1984 PLP 417 (CLC)

(a) Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 [M. L. R. 115]‑ ‑‑ Para 25‑Provision of para. 25‑‑Not mandatory. (b) Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 [M. L. R. 115]‑ ‑‑ Para. 25‑Regulation‑Interpretation‑Duty of Court to ascertain real intention of Legislature‑Scheme, purpose of enact ment and language used much relevant‑Regulation enacted for protection and benefit of tenants.‑‑[Interpretation of statutes]. (c) Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 [M. L. R. 115]‑ ‑‑ Para. 25‑Words "shall not be ejected" in para. 25 Significant‑Meaning thereby that Court must not eject tenant unless grounds contemplated by para. 25 established‑Collector holding tenants defaulter in payment of rent‑Not obliged to eject such tenant‑Collector can still take into consideration facts and circumstances of case. (d) Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 [M. L. R. 115]‑ ‑‑ Para. 25‑Provisional Constitution Order (1 of 1981), Art. 9 Default in payment of rent‑Ejectment of tenant not mandatory Collector/A. C., held, has jurisdiction to eject or refuse to eject tenant‑Collector/A. C. applying mind to facts of case and giving reasons while refusing to eject tenants‑Order of refusal, held further, cannot be said to have been passed without lawful authority. ORDER This is a petition under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, whereby, Allah Ditta petitioner wants this Court to declare order, dated 3rd June, 1982 of A. C./Collector, Kabirwala to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

2. The facts leading upto this petition in brief are that respondents Nos. 2 to 10 are tenants of Allah Ditta petitioner who filed suit for their ejectment before the Assistant Collector on the grounds that the respon dents/defendants were defaulter in payment of rent for crops of 1979 and Rabi 1980, that they had rendered the land unfit for cultivation,. that they had sold the irrigation water, and that they had not cultivated the land. in accordance with the customary manner of cultivation in the locality. The suit was contested and evidence was recorded by Assistant Collector. Since he could not dispose of the suit within 60 days the same was transferred to A. C./Collector, respondent No.

1. As for grounds other than the default in payment of rent the respondent No. 1 found that the petitioners could not produce any convincing evidence. As‑ for default in payment of rent he found that since the petitioner has obtained the decree for payment of rent pertaining to year 1979 and had not obtained the decree of rent pertaining to the period after the year 1979, therefore, the respondents could not be ejected on the grounds of default. The learned counsel submits that the decrees Exh. P‑I and Exh. P‑2 for the payment of rent passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents Nos. 1 to 10 conclusively prove that the respondents were defaulters and that the impugned order which has been passed in violation of the mandatory provision of para. No. 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 is without lawful authority.

3. After hearing the learned counsel and going through the material available before me, i am not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the reasons that to my mind, the provisions of para. No. 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 do not appear to be mandatory. For the proper interpretation of the relevant law, it would be convenient to, reproduce the same here :‑ 25. "Rights o f tenants.‑(I) A tenant shall not be ejected from his tenancy unless it is established in a revenue Court that he has :‑ (a) failed to pay the rent in accordance with the terms of his tenancy; or (b) used the land comprised in the tenancy in a manner which renders it unfit for the purposes for which he held it ; or (c) failed to cultivate or arrange for the cultivation of the land com prised in the tenancy in accordance with the terms thereof, or if there are no express terms in this behalf, in accordance with the customary manner of cultivation in the locality." When a statue is passed for the purpose of something to be done, it may be either a mandatory enactment or a directory one. There is no general rule as to when an enactment is to be considered mandatory and when merely directory, it would, therefore, be the duty of the Court to ascertain the real intention of the Legislature and for that the scheme, the purpose of the enactment and the language used therein may be very much relevant. The Regulation 115 when examined as a whole ears to have been enacted for t e protection and benefit of the tenants. It is significant to note that in para. No. 25 instead of "shall be ejected", the words "shall not be ejected" have been used. The words "shall not" in para, No. 25 in context only means that the Court must riot eject the tenant .unless the grounds contemplated by this para. are established. The omission of the words shall be ejected" is not without significance. If the idea C behind para. was to make ejectment obligatory or mandatory, the same could have teen more conveniently achieved by using the words "shall be ejected" and by omitting the words "shall not" in that para. For these reasons, I am convinced that in the event, the Collector holds the tenants as defaulter in payment of rent, it does not become obligatory on him to eject the tenants. He can still take into consideration the facts and the circumstances of the case. In the case in hand, the respondent No. 1 has given reasons for not ejecting the tenants.

4. Even otherwise, I find that no appeal or revision has been filed against the impugned order. Under the relevant rules, the remedy of appeal and revision has been provided against the orders passed' in para. No. 25 of‑ Martial Law Regulation

115. Furthermore, the respondent No. 1 had the jurisdiction to eject or refuge to eject the respondents Nos. 2 to

10. The respondent No. 1 ha: applied his mind to the facts. of the case and has given reasons in support of his order and as such, it cannot be said that the impugned order was passed without lawful authority.

5. For what has been stated above, there being no merit in this writ petition the same is dismissed in limine. M. Y. H. Petition dismissed.