1970 PLP 253 (SCMR)

WAHIDUDDIN AHMAD, J.‑This order will dispose of Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeals Nos. K‑60, K‑61 and K‑62 of 1969, which arise from a common judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, in Letter Patent Appeals Nos. 129, 130 and 131 of 1964, decided on the 16th May 1969. One Serai Illahi Bux filed three suits for possession of land on the basis of a sale deed executed in his favour by Bilawal son of Ishaque, Khair Mohammad son of Lal Bakhsh, and Allah Dino son of Khamiso. These were dismissed by the Civil Court, Khairpur. Appeals filed against them were also dismissed by the District Judge, Khairpur. The High Court of Khairpur State remanded the appeals back to the District Court but they were again dismissed. The matter was again taken to the High Court of Khairpur State, which accepted the appeals and decreed the suits on the 17th December 1950. The defendants challenged these orders in appeals before the Judicial Committee of Khairpur State, which maintained the decrees of the High Court with some modifications. The judgment of the Judicial Committee, was approved by the Khairpur Darbar, on the 6th April 1955. On the 9th January 1958, petitioners filed execution applica tions for the execution of the said decrees, but they were withdrawn on the 30th September 1960, as the survey numbers mentioned in the decrees had been changed and it was necessary to mention the new survey numbers of the lands in dispute. It may be mentioned that the lands in dispute were situated in Deh Patta of Taluka Gambat, but on account of new survey numbers, these lands fell in Deh Wali Muhammad of the same Taluka. On the 31st October 1960, fresh execution applications were filed and the objections of the judgment‑debtors that the execu tion applications were barred by time were dismissed. The appeals of the judgment‑debtors were also dismissed by the District Judge, Khairpur. The matter was then taken in the High Court of West Pakistan in Regular Second Appeals Nos. 60, 61 and 62 of 1963. A learned Single Judge of the West Pakistan High Court, Karachi Bench, dismissed these appeals on the ground that the execution applications were within time under Article 183 of the Limitation Act. This view was also upheld by a Division Bench of the High Court in the above‑mentioned appeals. It will be noticed that the High Court treated the order‑of the Judicial Committee of Khairpur State as order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in terms of subsection (3) of section 9 of the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act,.1949. Under this provision of law, any order made by the Judicial Committee of a State on any appeal and decided before the 13th day of October 1955, was for all purposes to have effect as an order made by the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under this Act. The petitioners have challenged the view of the High Court in these petitions. Their contention is that the Act X of 1957 was ultra vires. 7 hey have further contended that with the repeal of the Govern ment of India Act, 1935, the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949, being an amending or supplementary Act to the main Act of 1935, should be taken to have been repealed in 1956 and its provision being not in existence at the time when the execution applications were filed, Article 183 of the Limitation Act has no application to the facts of the present case. It is unnecessary to decide this question because, in our opinion, the execution applications filed by the respondents were within time under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. It will be seen that Khairpur Darbar approved the decision of the Judicial Committee on the 14th February 1955. 'First execution appli cation was filed on the 9th January 1958, but it was withdrawn on the 30th September 1960. The second execution application was filed on the 31st October 1960. I he question for determination, therefore, is whether the execution application filed on the 9th January 1958, was an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court. If that is so, then period of three years will start from the date of the final order passed on it. Mr. Ibadat Yar Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, has contended that the execution application made in 1958 was not in accordance with law as the description of the property given in it was not correctly given. The contention of the learned counsel has not impressed us. It is not disputed that the respondents have men tioned in the execution application the same survey numbers which were mentioned in the decree that was passed in their favour. The mere fact that the survey numbers have in the meanwhile changed on account of fresh survey cannot render the description of the, property mentioned in the execution application as incorrect. Moreover, sub‑rule (2) of Order XXI, rule 11, C. P. C., in a. case where the decree is passed for possession does not require to give the exact particulars of the property sought to be delivered. Under Subsection (j), it is only to be mentioned that the assist ance of the Court is required by the delivery of any property specifically decreed. The respondents, in the execution applica tion filed by them, have complied with this requirement. The learned counsel for the petitioners has cited before us two cases of the Indian Jurisdiction, Janki Sahu Trust v. Ram Palat (A I R 1950 All. 580) and M. S. Sridliaran and others v. M. L. Narasimhaswamy (A I R 1960 Mys. 320). These cases are .in respect of the wrong description given in the execution application when an attachment is sought. There are different considerations when properties are sought to be attached in execution application. In a case where a decree for possession is to be executed, the only requirement of law is that the decree holder should mention in the application that he should be assisted by the Court by the delivery of any property specifically decreed. This requirement was sufficiently fulfilled by the res pondents. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the application was withdrawn for giving fresh survey numbers and, therefore, it was a defective application has no force. We are satisfied that the execution applications made by the petitioners were in according with law and, therefore, the second execution application filed by the respondents on the 31st October 1960, was within limitation under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. There is, therefore, no force in these petitions which are dismissed. Petition dismissed.