P L D 1969 Lahore 12 (PLP)

4. It is admitted that the property in dispute, which is a plot of land, is a part of a bigger plot measuring eleven Marlas and seventy‑five feet, and the present appellant is in occupation of three‑fourths of it, on a part of which is. situated a Chhappar for tethering cattle while on the remaining he is running a fuel‑wood business. There is, therefore, no controversy about the fact that the property in dispute is being. utilised for carrying on business.

5. Section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, defines "shop" as‑ "'shop' means evacuee business premises of any value in an urban area or of the value of ten thousand rupees or more in a rural area together with godowns or store‑houses, if any, attached or appurtenant to such premises, but does not include any budding situated within the premises of an Industrial concern, or a building or premises declared to be a Big Mansion or hotel or such class of business pre mises in a rural area as may be declared by the Central Government, by notification in the official Gazette not to be shops within the meaning of this clause: Provided that where any building or premises not so declared consist of more than one business unit, and such units are in the possession of several persons, then unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise, the whole of such building or premises shall be deemed to be a shop: Provided further that where any such building or premises, consists, of both Residential and business units, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, may order that the whole of such building or premises, or such part or parts thereof as may be specified to the order shall be deemed to be a shop or a house." It is significant that the property, which can constitute a shop under that section, has been divided into two clauses,. i.e. (i) building, or (ii) premises. In the beginning of the section the expression used in "evacuee business premises" while later on, reference has been made to "building or premises". It, therefore, requires no argument to hold that the word "premises" has been used by the Legislature as a word of wider import than a building but capable of being used for expressing the idea of building, also. This use of the word "premises" is not open to any objection either.

6. The word "premises" has been defined in the Wharton's Law Lexicon, Fourteenth Edition, page 791, as "it is, however, often used as meaning land or houses".

7. This expression also fell for interpretation in Dee D. Benjamin Hemming v. Thomas Willetts ((1849) 7 C B 709), reported in 137 H. R. C. P., page 280, and at page 283 Wilde, C. J., observed that .‑ "The word `premises' is commonly used as comprising land and houses and other matter. Either `tenements' or 'premises' would be sufficient to include the land." In still another case Metropolitan Water Board v. Paine ((1907) 1 K B 285) Ridley, J. found that the word 'premises' in the popular sense may 'include the word land as is stated in the dictionaries'. In still another case, and, of course, much nearer in point of time, i.e., Gardiner v. Sevenoaks Rural District Council ((1950) 2 All E R 84) Goddard, C. J., observed at page 85 of the report :‑ "'premises' is, no doubt, a word which is capable of many meanings. How it originally became applied to property is, I think,, generally known. It was from the habit of conveyances when they were drawing deeds of conveyance referring to property and speaking of 'parcels.' They set out the parcels in the early part of the deed, and later they would refer to 'the said premises', meaning strictly that which had gone before, and gradually by common acceptance 'premises' became applied, as it generally is now, to houses, land, shops, or whatever it may be, so that the word has come to mean generally real property of one sort or another."

8. Similarly, Jarman in his Treatise on Mills, seventh Edition (1930) Volume II, observes at page 1257 :‑ "But the word is constantly used, not only in popular language but also in modern Acts of Parliament without reference to what is before mentioned, in the general sense of houses, land and the like . . . . ." It is, therefore, not necessary to stretch etymoligy or imagination for the purpose of holding that the expression "premises" also connotes land and would, therefore, cover and open plot, unless the statute, in which it is being used treats it as word of art and it goes without saying that in such a case the interpretation clause of such statute will a state the meaning with which it is to be clothed in that Statute. The word "premises" does not find any mention in section 2, which is the interpretation section of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. It is therefore, proper that it should be given the meaning which it hag in common acceptation.

9. If there be any need of authority for this proposition .it is not far to find, for Craies in Sixth Edition of his Book, Statute Law, quoted at page 162 the following observation from Attorney‑General v. Winstantley ((1831) 2 B & Cl. 302) :‑ "the words of an Act of Parliament which are not applied to any particular science or art' are to be construed `as they are understood in common language'."

10. It follows, therefore, that a property other than a building, which is otherwise covered by the definition quoted above, would not be excluded from the definition of a shop for the purposes of section 30, simply because it is not a building.

11. The property in dispute is partly an open plot and partly built up in so far as it has a chhappar, allegedly constructed by the appellant, upon it. It would, therefore, be covered by the word "premises" and fall within the four corners of the scope of section 30 of the Act.

12. As far the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, goes, suffice it to say, that "rented land" is specifically mentioned in it and, therefore, there is no difficulty in applying this Ordinance to cases concerning ejectment from open land as such.

13. My conclusions, therefore, are :‑ (a) the word "premises", unless used as a term of art in a Statute, is to be understood as including land whether as a part of a building or independently of it ; (b) that this word has not been used as a term of art in section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 ; and therefore, (c) evacuee land, which is being utilised as business pre mises and has been acquired under section 3 of the Act, is covered by the definition "shop" for the purposes of section 30 of the said Act.

14. This appeal is dismissed and the appellant is directed to put the respondent is possession of the property in dispute forthwith. The appellant shall bear the costs throughout. A. E. Appeal dismissed.