2002 PLP 82 (PLC)

(1) The judgment of Labour Appellate Tribunal has erred in taking notice on many irrelevant issues raised by the respondents No.2 in his affidavit‑in‑evidence and thereby tried to improve his case. (2) That the Labour Court was not justified by holding that respondent No.2 has been terminated due to his trade union activities and has ignored the factual position as such before termination of services of respondent, the respondent had resigned as officer‑bearer of the trade union (3) That the Labour Court erred in holding that the retrenchment could not only be effected in the cases of financial losses or decline, in the business of the company. According to learned counsel, the appellant company sustained a huge loss of Rs.12,332,

000. The appellant has not appointed any person in place of respondent No.2. It has been submitted that at no stage it was even alleged by respondent No.2 that the six contractor workers allegedly appointed by the appellant were hired to perform the nature of job which respondent No.2 was performing. (4) That the respondent No.2 neither in his petition nor in his affidavit‑in‑evidence has taken the ground that people junior to him in his category have been retained and his services have been terminated nor he has established the same. (5) That the respondent No.2 has not proved the mala fide on the part of appellant regarding retrenchment of the service of the respondent. " Also, that the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has referred the points for determination in the judgment, framed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, which were as follows:‑‑ (1) Whether the applicant's retrenchment by the respondent was justified as provided under the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 or otherwise? (ii) Whether the retrenchment of the applicant was legal or otherwise? (iii) Whether the applicant is entitled for the relief claimed for? Now, it may be seen that on point No. 1, in para. 8 of the judgment, the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has only reproduced discussion and reasoning of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, without offering his own reasons. On points Nos.2 and 3, in para.9 of the judgment, the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has only made observations regarding conclusion arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer, without himself going into the facts of the case and passing a reasoned judgment, as an appellate authority. Similarly, in para. No.1Q of the judgment, learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has made observations about the conclusion arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer, adding that the petitioners were not able to bring on record, the material that any financial crises had occurred, the production had experience decline, income had faced deficit or that the retrenchment of the respondent was bona fide for the sake of reorganization. The observations, which have been seriously challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In our view, the judgment of Labour Appellate Tribunal just agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer, without assigning any reason to his agreement or without making any comments on tire arguments put forth on behalf of the petitioners and noted in the impugned judgment, or without any reference to evidence on record or relevant law, is not a judgment in the eyes of law. It may be noted that under subsection (5) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, Labour Court can go into all facts of the case and pass such order, as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case. Labour Appellate Tribunal is an appellate authority, has the same powers. But such powers can be exercised only when there is an independent application of mind in the facts and circumstances of the case and law involved in the matter. Words 'just' and 'proper' as used in subsection (5) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, came up for consideration in the case of Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others (PLD 1987 SC 447), and following principles were laid down:‑‑ "... The words 'just' and 'proper' mean 'right or fair' and 'suitable' respectively. The word 'just' in subsection (5) of section 25‑A of the Ordinance has been used as an adjective to mean 'according to law' and the word 'proper' to mean 'accurate'. (See Legal Thesaurus, Regular Edition, by William C. Burton at pages 304 and 415). Therefore, the order to be 'just and proper' conveys the eminent sence of the order being in accordance with law and to be proper. It involves all processfull and procedural application of law and includes adequate application of substantive provisions thereof. Commonly stated it all take in matter of legality, propriety and correctness of the order. " It was further held that:‑‑ "It is not right to say that the Tribunal which is invested with the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, has the jurisdiction to decide it 'rightly or wrongly' because the condition of the grant of jurisdiction is that it should decide the matter in accordance with the law. When the Tribunal goes wrong in law, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it because the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide rightly but not the jurisdiction to decide wrongly. Accordingly, when the Tribunal makes an error of law in deciding the matter before it, it goes outside its jurisdiction and, therefore, a determination of the Tribunal which is shown to be erroneous on appoint of law can be quashed under the writ jurisdiction on the ground that it is in excess of its jurisdiction. " The judgment reported in 1982 SCMR 542, referred by Mr. K.N. Kohli is distinguishable, inasmuch as, in the reported case, it was held that the question whether in a particular case there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of rule 31 of Order 41, C.P.C. would depend on the nature of the judgment, which is under appeal. And, in the reported case, it was found that there has been a substantial compliance. Respectfully following the aforementioned principles of law, we are clearly of the view that the judgment impugned herein and passed by learned Chairman, Labour Appellate Tribunal, is not in accordance with law, and therefore, without lawful authority. Resultantly; petition is accept, the impugned judgment, dated 2nd May, 2001, is declared to have been passed outside its jurisdiction and, therefore, case is remanded to the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, for decision afresh, in accordance with law. H. B. T./113‑Q Petition accepted/Order accordingly.