P (PLP)

SAKER, J. C.‑

This is a revision petition against the ‑order of the Sub‑Judge and Magistrate, 1st Class, Quetta, dated 28th December 1949 whereby the accused respondents against whom a case had been lodged under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, were discharged under section 209 Criminal Procedure Code. The prayer before this Court that the said order should be set aside and the accused respondents committed to the Court of Sessions to stare their trial, for the offence of murder. The circumstances of this case have been fully set out in the order of the lower Court and need not be recapitulated in full in this order. Briefly, however, the alleged facts of the case are that Mst. Saira Begum, the deceased, daughter of Sh. Umar Din, complainant‑petitioner and wife of accused‑respondent Abdullah. who was living in the house of her husband along with her father- in‑law, mother‑in‑law and brothers‑in‑law (all accused. respondents in this case) was found dead in the bath room of the same house on 11th August 1945. The police who was the first to arrive on the scene found the door of the room closed from within and on being forcibly opened, they found the dead body hanging by a silk azarband" tied to a peg above her head. The police after usual investigations came to the conclusions that the case was of suicide and therefore got it filed. Subsequently, an inquest was held by the Senior Sub‑Judge and Magistrate 1st Class, Quetta who came to the conclusion that the case was not of suicide but of homicide and that suspicion arose against the present respondents. The police, however, stuck to their previous finding and accordingly the District Magistrate; Quetta ordered the filing of the case. The father of the deceased woman however lodged a complaint against the accused‑respondents under section. 302, Pakistan Penal Code which resulted in the order, dated 28th December 1949 the subject of revision in this Court. The record discloses that several medical opinions have been expressed in the case. In the first place, the two doctors, who proceeded to the spot shortly after the death of this unfortunate woman, gave as their opinion that this was a case of homicide and not suicide. Subsequently, the body was sent for postmortem examination and the doctor, who carried out the examination came to the conclusion that death was due to strangulation. Finally, the Civil burgeon, Quetta, who was called in evidence, was of opinion that the case was one of suicide. Yet later in his evidence before the Magistrate, who held the inquest he stated that there were indications suggestive of a foul play. In the first place while the written post mortem report is on record, this cannot be used in evidence owing to the fact that the doctor, who carried out the postmortem examination. was never called to give oral evidence and the report' which has not been proved has no evidentiary value and must therefore be discarded. This Doctor was, however, examined by the inquiry Magistrate who held the inquest and while his statement cannot be considered as relevant to the case before me became Doctor was not examined in the trial Magistrate's Court. I take notice of the fact in his evidence this Doctor finally comes to the conclusion that this was a case of suicide. It can therefore be safely presumed that if his evidence had been recorded by the Committal Magistrate he would still have expressed an opinion that it was a case of suicide. The medical evidence in this case is therefore extremely confusing and gives no clear indication as to whether this was a case of suicide or homicide though the balance of evidence would appear to indicate that the woman had met her death by suicidal hanging. I turn next to the question of the retraining evidence and to the learned Magistrate's appreciation of it in so far as the accused‑respondents are concerned. It is an accepted principle of law that a High Court with not normally interfere in revisional proceedings with, a finding of fact of a lower Court. Even if the lower Court had failed to appreciate the evidence properly this would normally be no ground for revision. It must be shown that there has been some substantial error either in 'law or that in the appreciation of evidence the lower Court had taken a completely perverse view before the revisional. powers of this Court are attracted. In this case before me the learned Magistrate has come to the final conclusion that this was a case of homicide though he contends that apart from vague suspicions there are no grounds for making assumption that the accused‑respondents were responsible for the crime. After perusal of the evidence on record I see no reason to take any other view than that taken by the learned Magistrate in regard to the evidence against the accused respondents. I would, however, go even further in regard to the cause of death as, for the reason I have stated above, it would appear to me that there is a considerable element of doubt regarding the cause of death. It cannot be said with any certainty that this was a case of homicide or suicide and to that extent only do I differ with the' views expressed by the learned Magistrate. In taking this view the case against the accused‑ respondents must be even weaker for if it were conclusively held that this case was a case of suicide the question of the guilt of the accused‑respondents would trot arise and they would automatically be exonerated from all blame concerning the death of the woman It follows therefore that I decline to accept the plea for setting aside the order of the Committal Magistrate and reject the revision petition. A.H. Petition rejected.