1989 PLP 1582 (CLC)

Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others P L D 1983 SC 53 fol. Syed Waheed‑ur‑Rehman Gillani for Petitioner. Sh. Khalil‑ur‑Rehman for Respondent. Date of hearing: 14th February, 1989. Subject‑matter hereof happens to be a vacant plot abandoned by the non‑Muslim evacuees at the time of partition of the sub‑continent. This is a fact admitted between the parties that this plot is situated in between two erstwhile evacuee houses bearing Nos.2059‑A and 2061‑A situated in Mohallah Sathan, Inside Bhati Gate, Lahore which have been respectively transferred to the plaintiff‑petitioner and the defendant‑respondent and even the dispute with regard to the transfer of this plot stands finally determined in favour of the defendant.

2. The petitioner, claiming to be in possession of the plot in dispute, brought a suit for permanent injunction for the respondent being restrained from ejecting her without due course of law. Defendant contested the suit by denying the plaintiffs claim with regard to possession and, while reiterating that it stands transferred to her and she is exercising right over it as its exclusive owner, also raised a number of technical objections in opposition of her suit which was set down to be tried on just four issues relating respectively to the form, cause of action, non‑joinder of necessary parties and the plaintiffs entitlement to the decree prayed for. Upon appreciation of the evidence led by the parties, trial Court concluded that the plaintiff has not shown the nature of any act done by her in the plot as constituting her possession over it and, at any rate, she does not have any cause of action for the suit due to absence in her of any right to be in possession of the defendant's plot, for the protection whereof she is not eligible to be given the aid of a Court of equity lest a wrong gets perpetuated and even if she be admitted to be in wrongful possession of the plot, her act does not deserve to be stamped by the Court. In consequence, trial Court dismissed her suit by the judgment dated 1‑10‑1985. ,.

3. Plaintiff's appeal in the District Court also met the same fate at the hands of a learned Additional District Judge who affirmed the trial Court's view with regard to the availability of relief claimed by her and dismissed the appeal by his judgment dated 27‑5‑1986 into upholding the decree of the trial Court.

4. The plaintiff has now come up to this Court on revision. The fact of the title of the plot in suit finally vesting in the defendant‑respondent is not controverted and has rather been admitted all along. Hence, the two Courts below cannot be said to have regulated their discretionary jurisdictions, conferred by section 52 of the Specific Relief Act, in either an arbitrary or a fanciful manner to refuse to provide the desired relief because it is well‑settled that possession of vacant properties is in law presumed to follow the title and this presumption had not been dislodged to the satisfaction of either of the Courts below and hence their judgments and decrees do not become amenable to interference in, exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

5. Furthermore, the provisions of section 54 of the Specific Relief Act appear to be presenting a real difficulty in the plaintiff's maintaining the plea for grant of a decree of permanent injunction due to want of existence in her favour of some obligation to be under the threat of a breach and muchless may she claim any invasion or threat of invasion of some lawful right vesting in her either for the plot in dispute or for its enjoyment to be able to bring her case under any one of the five categories of cases listed therein. In the admitted state of the facts and the law applicable thereto, the petitioner cannot possibly bring her case within the narrow campus in contemplation of section 54 (ibid). Hence, the relief claimed in the suit is neither tenable in law nor does it really have to be claimed in a suit 1 because it goes without saying that everyone is expected to act only in accordance with the law. Suits to claim such decrees, though quite often brought, happen to really be a purposeless exercise involving sheer waste of time and money so that they deserve to be thrown out at the very preliminary stages on account of their futility.

6. The Two Courts below cannot be said to have anywise erred in the exercise of their discretionary jurisdictions to refuse relief to the plaintiff who has not been able to bring her case within the four corners of the rule of law laid down in Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others PLD 1983 SC 53 for becoming amenable to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction which, again, being discretionary is liable to be declined to be made available to her for the very same reasons which have prevailed below.

7. In result, this revision‑petition is dismissed. But still, keeping in view the fact that the parties are close neighbors, they are left to bear their own respective costs. AA./A‑635/L Revision dismissed.