, there is no invariable rule that a criminal proceeding should be stayed pending the decision of the civil suit but the matter is one of discretion entirely. In exercise in this discretion the guiding principle should be to see as to whether the accused is likely to be prejudiced if the criminal proceeding is not stayed. Judged in the light of these principles, it appears to us that as the criminal proceedings were initiated subsequently to the institution of the civil suit, and as the decision in the criminal case not only involves the determination of the genuineness of the sama documents, as have been challenged in the civil suit but also indirectly involves a question as to title to property, it would have been appropriate for the learned Judge in the High Court to stay the criminal proceedings. We would have adopted this course, but for the reason that unfortunately the litigation between the parties has been pending for nearly nine years, and it would not, therefore, be desirable to postpone the recording of evidence in the criminal proceedings until the finalisation of the civil suit. We, accordingly, consider that ends of justice would be met if the recording of evidence in the criminal proceedings may commence and be completed, but the final judgment shall not be pronounced during the pendency of the civil suit between the parties in respect of the same subject-matter. Such a course of action would avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions being delivered on the same question by the civil and criminal Courts concerned. The appeal is, therefore, partly accepted in the terms just indicated. Petition partly accepted.