1980 PLP 1059 (CLC)

3. Earlier, on 19th March 1978, when the case came up for hearing before the learned trial Court, it transpired that the respondents had failed to deposit the amount in question. The Court, therefore, rejected the plaint under section 22 (4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act.

4. The respondents challenged this order through an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge who rejected the revision on 18th October 1978, for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, on the same date, accepted the appeal. He held that the respondents did not act wilfully or mala ode in not complying with the trial Court's order dated 7th February 1978, and allowed them to deposit the one-fifth of the pre emption money by 10th November 1978. This order has been called in question through this appeal.

5. The only argument advanced by the appellants' learned counsel was that the value of the subject-matter of the suit being 1,40,000, the appeal before the learned Additional District Judge was not competent. He referred to section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 and the amendment made therein by Section 2 of the Punjab Civil Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1978, whereby if the value of the original suit, in which the decree or order is made, exceeds Rs. 50,000, the appeal lies to the High Court. He further placed reliance on 2 (h) of the Ordinance, which reads as under-:- 'Value' used with reference to a suit means the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit." His argument was that the word `value' used in section 18 of the Ordinance, would carry the same meaning as given thereto in the definition clause and that therefore, the forum of appeal was to be determined on the basis of the value of the subject-matter of the suit. He sought support for his these submissions, from some of the observa tions made in Muhammad Siddiq v. Haji Ahmad & co. (P L D 1967 Kar. 468),

6. Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act, governs the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and is reproduced below :

"

3. Power for Provincial Government to make rules determining value of land for jurisdictional purposes.

(I) The Provincial Government may make rules for determining the value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in the suits mentioned in the Court Fees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs (v) and (vi), and paragraph (x), clause (d). (2) The rules may determine the value of any class of land, or any interest in land, in the whole or any part of a local area and may prescribe different values for different places within the same local area." The rules framed by the Provincial Government under section 3 were published under the Punjab Government Notification No. 255, dated 4th March, 1889 and are to be found in Chapter 3-D of Vol. I of the High Courts Rules and Orders. According to these Rules when the land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate and the annual revenue payable to the Government, on land is permanently assessed, the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction is to be fixed at sixty times of the assessed revenue. In case the revenue is not permanently settled, it is to be fixed at 30 times of the assessed revenue. From the perusal of the copy of the Register Haqdaran for the year 1973-74 placed on the trial Courts' file I find that the entire land is assessed to land revenue and the assessment appears to be permanent in character. On the argument advanced by the appellants' learned counsel whether the land is assessed to land revenue permanently or not, is not of much significance. What is significant is that land revenue is payable on the land under these rule `t as long as the land is assessed to land revenue, the market value cannot be the jurisdictional value. The line of reasoning adopted by the learned counsel was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Mumtaz Begum v. Zulfiqar All (P L D 1960 Lah. 1088) and on the facts of that case, on interpretation of the relevant provisions of law, including sections 3 (4) and 39 of the Punjab Courts Act, which are analogous to section 2 (h) and 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, it was maintained that the jurisdictional value, in a pre-emption suit, in accordance with the rules framed under section 3 of the Suit Valuation Act should be 30 times the land revenue. A reference to page 1098 of this report will provide that :- "We will accordingly hold that in suits for pre-emption the jurisdictional value of the appeal remains as determined under the Suits Valuation Act and the rules framed there under notwithstanding the amount on the payment of which the decree for pre-emption had been passed being far in excess of the pecuniary jurisdiction as so determined."

7. The view taken in Mumtaz Begum's case was followed by another Division Bench in Muqarrab Khan v. Muhammad Anwar Khan (P L D 1964 Pesh_ 229) and it was held : "That in determining the forum of appeals in land suits or interest in the land for the purposes of section 18 of the Ordinance the determining factor would be the value of original suit determined under rules framed under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act for the purposes of jurisdiction, and not the market value of the subject-matter of the suit."

8. The precise point raised in this appeal was also considered in Sadar Din V. Elahi Bakhsh (1) and it was laid down that:- The forum of the appeal is determined under section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 and it does not lay anywhere that the forum of appeal is to be determined on the basis of the sale price or the market value of the land in dispute but only says that it is to be determined on the basis of the value of the suit. The value of the suit in such a case being the one which is notionally fixed the same determined the forum. I have examined the ruling cited by the appellants learned counsel. It has no applicability to this case.

9. It is not the appellant case that even In according with the rules the valuation would be more than Rs 50,

000. The appeal before the learned Additional District Judge was thus competent. This appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. M.Y.M. Appeal dismissed.