2002 PLP 53 (MLD)

HAFIZ ABDUL REHMAN ANSARI (MEMBER). ‑‑‑Ghulam Sarwar appellant was enrolled as an Advocate of Lower Court on 14‑1‑1989 by the Sindh Bar Council and he practised as such till 12‑3‑1996 when he joined Prosecution Branch Sindh Police Department as Prosecuting Sub‑Inspector (PSI). On 1‑4‑1997 he was discharged from service under Police Rule 12.8 as mentioned in the order, dated 1‑4‑1997, of Deputy Inspector‑General of Police, Larkana Division. The allegations against the appellant mentioned in letter, dated 1‑4‑1997, are that he had no knowledge of prosecution job, that he was not conducting cases with dedication in order to achieve good results, that he is irregular in his Court duties, and that he is, irresponsible officer.

2. After his discharge from service, the appellant submitted an application to the Sindh Bar Council, seeking resumption of practice as an Advocate. His application was considered by the Enrolment Committee of the Sindh Bar Council but the same was returned to the Council vide order, dated 4‑7‑1998, with the observation that allegations on which the appellant was discharged from service fall within the expression of "Moral Turpitude" and as such his application is returned to Sindh Bar Council in terms of section 31 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973. The Sindh Bar Council after considering the matter in its meeting held on 12‑9‑1998 unanimously endorsed the decision/order of its Enrolment Committee, rejected the application of .the appellant for resumption of practice. The appellant has assailed in this appeal order, dated 4‑7‑1998 passed by Enrolment Committee and decision dated 12‑9‑1998 of Sindh Bar Council, section 26(2)(1) of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 is reproduced below:‑‑ "(2) A person shall be disqualified from being admitted as an Advocate if‑‑ (i) he was dismissed or removed from service of Government or of a public statutory corporation on a charge involving moral turpitude, unless a period of five years, or such less period as the Federal Government may, by Notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf, has elapsed since his dismissal or removal; or" Police Rule 12.8 of the Police Rules, 1934 is reproduced as under:‑‑ "Probationary nature of appointments, Inspector, Sergeants, Sub‑Inspectors and Assistant Sub‑Inspectors who are directly appointed will be considered to be on probation for three years and are liable to be discharged at any time within the period of their probation if they fail to pass prescribed examination including the riding test, or are guilty of grave misconduct or are deemed for sufficient reason, to be unsuitable for service in the Police. A probationary Inspector shall be discharged by the Inspector‑General, arid all other Upper Subordinates by Range Deputy Inspector‑General, Assistant Inspector‑General, Provincial Additional Police (designated as Commandant, Provincial Additional Police). No appeal lies against an order of discharge..." Sub‑Rule (3)(a) of Rule 4 of Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 is also relevant which is as under:‑‑ (3) In this rule, removal or dismissal from service does not include the discharge of a person‑‑ (a) appointed on probation, during the period of probation, or in accordance with the probation or training rules applicable to him; or (b) appointed, otherwise than under a contract to hold a temporary appointment, on the expiration of the period of appointment; or (c) engaged under a contract, in accordance with the terms of the contract. " The case of the appellant is covered in sub‑rule (3)(a) of Rule 4 as the appellant was on probation, his services were not regularized and as such no inquiry was held before discharge of his service. To me discharge cannot be equated with dismissal or removal from service as is very much clear from the provisions of sub‑rule 3(a) of Rule 4 of Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1974. While in section 26(2)(1) of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, words used are "dismissed or removed from service" which does not include discharge from service, so, the case of the appellant is not hit by section 26(2)(1) of Act, 1973. Discharge from service is not considered such penalty as is dismissal or removal, by the Rule‑making Authority itself. The appellant was a probationer, he had just completed one year service when on 1‑4‑1997, he was discharged form service by D.I.G., Larkana. There is nothing supporting material on record mentioned in the order dated 1‑4‑1997 of D.I.‑G., Larkana, on the basis of which he formulated the opinion and levelled allegations against the appellant, it was just opinion of one person without supplementing material. Secondly the allegations mentioned in the letter, dated 1‑4‑1997, hardly fall in the ambit of definition of moral turpitude, which can be made, ground for refusal or resumption of practice. In the letter, dated 1‑4‑1997, allegations levelled against the appellant, for discharging him from service, are of general nature, there is no specific allegation of accepting bribe, dishonesty or of committing any other moral offence. General allegations levelled against the appellant do not constitute the moral turpitude. Cases referred in the order, dated 4‑7‑1998 or Enrolment Committee of Sindh Bar Council are distinguishable as in none of the case, such allegations as are made ground of moral turpitude in the instant case are mentioned in these referred cases. The case of the appellant is maximum of inefficiency which hardly constitutes "moral turpitude" as mentioned a ground for refusal of resumption of licence in section 26(2)(1) of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973. Appeal is allowed and Sindh Bar Council is directed for resumption the licence of applicant so he may practise law. H.B.T./G‑73/K Appeal allowed.