1985 PLP 212 (SCMR)

M.S.H. QURAISHI, J.-- Leave to appeal has been sought through these two petitions, that is, C.P. Nos. 413 and 414 of 1984, from the order of a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's E.S.A.Nos. 347 and 348 of 1977.

2. The execution proceeding was in respect of a decree of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller on 16-2-1965 on the basis of a compromise reached between the petitioners (tenant in the two petitions, on the one hand, and respondent No.l Muhammad Yaqoob (landlord) on the other, whereby the petitioners had agreed that if their revision, which was then pending before the Settlement Commissioner regarding their own claim to transfer of the disputed property, did not succeed, they would voluntarily surrender possession to the respondent within six months of the decision, that in the meantime they would pay the arrears of rent from the date of the P.T.O., i.e. 26-7-1961, by 16-3-1965, failing which they would be liable to be ejected. The said revision was accepted by the Settlement Commissioner on 30-5-1966, in the result of which the matter was remanded but the remand order on being challenged in the constitutional jurisdiction was set aside by the High Court on 23-11-1973- on the view that the transfer made in favour of the respondent /landlord was a past and closed transaction and it was not competent of the Settlement Authority to re-open it. The petitioners moved the Supreme Court but their plea for leave to appeal was refused on 3-12-1974. Thereupon, the landlord applied on 15-1-1975 for execution of the decree passed by the Rent Controller on 16-2-1965. The objections raised by the petitioners were rejected by the executing Court. Their appeals failed on 9-4-1977 where after they filed the second appeals in the High Court which were dismissed by the impugned order dated 18-3-1984. The High Court held that in view of the provision of subsection (7) read with subsection (8) of section 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, the order passed by the Controller, subject to the result of an appeal, whether the same had been filed before or after the commencement of the amending. Ordinance IX of 1979, became final and was not open to question in any. Court of law including the High Court. On merits, the High Court repelled the contention that the execution was barred by time as, in the view of the High Court, time would start running from the date of the order of the Supreme Court, i.e. 3-12-1974.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the High Court had fallen into error in applying the provision of subsections (7) and (8) of section 15, whereas the matter relating to execution was governed by section 17 of the Ordinance. In this connection he pointed out that under the law in force at the relevant time, the execution application would lie before a civil Court and for this reason also the aforesaid provision of section 15 was not applicable. Nothing, however, turns on this submission because the High Court has dealt with the matter on merits too. Learned counsel then disputed the view taken by the High Court that the execution application was time-barred and urged that the terminus a quo would be 16-2-1965 when the decree had been passed. The contention has no force because the decree was conditional upon a decision in the petitioners' revision before the Settlement Authority, which decision acquired finality or rejection of the petitioners' leave petition before the Supreme Court on 3-12--1974. Learned counsel concedes that the implementation of the revisional order of the Settlement, Commissioner had been stayed by the High Court. That being so section 15 of the Limitation Act would also come into play in computing) the period of limitation.

4. Lastly, he raised the point that the petitioners had agreed to vacate the premises if the decision in the revision would go against them but that the revision in so far as the Settlement Authority was concerned had been accepted and as such the petitioners were no longer bound by the agreement. Since the decision of the Settlement Authority cannot be treated to be final as the same had merged in the orders passed by the High Court and this Court, the petitioners were very much bound by the terms of the compromise.

5. We thus fined no merit in these petitions and accordingly dismiss the same. M . Z . M . Petition dismissed.