P L D 1956 Sind 298 (PLP)

Nemo for Respondent. MUNSHI, J.‑This is an appeal from the judgment of the 1st Assistant Judge, Sukkur (Mr. Ghulam Hyder Pit) setting aside the judgment and decree of the Joint Sub‑Judge Rohri, dissolving the marriage of the appellant‑plaintiff with respondent‑defendant, The facts leading to this appeal briefly stated are these Respondent married the appellant about 10 years before the suit. For about four years they pulled on well but thereafter, according to the appellant, the respondent treated her cruelly, charged her with immorality and failed to maintain her. The matters came to a head about a year before the suit when at the intervention of some respectable people, the respondent divorced the appellant. About six months before the suit, the respondent again claimed the appellant as his wife. The latter therefore filed a suit for declaration that the respondent had divorced her and for injunction restraining him from calling himself her husband and for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and non‑maintenance. The Court decreed her suit dissolving her marriage with the respondent on the ground that he had failed to maintain her for more than two years. Against this decree and judgment, the respondent filed an appeal and the learned Assistant judge, by his judgment dated 17th December 1949, set aside the judgment and decree of the Sub‑Judge. It is against this judgment and decree that the present appeal has been filed. Section 2 (ii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act VIII of 1939 upon which the judgment of the original Court was based enacts that a woman married under Muslim Law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on the ground that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for period of two years. It therefore appears clear that in order to succeed in a suit for dissolution of marriage all that a woman is required to do is to establish that for two years immediately preceding the suit, her husband has not provided for her maintenance. Once that is established she will be entitled to a decree as a matter of course. Courts have not to go into the question whether the woman herself has contributed towards the failure of her husband to provide maintenance for her. Her refusal to stay with her husband or to render conjugal rights to him is also no ground for refusing her claim for dissolution. The Courts have also not to go into the question of possible hardship to the husband resulting from such judgment. Rules of interpretation require Courts to give effect to the words employed in enactments without busying themselves with the consequences that might flow from such action provided of course the words themselves are unambiguous. In this case there is absolutely no ambiguity in the wording of the section, and hence there is no warrant for reading in the section something which it does not contain. In this particular case the allegation of the appellant that the respondent has failed to provide for her maintenance for more than two years immediately preceding the suit is not denied. In fact this has been admitted by the respondent in his deposition in the Court of the Sub‑Judge. This is what he has said. "I left Sukkur for my village since 4‑5 years. I have not maintained my wife during this period of 4‑5 years because she did not come to me and live with me in my house at Khairpur". After this admission on the part of the husband, the learned Sub‑Judge was quite justified in decreeing the suit. The learned Assistant judge who upset the decree has gone on grounds not recognised by law. For he says that the judgment of Sub‑Judge if maintained would lead to absurd results. The learned Judge appears to be of the view that a Muslim husband would be justified in refusing maintenance to his wife if the latter refused to live with him in his house or render conjugal rights to him. The language of section 2 of the Act is quite plain and it makes no mention of any condition under which the husband can refuse maintenance to his wife. The liability to maintain is unconditional and is quite independent of what the wife does or refuses to do. The learned Assistant Judge had a ruling of this Court A I R (1946) Sind 48 before him but he has not followed it on the ground that the opinion of Justice O'Sullivan was a mere obiter dicta. In that case O'Sullivan, J. held that he was in entire agreement with the view, of Beckett, J. expressed in A I R (1941) Lah. 166, where it was held that divorce can be granted on grounds which do not necessarily involve any deliberate default on the. part of the husband and that it is absolutely immaterial whether the failure to maintain is due to poverty, or failing health, loss of work etc. There is more recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Noor Bibi v Pir Bakhsh (P L D 1950 Sind 36) holding that on account of the failure of the husband to maintain his wife for two years the wife was entitled to a dissolution of her marriage under clause (ii) of section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, in spite of the fact that on account of her conduct, the wife would not have been entitled to enforce any claim for maintenance against her husband in respect of the period during which he had failed to maintain her. In the result therefore we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the Assistant Judge and maintain those of the Sub‑Judge, Rohri. The coats of this appeal are directed to be borne by the respondent. G. B. CONSTANTINE, C. J.‑I agree. A.H.???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal allowed