1985 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

MUHAMMAD IRSHAD KHAN (MEMBER).‑By way of the present, appeal the appellant seeks to challenge the order of his removal from service as a L.D.C./Meter Reader passed under section 17 (1‑A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958.

2. A preliminary objection about the competence and maintainability of the appeal was raised on behalf of the respondent‑Authority by contending that an order passed under section 17 (1‑A) of the WAPDA. Act is not appealable before this Tribunal. We have considered similar objection earlier in a number of cases and held that this Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear appeal against an order passed under section 17 (1‑A) of the WAPDA Act. For the reasons given in those cases the preliminary objection raised in this case is repelled.

3. In the written statement it was averred though not pressed at the bar that the appeal is time‑barred. We have, however, noticed that the impugned order, dated 12th January, 1983 was communicated to the appellant on 21st January, 1983 and he filed the present appeal on 20th February, 1983 which thus is found to be in time. This preliminary objec tion of the respondent is also overruled.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant first contended that in passing the removal order the respondent had ignored its own instructions circulated vide memo. dated 1st November, 1975 and 17th April, 1982 whereby a policy decision has been taken that action under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act shall be taken only against dishonest, corrupt and highly inefficient officials, while the impugned order was passed on the allegation levelled by the Chairman, Area Electricity Board, WAPDA, that the appellant adopted deceitful means for obtaining employment in WAPDA. It was urged that the allegation even if correct, could not be made a base for passing an order under section 17 (1‑A) of the WAPDA Act. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the policy decision contained in the said circular does not have the force of a statute and as such has no binding effect. We are of the view that the said policy decision may or may not have the force of a statute, departure therefrom would clearly indicate arbitrariness and the orders passed in such an arbitrary manner are unapprovable. After all a public authority cannot be permitted to depart from the principle which it has laid down for itself.

5. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the allegation of adopting deceitful means for obtaining employment in WAPDA was false and baseless. The respondent‑Authority was not able to show us anything in support of the allegation except that it was stated at the time of obtaining employment in WAPDA the appellant claimed to be a permanent resident of Lahore while, in fact, he was a permanent resident of some other place. There was no material at all to establish that the appellant was not a resident of Lahore. Assuming, however that he was a permanent resident of a place other than Lahore even then he was not, in any way, disqualified for appointment in WAPDA. There was, there fore, no reason for the appellant to show incorrect place of his permanent residence. The allegation is thus found unfounded and, in any case, does not constitute a deceitful mean for obtaining employment in WAPDA. It was further noticed by us that the recommendation of the Chairman Area Electricity Board, WAPDA, for removal from service of the appellant on the basis of the said allegation was approved without any proper application of mind. Indeed, there was no material whatsoever before the respondent‑ Authority to warrant the extreme action of removal from service. We have, therefore, no option but to hold that the impugned order being based on no material and having been passed in an arbitrary manner is unsustainable.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant has further assailed the impugned order on the ground that the order was not passed by the authority competent in law to pass it, and, in any case, the said order has been passed against the mandatory provisions of the Pakistan Essential Service (Maintenance) Act, 1952, which stood extended to the employment of the appellant and has an over‑riding effect notwithstanding any other inconsistent provisions contained in any other law including the WAPDA Act, therefore, the impugned order is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Since, however, the reasons already given above by us, are sufficient to strike down the impugned order, we do not consider it necessary to go into these questions and would reserve our opinion thereon for an appropriate occasion.

7. In the result the appeal is accepted, the impugned order is set aside and it is directed that the appellant shall be reinstated into service with effect from the date he was removed from service. There shall be no order as to costs. A. E. Appeal accepted.