SCMR 2004

2004 PLP 1481 (SCMR)

WAPDA — Applicant Versus Messrs DADA BHOY CEMENT INDUSTRIES LTD. — Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
Supreme Court of Pakistan
Decided Date
Civil Miscellaneous Application No.811 of 2003 in Civil Appeal No. 1840 of 1998, decided on 21st May, 2004.
Honorable Judges
Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, C.J., Javed Iqbal and Abdul Hameed Dogar, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2004 PLP 1481 (SCMR)
Forum / Court Supreme Court of Pakistan
Bench Members Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, C.J., Javed Iqbal and Abdul Hameed Dogar, JJ
Parties WAPDA — Applicant Versus Messrs DADA BHOY CEMENT INDUSTRIES LTD. — Respondent
Primary Law (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980, (a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2004 PLP 1481 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980, (a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980 as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2004 PLP 1481 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, C.J., Javed Iqbal and Abdul Hameed Dogar, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2004 PLP 1481 (SCMR) (WAPDA — Applicant Versus Messrs DADA BHOY CEMENT INDUSTRIES LTD. — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

(b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980 (a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980

Representation

  • Muhammad Ali Sayyeed, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 21st May, 2004.
  • ----O. X, R.1 & O.XIX, R.6---Notice to Advocate-on-Record---Cause list is issued which is equivalent to proper notice to the Advocate-on Record and such is a well entrenched practice of the Supreme Court which is being followed for the last few decades.
  • Fazal Ghani Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant.
  • 2. Mr. Fazal Ghani Khan, learned ASC who appeared on behalf of the applicant mainly contended that no notice whatsoever was issued to the Advocate-on-Record and on this score alone, the appeal may be restored. We are not persuaded to agree with the prime contention of the learned counsel because usual cause list was issued which is equivalent A to proper notice to the Advocate-on-Record and this is a well entrenched practice of this Court which is being followed for the last few decades. It transpired from scrutiny of the official record that the proposed cause list bearing No.8 of 2001 dated 27-1-2001 was listed before Bench-III on 23-2-2001 at Serial No.3 (page 13 of the proposed cause list) which was repeated again in the final cause list bearing No.8 of 2001 dated 14-2-2001 on 23-2-2001 at serial No.2 (page 22 of the final cause list). The above mentioned record negates the version of learned ASC who appeared on behalf of the applicant. 'No serious effort whatsoever was made either by the Advocate-on-Record or WAPDA (applicant) to know the fate of the appeal which depicts a careless and indifferent approach and is regrettable. It was held by this Court while examining an identical proposition that `an argument was raised that after the reservation of the judgment the respondent and his Advocate-on-Record had no due notice of the date of announcement of judgment in terms of Order X, rule 1 of the Rules, 1980 in that no notice was personally served on him or his learned Advocate-on-Record. Suffice it to say office record unequivocally contradicts the belated plea. in that supplementary cause list issued by the office on 26-9-2002 for announcement of judgment on the next day was duly faxed to the Assistant Registrar, Branch Registry at Lahore and in the normal course of business the list was duly affixed on the notice board of the Court which is deemed to be sufficient notice to all concerned. There is no requirement of law that a party who has chosen not to prosecute the cause even after intimation of listing of the case and lapse of more than two weeks keeping away from the proceedings should necessarily be personally served with the notice of B announcement of the judgment. Notice to Advocate-on-Record in line with the provisions of Order XIX, rule 6 of the Rules would be sufficient compliance with the requirement of law. We are firmly of the view that notice to Advocate-on-Record through cause list was sufficient and adequate within the meaning of the rules, 1980. Having known the listing of the hearing of the appeal on 10-9-2002 it was incumbent and obligatory upon the respondents to enquire about the fate of the appeal and on coming to know that the judgment had been reserved to make an honest endeavour for re-hearing of the appeal on merits. We are not unmindful of the principle of law that a cause must be decided on merits otter affording an opportunity of hearing to all the parties but it is equally well recognized principle of law that the law and equity help those who are diligent and vigilant in the prosecution of their remedy rather than the indolent and careless litigants. Since the respondents manifestly demonstrated an attitude of complete indifference and inattention by their conduct, we are certainly of the view that no good ground has been made out for the exercise of discretion for enlargement of time. In any event no sufficient cause has been shown within the contemplation of the term for extension of time in the instant case. There B is another angle of the case namely the appeal in which leave to appeal was granted as far back as 10th July, 1996 and heard after the passage of more than seven years finally setting at rest the controversy between the parties. After all finality is attached to the judgments of the Courts in order to avoid a state of uncertainty and indecisiveness. Since the appeal was finally decided and rights of the parties determined on merits it would not be in the fitness of things to unsettle the settled law and encourage the hearing of cases after the lapse of period prescribed for setting the law into motion. Dur Muhammad v. Abdul Sattar PLD 2003 SC 828, the applicant got up from the deep slumber after 731 days to get the appeal restored but no lawful justification could be furnished for the inordinate delay. Mr. Muhammad Ali Sayeed, learned ASC who appeared on behalf of caveator has rightly contended that the application for restoration has been filed long after the expiry of limitation and is otherwise vitiated by unexplained laches and gross negligence.

Headnotes / Summary

O. X, R.1 & O.XIX, R.6

Notice to Advocate-on-Record

Cause list is issued which is equivalent to proper notice to the Advocate-on Record and such is a well entrenched practice of the Supreme Court which is being followed for the last few decades.

O. XV, R.5

Dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution

Application for restoration of appeal after lapse of 731 days and seeking condonation of delay

Validity

Application for restoration having been filed long after the expiry of limitation and being otherwise vitiated by unexplained laches and gross negligence, was dismissed

Principles. Dur Muhammad v. Abdul Sattar PLD 2003 SC 828 fol. Fazal Ghani Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant.

Judgment & Decree

JAVED IQBAL, J.

Leave to appeal was granted by this Court vide order, dated 12-11-1998 to consider as to whether the disputed amount would be appropriated on additional charge or only to the extent of mark-up. The said appeal was however, dismissed on 23-2-2001 for non-prosecution. After lapse of 731 days, an application for restoration of delay has been moved under Order XV, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules 1980.

2. Mr. Fazal Ghani Khan, learned ASC who appeared on behalf of the applicant mainly contended that no notice whatsoever was issued to the Advocate-on-Record and on this score alone, the appeal may be restored. We are not persuaded to agree with the prime contention of the learned counsel because usual cause list was issued which is equivalent A to proper notice to the Advocate-on-Record and this is a well entrenched practice of this Court which is being followed for the last few decades. It transpired from scrutiny of the official record that the proposed cause list bearing No.8 of 2001 dated 27-1-2001 was listed before Bench-III on 23-2-2001 at Serial No.3 (page 13 of the proposed cause list) which was repeated again in the final cause list bearing No.8 of 2001 dated 14-2-2001 on 23-2-2001 at serial No.2 (page 22 of the final cause list). The above mentioned record negates the version of learned ASC who appeared on behalf of the applicant. 'No serious effort whatsoever was made either by the Advocate-on-Record or WAPDA (applicant) to know the fate of the appeal which depicts a careless and indifferent approach and is regrettable. It was held by this Court while examining an identical proposition that `an argument was raised that after the reservation of the judgment the respondent and his Advocate-on-Record had no due notice of the date of announcement of judgment in terms of Order X, rule 1 of the Rules, 1980 in that no notice was personally served on him or his learned Advocate-on-Record. Suffice it to say office record unequivocally contradicts the belated plea. in that supplementary cause list issued by the office on 26-9-2002 for announcement of judgment on the next day was duly faxed to the Assistant Registrar, Branch Registry at Lahore and in the normal course of business the list was duly affixed on the notice board of the Court which is deemed to be sufficient notice to all concerned. There is no requirement of law that a party who has chosen not to prosecute the cause even after intimation of listing of the case and lapse of more than two weeks keeping away from the proceedings should necessarily be personally served with the notice of B announcement of the judgment. Notice to Advocate-on-Record in line with the provisions of Order XIX, rule 6 of the Rules would be sufficient compliance with the requirement of law. We are firmly of the view that notice to Advocate-on-Record through cause list was sufficient and adequate within the meaning of the rules, 1980. Having known the listing of the hearing of the appeal on 10-9-2002 it was incumbent and obligatory upon the respondents to enquire about the fate of the appeal and on coming to know that the judgment had been reserved to make an honest endeavour for re-hearing of the appeal on merits. We are not unmindful of the principle of law that a cause must be decided on merits otter affording an opportunity of hearing to all the parties but it is equally well recognized principle of law that the law and equity help those who are diligent and vigilant in the prosecution of their remedy rather than the indolent and careless litigants. Since the respondents manifestly demonstrated an attitude of complete indifference and inattention by their conduct, we are certainly of the view that no good ground has been made out for the exercise of discretion for enlargement of time. In any event no sufficient cause has been shown within the contemplation of the term for extension of time in the instant case. There B is another angle of the case namely the appeal in which leave to appeal was granted as far back as 10th July, 1996 and heard after the passage of more than seven years finally setting at rest the controversy between the parties. After all finality is attached to the judgments of the Courts in order to avoid a state of uncertainty and indecisiveness. Since the appeal was finally decided and rights of the parties determined on merits it would not be in the fitness of things to unsettle the settled law and encourage the hearing of cases after the lapse of period prescribed for setting the law into motion. Dur Muhammad v. Abdul Sattar PLD 2003 SC 828, the applicant got up from the deep slumber after 731 days to get the appeal restored but no lawful justification could be furnished for the inordinate delay. Mr. Muhammad Ali Sayeed, learned ASC who appeared on behalf of caveator has rightly contended that the application for restoration has been filed long after the expiry of limitation and is otherwise vitiated by unexplained laches and gross negligence.

3. In sequel to above mentioned discussion, the Civil Misc. Application bearing No.811 of 2003 being hopelessly barred by time is dismissed. A copy of this order be sent to the Chairman, WAPDA for appropriate disciplinary action against the delinquents responsible for not pursuing the appeal with vigour and vigilant as result whereof the applicant (WAPDA) would sustain a considerable financial loss, under intimation to the Registrar of this Court. M.B.A./W-5/S Application dismissed.