1984 PLP 899 (PLC(CS))

Iftikhar Ahmad for Respondent No.

2. Date of hearing : 5th July, 1983. 'This revision is directed against the decision, dated 6th April, 1982 of a report made under section 46-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 by the Deputy Director, Labour Welfare (Conciliation). An incident took place on 15th February, 1981 in respondent No. 1's factory, Gulberg, Lahore, resulting in injuries sustained by certain members of the petitioner union and the rival union, total destruction of three cars of respondent No. 1 and damages to the premises of the factory. The factory was closed down on the said day and on the following day i. e. 16th February, 1981 application under Standing Order I 1-A of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 was lodged to the Labour Court for permission to close down the factory. The request made in the report under section 46-A was to declare the closing of the factory as illegal lock-out. The learned lower Court has dismissed the report.

2. Admittedly, at the time the incident took place, an industrial dispute was pending in the Labour Court but according to the material, the incident and closure was not on account of or in relation to the said dispute. There are two unions and the petitioner is the C. B. A. The non-C. B. A. is not a party to the report made under section 46-A. The cause of the incident is a rift between the two unions. A day earlier on 14th February, 1981 an incident took place in which one Abdul Rashid belonging to the non-C. B. A. group was beaten and a case was got registered with the police afterwards Rashid, Babar Humayun, Bashir Ayub and Sabir of the C. B. A. In retaliation to the said incident a scuffle took place on 15th February, 1981 between the two unions, which resulted in the closure of the factory by respondent-No.

1. In F. I. R. Exh. R. W.-4/1 registered in respect of the incident of 15th February, 1981 the C. B. A. people have been shown to be responsible but without prejudice to the decision of the said case this appears to be incorrect. Since a day earlier (14th February, 1981) Abdur Rashid belonging to the anti-C. B. A. group was attacked. The non-C. B. A. and not the C. B. A. had motive to take revenge. Since the management favours the non C. B. A. group, so in the F. I. R. (Exb. R. W.-4/1) a twist appears to have been given to the story stating that the members of the C. B. A. attacked the persons belonging to the non-C. B. A. group. The persons attacked are named in the F. I. R. The fact that the management favours the non-C. B. A. union is admitted by the witness of respondent No.

1. He is Muhammad Aslam R. W.

3. What he actually said is "the rival union was liked by the management". It is thus clear that respondent No. I was not neutral. This was not because of respondent No.

1. Where. law has introduced unionism, the management should not grudge it. This is true that demands both reasonable and unreasonable are raised by the unions but the management should remain above board. The demands which can be accepted may be accepted by the management and the ones that are not considered reasonable may be rejected, leaving the Court to give decision if the dispute is brought to it. If the management starts favouring one union and dislikes the other on account of their union activities, it causes a great rift between the unions and the damaging results have to be faced by the management also as happened in the present case. If a management acts in such a manner, it should be prepared to face the consequences. If respondent No. I had not been favouring the anti- C. B. A. union, certainly no damage would have been caused to the people of the factory. Anyhow there is no evidence that the incident of 15th February, 1981 took place at the instance of the management. It was justified in closing the factory to save it from further disaster. The evidence produced by the C. B. A. union that damage was caused to the doors and windows and the cars were burnt by outsiders and the members of the anti C. B. A. was rightly disbelieved by the learned lower Court. The members of the non-C. B. A. being favourites of the management would not inten tionally cause loss to the management, whereas the C. B. A. and its members being under the impression that the management was against them and that the management was patronizing the non-C. B. A. may indulge in damaging acts. If the management had arranged the scuffle which took place between the unions on 15th February, 1981, it would have taken precaution to have arranged to protect the cars and other items damaged. Since this part of the evidence produced by the C. B. A. union is, according to the circumstances of the case, believable that the workers of the other union attacked, it cannot be said that the C. B. A. union observed illegal strike on 15th February, 1981 and, thereafter, after the incident none could dare to stay because the police had interfered and teargas was used. The C. B. A. workers did indulge in beating but since they did not take the initiative, they were not responsible for the incident. They may have exercised the night of private defence but this not being a criminal case, they cannot be said to have started illegal strike. The incident started before the working hours although it continued for some time during working hours This is true that the act of closing down the factory did not amount to lock-out, but they were not justified in not re opening the factory uptil now. The abscess had, to a great extent, sub sided, so they should have after a few months re-opened the factory. The closure was not a lock out because it has not been proved to have any connection with any industrial dispute. An industrial dispute, no doubt, was pending but it had no connection with the incident for which the factory was closed. There is no evidence that some specific terms and conditions of service were suggested by the employer. According to the statement of P. W. 1, the management had suggested three conditions for re-opening the factory and the learned counsel for the petitioner union says that they can be' the ingredients of lock-out. This argument is ex facie hollow. Neither this had any connection with the industrial dispute pending at that time. nor suggested any terms and conditions of service. They were that Ch. Gulzar and Tariq Latif be arrested, the closure of the factory be declared as illegal lock out and that report under section 46-A be withdrawn. Manifestly these are not conditions of service. The defini tion of lock-out given in section 2 (xvi) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 reads as under :- "Lock-out" means the closing of a place of employment or part of such place or the suspension, wholly or partly, of work by an employer, or refusal, absolute or conditional, by an employer to continue to employ any number of workmen employed by him where such closing, suspension or refusal occurs in connection with an industrial dispute or is intended for the purpose of compelling workmen employed to accept certain terms and conditions of or affecting employment." I have already discussed above that closure has no concern with the indus trial dispute. The immediate cause and motive was the incident of 14th February, 1981 as suggested even in the report under section 46-A. The three conditions put forth by the management are obviously not terms and conditions of service or employment. If a factory is closed to pressurize the workers to accept certain terms and conditions of service, the said terms and conditions should pre-exist. But in the present case the three conditions suggested by the management, firstly, as mentioned A above, cannot be called terms and conditions of service and secondly they did not pre-exist and rather are the outcome of the closure. The question of the arrest of Ch. Gulzar and Tariq Latif arose on account of the incident of 15th February, 1981. They were cited as accused in the F. I. R. lodged in respect of the said incident. The demand of the management to declare the closure as illegal lock-out arose on account of the closure and could have arisen if the closure had not taken place. Likewise the demand of withdrawal of the report under section 46-A is the outcome of the incident and the closure. But for the closure no report under section 46-A would have been made. So, all the three conditions did not exist before the closure nor can be characterised as terms and conditions of service. When the closure is not a lock-out, no question of its been illegal lock-out can arise. Needless to say that first of all there should be lock-out. If such a lock out is commenced or continued otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, it will be an illegal lock-out. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited A I R 1956 Mad. 241 and 1973 P L C

47. Both the authorities are not germane to the facts of the present case. Rather the latter is on the point of strike. 1960 P L C 1005 (Madras) is distinguishable. In this ruling closing down the place of business and not the business itself has been said to be a lock-out. In the present case not only the place of business was closed but business of shoe making at Lahore was also closed. 3. it has been further argued by the learned counsel that the closure was a lock-out being against M. L. R.

23. This argument too is devoid of force. This regulation disallowed strikes and lock-outs. The term lock-out has not been defined in this regulation, so its definition will, for the purpose of this regulation, remain the same as given in section 2 (xvi) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It, therefore, means that lock-outs as defined in section 2 (xvi) have been disallowed. Since the closure in dispute, as observed above, is not lock-out, so it cannot be said that the closure was hit by regulation No. 23.

4. No other point has bin argued before me. The learned lower Court has rightly observed that the closure in dispute does not amount to illegal lock-out.

5. As upshot of the observations made above, I do not find any force in this revision and dismiss the same. P' A' Revision dismissed. n