1988 PLP 64 (PLC)
and another Versus GHULAM SARWAR
| Citation | 1988 PLP 64 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind |
| Bench Members | Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | and another Versus GHULAM SARWAR |
| Primary Law | Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1988 PLP 64 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1988 PLP 64 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1988 PLP 64 (PLC) (and another Versus GHULAM SARWAR). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Sadiq Khan for Appellants.
- M. S. Shahani for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 2nd April, 1987.
- 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent was a permanent workman of the appellant‑Bank and his duties were primarily and mainly clerical in nature as he was, appointed as a cashier on 15‑12‑1975 and at the relevant time he was posted at Kandhkot Branch of the appellant‑Bank. On 16‑8‑1978, the respondent was served with a charge‑sheet alleging misconduct and as his reply to the charge‑sheet was not found satisfactory, therefore, the appellant‑Bank had appointed two enquiry officers. None of the enquiry officers could find the respondent guilty of the alleged misconduct in an impugn and illegally held domestic enquiry yet, he was removed from the employment on 29‑8‑1979. The respondent claimed that during this long period of about one year from 16‑8‑1978 till 29‑8‑1979, he was very unlawfully put under suspension. Thereafter the respondent had served grievance notice, dated 18‑9‑1979 through his Advocate and thereafter filed grievance petition bearing No.368 of 1979 under section 25‑A. I.R.O. , 1969, which was alleged by the Labour Court and the appellant‑Bank had impugned this order of the Labour Court before this Tribunal and this Tribunal had allowed the appeal of the appellant‑Bank holding that the service of the grievance notice under the signature of a Counsel was not valid. Thereafter, the respondent submitted a constitutional petition No.12 ‑ of 1981 before the High Court of Sind which was subsequently dismissed on 28‑4‑1983. Against the order of the High Court, the respondent had filed a petition for Special Leave to Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this petition too, was rejected on 18‑3‑1984. That, just after the decision of the Supreme Court the respondent had served a fresh grievance notice, under his own signatures, upon the appellant‑Bank on 21‑3‑1984 and then, the present grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969 was filed. Along with this grievance petition, the respondent had also filed an application under section 65‑B of I.R.O. 1969 read with section 5 of Limitation Act.
- 5. I have heard Mr. M. Sadiq Khan, the learned Advocate for the appellant‑Bank Mr. M. L. Shahani, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent. I have also carefully examined the record and proceedings of the case as well as have also perused the affidavit and the counter‑affidavit, filed by both the parties before this Tribunal. At the very outset, I would hold that Mr. M. Sadiq Khan, the learned Advocate for the appellant‑Bank has failed to submit anything new to what he had submitted before the learned Labour Court in support of his case. I therefore, see no force in any of his contentions. Mr. M. L. Shahani, the learned counsel for the, respondent has submitted that a notice given before the enunciation of Law by Supreme Court in the year 1980, came within an exception, and could be treated as a valid notice. He further pleaded that the decision was given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence, an exception could be spelt out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court alone and so the respondent's Counsel bona finely and without any gross negligence of ignorance of the statutory provision, advised the respondent to A pursue his remedy upto Supreme Court, and the respondent who was a layman, did act upon this advice without any negligence or carelessness on his part. In view of these submissions I would hold the grievance petition, of the respondent well within time. The learned Labour Court has also rightly observed that the present case of the respondent cannot be treated as being barred by the principles of res judicata.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑Ss.25‑A & 38(3)‑‑Removal from service‑‑Reinstatement‑‑Grievance petition of respondent worker neither barred by time nor by principles of res judicata‑‑Respondent although designated as Cashier yet was a workman doing clerical and manual duties‑‑Labour Court discussed every legal aspect of case and whole evidence on record before passing a well‑reasoned order reinstating worker‑‑Order of Labour Court, held, was unexceptionable‑‑Worker ordered to be reinstated in service with fifty per cent back benefits.
Judgment & Decree
Date of hearing: 2nd April, 1987. This is an appeal filed by Messrs United Bank Limited, Sukkur, against an impugned order, dated 5‑11‑1986, passed by Sind Labour Court No. VII, Sukkur, who had allowed the grievance petition of the respondent under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent was a permanent workman of the appellant‑Bank and his duties were primarily and mainly clerical in nature as he was, appointed as a cashier on 15‑12‑1975 and at the relevant time he was posted at Kandhkot Branch of the appellant‑Bank. On 16‑8‑1978, the respondent was served with a charge‑sheet alleging misconduct and as his reply to the charge‑sheet was not found satisfactory, therefore, the appellant‑Bank had appointed two enquiry officers. None of the enquiry officers could find the respondent guilty of the alleged misconduct in an impugn and illegally held domestic enquiry yet, he was removed from the employment on 29‑8‑1979. The respondent claimed that during this long period of about one year from 16‑8‑1978 till 29‑8‑1979, he was very unlawfully put under suspension. Thereafter the respondent had served grievance notice, dated 18‑9‑1979 through his Advocate and thereafter filed grievance petition bearing No.368 of 1979 under section 25‑A. I.R.O. , 1969, which was alleged by the Labour Court and the appellant‑Bank had impugned this order of the Labour Court before this Tribunal and this Tribunal had allowed the appeal of the appellant‑Bank holding that the service of the grievance notice under the signature of a Counsel was not valid. Thereafter, the respondent submitted a constitutional petition No.12 ‑ of 1981 before the High Court of Sind which was subsequently dismissed on 28‑4‑1983. Against the order of the High Court, the respondent had filed a petition for Special Leave to Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this petition too, was rejected on 18‑3‑1984. That, just after the decision of the Supreme Court the respondent had served a fresh grievance notice, under his own signatures, upon the appellant‑Bank on 21‑3‑1984 and then, the present grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969 was filed. Along with this grievance petition, the respondent had also filed an application under section 65‑B of I.R.O. 1969 read with section 5 of Limitation Act.
3. The appellant‑Bank had contested the petition of the respondent before the learned Labour Court, mainly on the points of its having been hopelessly time‑barred and also to have been hit by the principles of res judicata. They submitted that as the charge of the misconduct was fully established against the respondent in a lawfully and properly held domestic enquiry therefore, he was rightly dismissed from service so he could not maintain the grievance petition which was liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits‑in‑evidence and they were duly cross‑examined. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has framed five issues and then, passed the impugned order directing the reinstatement of the respondent with fifty per cent back benefits, hence, this appeal.
5. I have heard Mr. M. Sadiq Khan, the learned Advocate for the appellant‑Bank Mr. M. L. Shahani, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent. I have also carefully examined the record and proceedings of the case as well as have also perused the affidavit and the counter‑affidavit, filed by both the parties before this Tribunal. At the very outset, I would hold that Mr. M. Sadiq Khan, the learned Advocate for the appellant‑Bank has failed to submit anything new to what he had submitted before the learned Labour Court in support of his case. I therefore, see no force in any of his contentions. Mr. M. L. Shahani, the learned counsel for the, respondent has submitted that a notice given before the enunciation of Law by Supreme Court in the year 1980, came within an exception, and could be treated as a valid notice. He further pleaded that the decision was given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence, an exception could be spelt out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court alone and so the respondent's Counsel bona finely and without any gross negligence of ignorance of the statutory provision, advised the respondent to A pursue his remedy upto Supreme Court, and the respondent who was a layman, did act upon this advice without any negligence or carelessness on his part. In view of these submissions I would hold the grievance petition, of the respondent well within time. The learned Labour Court has also rightly observed that the present case of the respondent cannot be treated as being barred by the principles of res judicata.
6. As regards the other points of merits of the case and that the respondent, though designated as Cashier, yet was a workman doing clerical and manual duties, the learned Labour Court has thoroughly discussed every legal aspect and the whole evidence brought on record and then had passed a well‑reasoned impugned order which needs no interference. I would accordingly maintain the same.
7. For the reasons stated by me above, I see no reasons to interfere with the impugned order and would maintain the same. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. The respondent is directed to be reinstated in service forthwith, fifty per cent back benefits. As these back benefits are deposited in this Tribunal, therefore, they be paid to the respondent, after due verification. M.Y.H./1003/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.