2025 PLP 1328 (CLC)

KHADIM HUSSAIN SOOMRO, J.

Through this writ petition, the petitioner seeks the following reliefs:- "It is therefore, respectively prayed that instant writ petition may kindly be accepted and impugned order dated 07.04.2023 may kindly be set aside and the CNIC of petitioner may graciously be unblocked in the interest of justice. Any other relief, which this Honourable court may deem fit, just and proper in the given circumstances of the case, may also be awarded."

2. After issuance of notice, Respondent No. 2 filed a concise statement. A perusal of the same reflects that the petitioner's CNIC has been blocked on the direction of the learned Executing Court in Execution Application titled "Sanila Hussain and others v. Muhammad Iqbal Hussain." Admittedly, the order of the Executing Court dated 01.06.2023, whereby the Court directed Respondent No. 2 to block the CNIC of the petitioner, has not been called in question before this Court. The petitioner instead of approaching the learned Trial Court has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court, being an extraordinary remedy, cannot be invoked as a panacea for all grievances, particularly where an equally efficacious, alternate, and adequate statutory remedy exists. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies operates as a jurisdictional bar, precluding litigant from resorting to constitutional remedies under Article 199 of the Constitution without first availing themselves of the statutory mechanisms expressly provided by law. The underlying rationale of this doctrine is to prevent litigants from circumventing established statutory. frameworks, thereby ensuring that the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court is not diluted into an ordinary appellate forum. This principle has been unequivocally affirmed by the Apex Court in Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others (2011 SCMR 1813), wherein it was held that the term 'adequate remedy' signifies a remedy that is not merely theoretical but is, in fact, efficacious, expeditious, convenient, and effectual in redressing the aggrieved party's grievance. Thus, the discretionary exercise of writ jurisdiction must remain an exception rather than the rule, reserved only for cases where no equally effective alternative exists.

3. Another aspect of the instant petition is that it was filed on 30.09.2024, wherein the petitioner has impugned the order dated 07.04.2023 and sought the unblocking of their CNIC after a lapse of one year and five month, regarding which the counsel has given no reasonable explanation. Hence, the laches also hits this petition. The concept of laches is distinct from that of ordinary litigation when it comes to court cases involving service matters. In the case of M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others 1994 SCMR 1024 the Apex Court of Pakistan has observed as under:- "

7. As regards laches, it is to be noticed that though the appellant had been diligently agitating in all the other forums, he invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction after about twelve years. In service matters the concept of laches is different from that of ordinary litigation. This difference has been fully brought out in the Chairman, District Screening Committee, Lahore and another v. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi (PLD 1976 SC 258) and S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and another (1978 SCMR 367)."

4. Similarly, if the constitutional petition remedy is not invoked within a reasonable timeframe, interfrence may be declined on the grounds of laches. It is inherent in the doctrine that procrastination undermines equity, a principle favouring vigilant and not indolent. Laches, in its elementary sense, signifies a failure to undertake actions that ought to have been performed within a reasonable temporal framework. The assessment of laches in a constitutional petition is invariably contingent upon the conduct exhibited by the individual seeking constitutional recourse, but in the instant case, the counsel for the petitioner could not justify the delay in filing the petitions. The reliance can be placed on case laws such as Umar Baz Khan v. Syed Jehanzeb and others (PLD 2013 SC 268), Farzand Raza Naqvi and others v. Muhammad Din through Legal Heirs and others (2004 SCMR 400), (2012 SCMR 280, State Bank of Pakistan v. Imtiaz Ali Khan and others 2012 PLC (C.S.) 218) and Asghar Khan and others v. Province of Sindh and others (2014 PLC (C.S.) 1292).

5. The concept of laches is not an abstract or technical rule. It applies when it would be unfair to grant a remedy because one party's actions could be seen as a waiver of that remedy or because one party's actions and indifference put the other party in an unreasonable position to assert that remedy later on. Two crucial factors in these cases are the duration of the delay and the nature of the acts done during that time, which can impact, both parties and create a balance of justice or injustice regarding the remedy. The reliance can be placed on Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Hurd ((1874) L.R. 5 PC 221), which was observed on pages 239 and 240: "The doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which fairly be regarded as equivalent to the waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he had, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, Two circumstances, always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course of the other, so far as relates to the remedy."

6. I am of the considered opinion, under the circumstances of the case that the petitioner has failed to establish grounds warranting indulgence of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution; resultantly, the present petition is dismissed. However the petitioner is at liberty to avail the appropriate remedy, before the learned Trial Court. UN/80/Isl Petition dismissed.