P L D 1976 Lahore 392 (PLP)

Art. 203 read with West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), S. 15‑Transfer of proceedings‑Rent Controller‑A persona designata and not a Court‑Article 203 empowering High Court to supervise and control only Courts transfer of proceedings pending before Rent Controller, held, could not be ordered under such Article. Sh. Muhammad Nasir Ahmad Piracha v. S. M. Almas Ali, Advocate P L D 1971 Lah. 131 eel. M. Muhammad Mohsin Ansari for Petitioner. Raja Muhammad Akram for Respondents. Date of hearing : 28th November 1975. This is an application by Messrs the United Bank Limited against Abdul Khaliq and others for transfer of an ejectment petition pending under section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance before Ch. Salamat Ali Rent Controller, Lyallpur to some Court of competent jurisdiction in any District other than Lyallpur. Grievances running into 19 paragraphs and 7 pages have been listed. Notice having been sent to the respondents Raja Muhammad Akram Advocate has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this application on their behalf. The application was presented under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with its section

151. The objection is that the Rent Controller not being a Court and in any case not a Court subordinate to this Court the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted unless the same have been made applicable by the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Section 15 of the Ordinance provides for the transfer of an application pending under the provisions of that Ordinance. It has two subsections, the first deals with cases pending before a Controller and the power is given to the Appellate Authority to withdraw it and transfer it for disposal to any other Controller subordinate to it. The second subsection confers powers upon the High Court to withdraw any appeal pending before any Appellate Authority and transfer the same for disposal to any other such Authority subordinate to it. In the present case the proceedings are pending before a Controller. Section 15 (A) does not give any power to this Court to transfer these proceedings from him. Even the Appellate Authority can transfer it only to another Controller subordinate to it, while the prayer in the applica?tion before me is for transfer of the application outside the District of Lyallpur, which would mean its transfer to a Controller not subject to the Appellate Authority exercising jurisdiction in Lyallpur. Consequently the Appellate Authority at Lyallpur would not be competent to dispose of this case. The expression "Appellate Authority" has not been defined separately in the Ordinance. Appeals against the orders of the Rent Controller lie under section 15 to the District Judge having jurisdiction and against his orders to the High Court. In subsection (5) of section 15 three Authorities I.e. (a) the Controller, (b) the Appellate Authority, and (c) the High Court have been referred to separately. It, therefore, follows necessarily as a corollary that the Appellate Authority is different from the High Court inter alia because subsection (5) of section 15 deals with the trial stage as well as the appellate stages and the District Judge having not been mentioned as such while the in Controller and the High Court have been mentioned, the appellation "Appellate Authority" having been used in contradistinction to the expression High Court could relate only to the Authority, which hears the first appeal i.e. the District Judge. Section 15 (A) (a) is, therefore, not attracted to this case. Section 15 (A) (b) is also not attracted because it confers powers on the High Court only to transfer appeals from the Appellate Authority and not applications pending before a Controller. Let us now see if sections 24 and 151, C. P. C. confer any jurisdiction on this Court. Section 24 empowers the High Court or the District Court to transfer proceedings from Courts subordinate to them. Section 151 which deals with inherent powers of the Court authorises the High Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 4 (1) makes it clear that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. The Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance is certainly a local law. It prescribes its C own procedure and makes only sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the proceedings under it as is laid down in the explanation to Section 15 (4). Under section 16 the powers of a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence are conferred upon the Appellate Authority or a Controller. Under section 17 an order passed under section 10, 13 or 15 is to be executed by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. Only specific sections of the Code of Civil Procedure having been made applicable by certain provisions of the law the maxim Expressio unius est Exclusio alterius will step in and the rest of the provisions of the Code will be l inapplicable to the proceedings before a Rent Controller. These provisions include section 24 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it will, D therefore, be correct to assert that the power of the High Court to transfer cases under these two sections of the Civil Procedure Code is not available in the case of proceedings pending before a Rent Controller. There is yet another provision of law under which the High Court does exercise powers to transfer cases and that is enunciated in Article 203 of the Constitution thus- "Each High Court shall supervise, and control all Courts subordinate to it." It has been held inter cilia by the Supreme Court that the Controller under. this Ordinance is a persona designata and not a Court. The decision in Sh. Muhammad Arasir Ahmad Piracha v. S. M. Almas Ali Advocate P L D 1971 Lah. 131 wherein a plethora of rulings on this point has been quoted can be referred to. In these circumstances even the power under Article 203 is not available as the sine qua non for its exercise i. e. the person upon whom the power to supervise and control is sought to be exercised must be a Court In these circumstances there is no force in this petition, which is dismissed, but there shall be no costs in the circumstances of the case. S. A. H. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Petition dismissed.