P L D 1963 W (PLP)

In this case appellants are Lahore‑Pattoki Bus Service Ltd., Lahore, and the respondents are M. A. Transport Co. Ltd., Lahore, and this purports to be "an appeal under section 64, of the Motor Vehicles. Act against the order of R. T. A., Lahore dated 9/10‑2‑62 and the subsequent order of the R. T. A. granting 2 temporary stage carriage permits in favour of respon dent No. 1 on Lahore‑Lyallpur via Kasur‑Chunian Pattoki‑Head Balloki route for three months 28 days".

2. The first question which was argued before me in this connection was of the competency of appeal. It was urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that no appeal is competent against the grant of a temporary permit. Reliance for this purpose was placed on the view as expressed by Member, Board of Revenue (Mr. A. T. Naqvi) who in the course of his judgment in P L D 1959 W P (Rev.) 162, inter alia, observed, "Although no appeal lies against the grant of temporary permits". It is true that occasionally conflicting views have been expressed on the competency of appeal against the grant of temporary permit, but the question has been gone into fully very recently by Member Board of Revenue, Mr. M. W. Abbasi, as per P L D 1961 W P (Rev.) 60 in the New Lyallpur Sammundri Transport Compact), Group B, Lyallpur v. Regional Transport Authority, Lahore and another. After a detailed examination of the law on this point, Mr. Abbasi has held "that an appeal can be filed against the grant of a temporary permit under clause (f) of section 64 provided its provisions are duly complied with". The reasons for this finding are contained in the judgment, and need not be repeated. I fully endorse this view, which seems to be the only fair interpretation of the law as it stands, and hold that there can be an appeal against the grant of a temporary permit under clause (f) of section 64‑ provided its provisions are duly complied with.

3. The question to be determined, therefore, is whether the provisions of clause (f) of section 64 have been duly complied with, in the present case, under this clause, an appeal can be filed by a person providing transport facilities, who having opposed the grant of permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof‑". This clause makes it clear that the cause for appeal will arise after a permit has been granted, and will be le competent only to the transporter who had opposed the grant. In the present case the appellants have not filed copies of any order making a grant of temporary permits in favour of the respondents. No doubt there is a general reference to these grants but it is vague and unaccompanied by a copy of any order sanctioning the grant. The appellants have attached a copy of the preamble to the proceedings dated 9/10‑2‑1962 of Regional Transport Authority, Lahore, wherein it was "decided that a bus company will be granted route permits automatically for the vehicles of 1961 or later models which have not been brought on the route so far. Temporary permits will be initially issued for such vehicles so as to make latest model vehicles available to the travelling public immediately". In the appeal memo also, the main emphasis is on the general decision of 9/10‑2‑1962, which is stated to be contrary to law etc., etc. The arguments in the appeal memo are general, and no attempt has been made to prove that an objection was taken to the grant of the temporary permits. The heading of the appeal also shows that it is basically an appeal against the general decision of R. T. A., dated 9/10‑2‑1962, and the reference to the grant of temporary permits is undated and incidental. The heading of the appeal reads as: "Appeal under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the order of the Regional Transport Authority, dated 9/10‑2‑1962 and subsequent order of the Regional Transport Authority granting two temporary permits to respondent No. 1 on Lahore Lyallpur via Kasur . . . . . for three months and 28 days."

4. It will be noted that the actual date of the temporary permit is not mentioned and the order of Regional Transport Authority, Lahore which is specified with full details on the subject‑matter of the appeal is the decision of 9/10‑2‑1962. Even in the arguments before me the main emphasis was on the decision of 9/10‑2‑1962. All that was stated about the question of opposition under section 64 (f) was that the entire decision of the Authority was objected to. This objection was obviously with regard to the general decision, and not about any specified grant.

5. In the case of temporary permits where some authorities have even held that no appeal is competent particular care has to be taken to ensure that the provisions of section 64(f) are duly complied with. The present appeal is based on the presumption that an appeal lies against the so‑called "order of the Regional Transport Authority, Lahore, dated 9/10‑2‑1962." This cannot be accepted, as what is stated to be an order is only a general decision with regard to the policy and procedure to be adopted in the future, and is not an order of the grant of a permit. No vehicle can lawfully start operating on the basis of the so‑called order, dated 9/10‑2‑1962, and at any rate, it does not constitute a grant of permit for the purpose of section 64 (f). Only a specific order granting a route permit will confer, in certain circumstances, a right of appeal. This is not the case with regard to the decision of 9/ 10‑2‑1962. No other appeal-able order is before this Court. No doubt there are vague references to grant of temporary permits, but copy of no order of grant has been filed (as was the position in above case before Mr. M. W. Abbasi), and it has not been estab lished that provisions of section 64(f) have been fulfiled.

6. Looking to the appeal as it is filed before me, I cannot but hold that it does not fulfil the provisions of subsection (f) or of any other provision of section 64, and is, therefore, not competent. The appeal is accordingly rejected, and the relevant stay order vacated. K. M. A. Appeal rejected.