P L D 1952 Baluchistan 52 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD ASLAM, J C.‑This is an appeal by one Muhammad Hassan, a convict in Quetta Jail, from the judg ment of the Sessions Judge in Baluchistan, dated 27th February 1952, whereby the appellant was convicted of an offence under section 467, Pakistan P. C., and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The facts of this case are set out in, sufficient detail in the judgment of the learned Sessions judge' and I shall refer only to such sailent facts as are necessary for the consideration of this appeal. The convict‑appellant was employed in the Grindlays' Bank, Quetta, as a Ledger Clerk in 1949. One Mr. Masood Ahmad Rashid Ahmad, a Cadet in the Pre‑Cadet Training School, Quetta, who later left Quetta to join Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul, on completion of his course here, had an account in Grindlays' Bank, Quetta. The appellant, in August and September, 1949, is alleged to have stolen a number of blank cheques from the table of the Despatch Clerk of the said‑Bank. The name of this Clerk is also Masood Ahmad. The accused is said to have cashed these cheques after forging Mr. Masood Ahmad Rashid Ahmad's signature thereon. The alleged forgery was discovered on 17th September, 1949. When the Manager of the Bank was informed of it and he reported the matter to the Police for investigation. The evidence led by the prosecution deals with :‑ (a) the procuring and presentation of cheque No. XLOO1207 (Ex. P/P) and the recovery of the money from the Grindlay's Bank on the basis of that cheque ; (b) extra judicial confession by the convict‑appellant before the Bank Manager, Mr. Smith, and also before P. W. 4 Mr. Masood Ahmad, the Despatch Clerk, and P. W. 5 Mr. Karamatullah Khan, Accountant, of the same Bank ; (c) recovery of a receipt (Es. P/B) before witnesses for Rs. 300 deposited by the appellant in the account of Mr. Masood Ahmad Rashid Ahmad immediately after the incident ; and also production of a sum of Rs. 200 by him before the Police when they arrived and took the investi gation in hand the same date; and (d) testimony of the hand‑writing expert who identified the appellant's signature on the cheque in question. I propose to deal with these points seriatum in order to facilitate discussion of evidence and its appreciation. P. W. 4 Masood Ahmad worked as Despatch Clerk and kept in his custody a spare cheque book known as Office Cheque Book. This particular cheque book was used to issue emergency cheques to the clients of the Bank who forgot to bring their own cheque books to the Bank when they came to draw money. A register was maintained in which these persons signed for the cheques they got from the witness. The latter stated that on 17th September, 1949 when he came to office at about 10 a.m. he saw the appellant standing near his table. On checking the office cheque book he found that cheque No. XLOO1207 had been taken out of the said book by the accused (appellant) and he had signed for it in the register. Suspecting foul play, the witness informed the Cashier, Mr. G. E. Balsara, and asked 'him to let him know when this particular cheque, i.e. No. XLOO1207, was presented before him for encashment. The cashier received this cheque at about 12 midday and informed the witness. The latter asked the cashier to make the payment (Rs. 500). Soon after that the accused left the Bank for his lunch and when he returned the witness asked him as to why he had obtained that cheque and received payment on it. The accused replied that Masood Ahmad Rashid Ahmad was his friend and was staying with him and that the latter had given that cheque under his signature to the accused for drawing money from the Bank after the accused had paid him Rs.

500. The witness got suspicious and reported the matter to the Bank Manager, Mr. Smith. P. W. 5 Mr, Karamatullah Khan, who was Accountant in this Bank at that time, stated that after the discovery of the alleged forgery when he inquired from the appellant as to what the matter was he said that he had authority from Mr. Masood Ahmad Rashid Ahmad to draw money on his behalf. He admitted that he had obtained a blank cheque from the office. After half an hour or so the Police arrived and the accused deposited Rs. 300 in the account of Mr. Masood Ahmad Rashid Ahmad and also produced a sum of Rs. 200 before the Police, which represented balance of Rs. 500 drawn by him on the cheque in question. Mr. Smith, Manager of the Grindlays' Bank stated that the accused came into his office and admitted that he had forged the cheque in question. He promised to pay back the amount and begged for pardon. The appellant denied before the Sessions judge that he had deposited Rs. 300 into the account of Mr. Masood Ahmad Rashid Ahmad or had produced Rs. 200 before the Police, to make up the sum of Rs. 500 drawn by him on the cheque in question. There is ample evidence on record to prove this fact and, besides, the receipt Ex. P/B obtained by the accused bears an indubitable testimony to the fact that he credited a sum of Rs. 300 into Mr. Masood Ahmad Rashid Ahmad's account on arrival of the Police. Mr. Cyril G. Bhan, Hand‑writing Expert, and Examiner of questioned Documents, Lahore, who examined Cheque No. XL001207 and compared the accused's handwriting has expressed the opinion that the writing and signature on the cheque have been forged by the appellant. The learned counsel, for the appellant maintains that no conviction can be based on the testimony of a handwriting expert. He has referred rye to the discussion of this point appearing in the judgment of my learned predecessor in Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 1951 and also to the commentary under section 45 of Munir's Law of Evidence. I full agree with my learned predecessor's observations that it is very dangerous to convict a person on the sole testimony of an handwriting expert. I also agree with the views contained in the commen tary under section 45 of the Evidence Act referred to by the learned counsel that the expert testimony, especially the opinion of handwriting experts, must always be received with great caution and it is highly unsafe to rely on expert evidence when facts lead to a contrary conclusion. I must say here that the conviction of the appellant in this case is not based sole on the expert testimony alone, as the learned counsel has attempted to make out. There is a great deal of corroborative evidence as well as a very high degree of circumstantial evidence to support the expert testimony. I have carefully considered the grounds set forth in the Memo. of Appeal and have also heard the appellant's counsel at great length. The learned counsel has failed to satisfy me as to why the overwhelming evidence of so many witnesses examined by the prosecution, most of whom are responsible officers of Grindlay's Bank and against whom no allegation, of previous grudge or enmity has been made or proved, should not be given its due weight. It is clear that these witnesses were directly concerned with the transaction forming the subject‑matter of the charge against the appellant and they dealt with it in the course of their official duty. There is a suggestion in paragraph 4 of the Memo. of Appeal as to how the Cashier made payment to the appellant when the latter did not hold a 'token'. The suggestion, though very ingenious, has obviously not much force in it when is had to the fact that the appellant was himself a responsible official of the same Bank and was known to the staff who received cheques and made payments thereon. A departure from the normal practice of producing a `token' was not therefore beyond bounds of possibility. The counsel for the appellant has also argued that there was no direct evidence of the alleged forgery. I must dismiss this argument with the words that in the nature of the case it is most unlikely that any direct evidence would be forthcoming to show that a certain person or persons had actually seen the forgery being committed: There is however ample testimony of a number of disinterested witnesses and also a great deal of circumstantial evidence available substantiating the charge against the appellant in an unquestionable manner. In my opinion there can be no combination and no conspiracy in the chain of circumstances obtaining in this case. After giving the matter my careful consideration, I have no hesitation in saying that all the elements of an offence under section 467, Pakistan P. C. have been established against the convict‑appellant beyond any doubt and that he has been rightly convicted of that offence by the learned Sessions Judge. As regards the sentence, I find that the learned Sessions Judge has already dealt with the appellant very leniently. In view of the seriousness of the offence, the punishment awarded can by means be regarded as excessive. " Accordingly I uphold the conviction and sentence and reject this appeal. A. H.