2009 PLP 2063 (YLR)

IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, J.

Through this petition, the petitioner seeks setting aside of the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and the learned Additional District Judge, Narowal, dated 13-4-2002 and 3-5-2002 respectively.

2. Brief facts of this civil revision are that the respondents purchased the property measuring 4 Kanals and 4 Marlas Khata Nos. 67 and 77 situated in Mauza Chandarkay Mangolay Tehsil and District Narowal, vide oral sale land mutation No. 336 dated 29-11-2001 for a consideration of Rs.2,25,

000. The petitioner came to know of the said sale-at 4-00 p.m. on 25-2-2002 through Amir Manzoor son of Manzoor Ahmad and Muhammad Nawaz son of Muhammad Din residents of Mauza Chandarkay Mangloay Tehsil and District Narowal and he in the presence of the said persons immediately announced his willingness to exercise his right of pre-emption. After announcement of his willingness to exercise his right of pre-' emption before the witnesses, he sent a notice dated 27-2-2002 duly attested by witnesses, to the respondents. Through this notice, he being co-sharer of the property in question, offered the respondents to receive Rs.80,000 and demanded them' to surrender the possession of said land to the petitioner. When the respondents did not accede to the demand of the petitioner, the petitioner filed a suit against the respondents. While entertaining the suit, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narowal, ordered the petitioner to deposit Zar-e-Soim amounting to Rs.75,000 within twenty-two days from the date of filing of the suit. The .petitioner failed to deposit the Zar-e-Soim within the stipulated period of 21 days and verbally requested for extension of time for the deposit of Zar-e-Soim but the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narowal, refused to accept the oral request of the petitioner and dismissed his suit for non-deposit of Zar-e-Soim vide judgment dated 13-4-2002. Feeling aggrieved with the said judgment, the petitioner filed an appeal but the same was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Narowal, vide judgment dated 3-5-2002. Against the said judgment, the petitioner has filed this revision.

3. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narowal, failed to comprehend that the statutory period for the deposit of Zar e-Soim is 30 days while he had directed the petitioner to deposit Zar-e-Soim by affording him 21 days; that on 13-4-2002, the same could have been extended at least within the period of 30 days and such extension would have been in the interest of justice. It is further stated that to show his bona fide, the petitioner had got prepared a challan form for the deposit of the said Zar e-Soim but the same was refused by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narowal, and the petitioner on his own deposited the same in the Government Treasury on 20-4-2002 before the expiry of 30 days; that the same did not find favour with the learned lower appellate Court and both the Courts below have taken a very harsh view of the matter; that the petitioner should have been allowed a single opportunity. to show his bona fides and it would have been lawful for the Courts to extend the time within the period of 30 days, at least the learned appellate Court should have considered the same when the petitioner had on his own deposited the Zar-e-Soim, as such, both the Courts have committed illegality by refusing to extend the time within the statutory period. In support of these contentions, reliance is placed upon Rana M. Siddique v. Additional District Judge, Bahawalnagar and others (PLD 2005 Lahore 647), Muhammad Nawaz Tahir v. Said Akbar (2005 YLR 269) and Sheikh Muhammad v. Haji Nazir Ahmad (PLD 2005 Lahore 689).

4. On the other hand, the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner have been controverted by learned counsel for the respondents. It is argued with full force that section 24(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 is a penal provision, as such, the time .given by the Court cannot be extended, moreover, no explanation or justification or any reason had been given by the petitioner as to why has he not been able to deposit the Zar-e-Soim within the period fixed by the Court. It is further stated that the statutory provision of 30 days is to regulate the Court in determining the period to be afforded to the plaintiff, as such, the law has placed restriction that the same should not be beyond 30 days. Controverting the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondents states that it was not to be considered that the deposit of Zar-e-Soim can be made upto the period of 30 days and the Court is to determine the period and in the instant case, 21 days were determined by the Court, as such failure to deposit Zar-e-Soim entails the enforcement of the penal clause of section 24(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. Adverting to the challan form learned counsel for the respondents says that although the date entered by the petitioner is 13-4-2002, but the same has been deposited on 1.9-4-2002, a day prior to the filing of the appeal before the learned District Judge, Narowal. It is further stated that on 13-4-2002, no suit was pending, as such, the assertion of the petitioner that challan form was presented to-the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narowal, who had refused to sign the same, cannot be accepted as substantial right has been accrued to the respondents and in this regard, reliance is placed upon Subedar (Retired) Muhammad Khan v. Adalat Khan and another (2002 CLC 971), Ahmad Bakhsh v. Nasir Khan and others (2002 CLC 119) and Mian Muhammad Lutfi v. Mian Muhammad Taiha Adil (NLR 2000 Civil 422).

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the impugned judgments.

6. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner failed to comply with the order dated 22-3-2002, directing the petitioner to deposit Zar-e-Soim within a period of 21 days. The petitioner appeared in person before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narowal, on 13-4-2002 and verbally requested the Court for extension of time. The same had been disallowed in view of penal provision of section 24(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, wherein it has been made mandatory that on the failure to make the deposit of Zar-e-Soim within the period prescribed by the Court or if he withdraws the sum so deposited by him, his suit shall be dismissed, as such, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narowal, has passed the order dated 13-4-2002, dismissing the suit of the petitioner. The appeal filed by the petitioner also did not find any favour with the learned appellate Court keeping in view the mandatory provision of law into consideration. Further the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner should have been 'granted extension till the statutory period of 30 days, moreso, when the petitioner has shown his bona fide in good faith by making the deposit of Zar-e-Soim within a period of 30 days does not find favour with this Court in view of the fact that the statutory provision of 30 days has been provided by the legislature in order to guide and regulate the Court in fixing the period to be given to the plaintiff for depositing the Zar-e-Soim, which should not be more than 30 days. In the instant case, the Court had given 21 days and on the failure of the same, .the penal provision of section 24(2) of the said Act is to be complied with, which states that the suit shall be dismissed if the Zar-e-Soim is not deposited within the period directed by the Court, as such, no explanation could be afforded.

7. In view of the above, granting extention would defeat this mandatory provision of law, as such, both the Courts below have passed the impugned judgments in accordance with law. In this regard, reliance is placed upon Subedar (Retired) Muhammad Khan v. Adalat Khan and another (2002 CLC 971), Ahmad Bakhsh v. Nasir Khan and others (2002 CLC 119). Moreover, the petitioner cannot deposit the 1/3rd of the sale price of his own and it has only to be deposited by the order of the Court and in this regard, reliance is placed upon Mian Muhammad Lutfi v. Muhammad Talha Adil (NLR 2000 Civil 422). No interference of this Court in its revisional jurisdiction is required.

8. In view of the above circumstances, this petition is dismissed. M.Y./R-37/L Revision dismissed.