P L D 1967 Lahore 528 (PLP)

The learned Rent Controller arrived tit the following findings‑ Issue No. I.‑That Feroze Din and Din Muhammad are liable to pay the rent at Rs. 8 p. m., Mirajdin at Rs. 20 p. m. and the remaining ten tenants including Faqir Muhammad are liable to pay at Rs. 10 p. m. Issue No. 2.‑The Notices served by the landlord are valid and fulfil all the requirements of law under section 30 (3‑1) of Act, XXVIII of 1958. Issue No. 3.‑All the Respondents are Defaulters. Issue No. 4.‑The Rent Controller has the jurisdiction to try the application. and as a result of these findings he directed all the twelve tenants to vacate the premises in dispute by 20‑1‑

63. Dissatisfied with this Order the tenants filed separate appeals in the Court of the Appellate Authority who dismissed all of them except that of Fateh Din which was accepted. Hence the present 10 second appeals, all of which shall be disposed of by this Judgment. The only point canvassed before me by learned Counsel appearing for the appellants is regarding the legality of the Notices served under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The house in dispute was admittedly transferred in the names of Fazal Din and Muhammad Hanif. The Notices were served by one Syed Muhammad Naqi Pleader. The opening paragraph of these notices, which are similar in all respects except the name of the tenant and amount of rent demanded, runs as follows‑ "Instructed by my clients Mr. Fazal Din, s/o H. Bhag Din, etc. residents of Saddar, Lahore I hereby serve you with the following notice :‑" The name of Muhammad Hanif, the co‑transferee, does not find any mention in the Notice. Probably the learned Counsel who served the Notice was under the impression that the abbreviation "etc." was a good enough substitute for that name. Section 30 (1) Proviso (b) runs as under‑ " (b) it shall not be lawful for the transferee to eject such persons from the house or shop for a period of six years and from the industrial concern, cinema house or printing press for a period of 3 years from the date of transfer, notice of which shall be given by the transferee to the tenant within one month of such transfer by registered post (acknowledgment due)." The law requires notice to be given by the `transferee' and section 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 lays down that‑ (2) words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa. It can therefore not be argued that if there are more than one transferee the notice can be given by one transferee alone simply because the word used in the Displaced Person (Compensation A crud Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 is in the singular. The importance of a notice under section 30 of the said Act engaged the attention of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 'E. A. Evans v. Muhammad Ashraf' (PLD1964S C536). The following observa tions made at pages 547 and 548 of the said report may be quoted with advantage-- "It would thus appear that this section by its own force created a statutory tenancy in favour of such persons who were in occupation of evacuee premises at the time of their transfer. This statutory tenancy was to be in addition to any other right which they may have in such premises but upon the same terms and conditions upon which they occupied the premises before their transfer. Proviso (b) to subsection (1) further fixes the date from which the statutory tenancy is to commence; namely, where a notice of the transfer has been served on the tenant by the transferee within one month of such transfer by registered post (acknowledgment due) then the tenancy commences from the date of the transfer but under subsection (2) where no such notice is served, then from the date of the receipt of the Notice by the tenant. The service of the notice, there fore, is not merely a formality for acquainting the tenant of the transfer of the premises nor merely a notice of attornment, but it is designed to fix the terminus a quo of the period of protection. It is difficult to accept upon the wording of this section that such a notice could even be implied notice or information received aliunde . . . . Every word in a statute has to be given a meaning and the only meaning that these words are capable of bearing is that express notice in writing must be given in the manner prescribed." The Notices in the present case admittedly do not mention the names of both the transferees and it has been left to the Respondents (tenants) to get this information 'aliunde'. In view of the observation of the Supreme Court quoted above such a notice cannot create the relationship of landlord and tenant between Muhammad Hanif and the respondents. Even the creation of such a relationship between Fazal Din and the respondents is doubtful because if the Notice was not in accordance with law so far as one transferee is concerned it may be slightly difficult to argue that the Notice can be split up into two so as to make it lawful in the case of one of the transferees and unlawful in the case of the other. Be that as it may, there is no dearth of authority that if a Notice of ejectment be a condition precedent for an action in Court the Notice must be on behalf of all the landlords and if it is only on behalf of some of them, it is no Notice in the eye of law. This appeal is, therefore accepted along with the other 9 Appeals, i.e., S. A. Os. Nos.383 of 1963 to 391 of 1963 both inclusive with costs throughout. K. M. A. Appeals accepted.