P L D 1963 (W (PLP)

MANZUR QADIR, C. J.‑this is a Letters Patent Appeal against an order of a learned Single Judge in Chambers which was made on the 29th of November 1961.

2. In 1956 the Rehabilitation Commissioner came to the conclusion that in Chak No. 303/E.B., Tahsil Vehari, District Multan, a large number of sitting allottees had been deprived of their rights contrary to the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. After giving a general notice by a proclamation of his intention to set aside all the allotments in that Chak and after hearing such persons as appeared in response to the notice given through proclamation, the Rehabilitation Commissioner on the 3rd of November 1956 set aside all the allotments previously made in the aforesaid Chak and gave instructions as to how those allotments should be made afresh. Certain persons, who were adversely affected by this order, having failed to have it modified depart mentally, moved this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner. The writ petition was filed in April 1960, i.e., nearly four years after the order that was being challenged.

3. Meanwhile, on the 15th of November 1957, an order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner which, in substance, was almost identical with the order in question here, came up before a Division Bench of this Court in the case Abdul Ghafoor v. The Rehabilitation Commissioner (P L D 1958 Lah. 48): It was held in that case that a Rehabilitation Commissioner has no power to pass an omnibus order in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction and that before revisional jurisdiction could be exercised it was necessary to give individual notice to the party affected in each case, and that before passing orders it was necessary to give individual attention to the merits of each case. On the strength of this authority, a learned Judge in. Chambers accepted the writ petition in question and set aside the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner as illegal and incompetent. The order which was held to be invalid in the case reported in P L D 1958 Lah. 48 came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3/1 of 1959 which was decided on the 7th of June 1962. Their Lordships observed as follows:‑ "Rule 8 of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Rules, 1951, provides various modes of service of notices, summonses or orders under the Ordinance. One of the modes prescribed is by publication in a newspaper or proclamation by beat of drum or other customary method in the locality. Since a large number of persons was involved in the present case, the mode chosen for giving notice of an intention to revise all the allotments, by means of beat of drum in the village, could not be described as inappropriate. The proceedings would have become un‑necessarily prolonged if individual notices had to be served on all the residents of the Chak, who might be affected. Speedy settlement of the question was obviously called for and in the circumstances we do not think that any fault could be found with the mode of publication of the notice adopted, specially when it is remembered that the ground of the proposed revision was common to them all. It must, therefore, be held as a consequence that the relevant persons of this Chak had due notice of the intended revision and were given opportunity to represent their case to the Rehabilitation Commissioner, if they so desired. Apparently as the pleading showed, the contesting respondents had put in appearance before the Rehabilitation Commissioner. Their only grievance seems to be that individual attention was not paid to their cases and they were not asked separately to state their objection. The learned Rehabilitation Commissioner has, however, pointed out in the course of his order that the objection was common to all these persons. With respect, it seems to us that the High Court omitted to make allowance for this most important circumstance. Reference to the respondent's record individually would have obviously afforded no assistance in resolving the difficulty that had been created by ignoring some of the temporary allottees of the Chak and giving allotments to non‑allottees, to the prejudice of the former category of persons. ~ The sitting allottees had to receive preference over non‑allottees under the Rehabilitation Scheme. Indeed a consideration of each individual record would have revealed nothing, as on the face of it, it could not be said that the allotment taken in isolation was bad. It could only become objectionable when considered in the general context of all the claimants in calling upon the persons concerned collectively, to state whether any one of them had any specific objection to make, before the general revision was ordered. The fact that irregularities of the kind mentioned by the Rehabilitation Commissioner had been committed while making allotments in this Chak by the subordinate Rehabili tation authorities, was not controverted before him. We consider that the requirements of subsection (4) of section 11 were satisfied in the circumstances of this case, as it could not be said that no opportunity of being heard was granted to the persons likely to be affected by the proposed revision. The order passed, is seen to fall within the ambit of the power conferred on the Rehabilitation Commissioner by subsection (4) of section 11 of the Ordinance. * * * * * * We are, therefore, disposed to hold that the learned Judges were in error in deciding against the validity of the general order of revision merely on the ground that it was an omnibus order, passed without granting individual hearing or consideration of the record of each individual case."

4. The very basis on which the writ petition was accepted having now disappeared, the learned counsel for the respondents tried to argue that this writ petition could nevertheless be sustained on other grounds. We allowed him to present his case as if he were seeking an admission of his writ petition in the first instance. In that view of the matter, the first question to be determined is whether a writ petition brought four years after the impugned order, should be entertained in spite of the obvious laches. The learned counsel contends that his clients remained ignorant of the order. That, however, is neither borne out by the record which shows that they have been making departmental attempts to have it set aside, nor by the probabilities of the case. The other point of the learned counsel relating to the validity of the order are all covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court with reference to an order that was made almost in identical terms and almost in identical circumstances.

5. We accept this appeal and set aside the order of the learned Judge in Chambers dated the 29th of November 1961. The effect of this decision will, therefore, be that the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner which was set aside by the order of the learned Judge in Chambers will be restored and will take effect as if it had never been set aside.

6. In all the circumstances of this case, we would prefer not to make any order as to costs. A. H. Appeal accepted.