1992 PLP 373 (PLC)

This is an appeal against the order, dated 16-3-1991, passed by learned Presiding Officer, Fourth Sindh Labour Court at Karachi, whereby grievance application of the appellant was dismissed.

2. I have heard Mr. Mirza Muhammad Kazim, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. SA. Channa, learned counsel for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.

3. The brief facts of the case appear to be that the appellant was workman working with the respondents whose services were allegedly terminated by an order, dated 25-8-1988. After serving grievance notice upon the respondents the appellant filed grievance petition before the learned labour Court which was resisted by the respondents on the ground that the appellant was temporary workman whose services had been terminated by an order in writing dated 5-9-1988 in accordance with the Standing Order 12(3).

4. The appellant claimed to have been in the employment of the respondents since 1987. In support he has produced two entry passes Annexure A, dated 8-10-1987 and Annexure A/2, dated 29-8-1987. However, in the cross -examination he has admitted that these were `gate-passes' issued to the visitors of the company. He has admitted that since every body cannot enter into the factory as such he got prepared Annexures A and A/1 for the purpose of delivering his medical certificate. He further admitted, that he was recruited on 4-1-1988 therefore it can safely be assumed that the appellant was not recruited in 1987 but was recruited on 4-1-1988. This conclusion gets support from the appointment order Exh. R/1 which shows, that he was appointed from 4-1-1988. The appellant denies his signature upon his appointment order, but even on his own admission his date of appointment is 4-1-1988.

5. Secondly it is contended, that appellant was appointed on permanent basis on permanent job. Exh. R/1 shows that he was appointed as temporary helper on temporary post and temporary work which was likely to be over at any time within a period of nine months. He has produced his Card which is Annexure `B' to his petition, which he admits is a card issued to the temporary workers. This documentary evidence is also corroborated by appointment order Exh. R/1, which shows that the appellant was appointed on temporary basis. Even witness Muhammad Mairaj, examined by the appellant does not state, that the appellant was a permanent employee. Even if the work for which he was employed had continued for more than nine months still it would not have conferred upon him any right to be treated as permanent employee.

6. The next contention of the appellant is that he was removed from service by an oral order. The respondents have produced termination order, which is Exh. R/2, dated 5-9-1988, which maybe reproduced as under:-- "Since the temporary job/duration of work for which you were employed has been completed, your services are hereby terminated with effect from the close of work on 5th September, 1988 as per terms and conditions of your letter of appointment. Please collect your legal dues, if any, from our Cost Accounting Department on any working day after completing the clearance certificate."

7. Even for the sake of arguments if it is held, that the appellant was removed from service by oral order, but written order was subsequently passed, it would be a valid order as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Rauf v. M/s. Markran Fisheries Ltd. And another 1981 SCMR

631. Their Lordships have observed as under:- "However, according to learned counsel, the effect of paragraph 12(3) of the Standing Orders of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, (hereinafter called the said Ordinance), was that the petitioner could not be dismissed `except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken'. But, as the petitioner had been informed by a mere oral order after the second show-cause notice, not to report duty, the further submission was that the petitioner's employment had not been lawfully terminated. Now, although the respondent had not issued a written order of dismissal after its second show-cause notice, and merely prohibited the petitioner from working by an oral order, the respondent proved that it had later passed a written order of dismissal on 5-4-1974, therefore, the learned Judge held that the petitioner's employment had been terminated on' 5-4-1974 and had ordered that his pay and emoluments should be paid to him up to that date. We have examined this order of 5-4-1974 and we are satisfied that it complies with the provisions of Standing Order 12(3) of the said Ordinance, therefore, there is no merit in learned counsel's submissions."

8. The appellant has denied his signature on this termination order and contends that it was not served upon him. Even the handwriting expert Mauladad Khan also found that it did not bear signature of the appellant. However, it is admitted fact, that this document was produced and given to the appellant alongwith the reply statement of the respondent which was filed on 15-11-1988. The order would, therefore, be deemed to have been served upon the appellant on 15-11-1988 and would take effect from that date.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Mushtaq Ahmed v. M/s. Hoeschst Pakistan Ltd., Karachi 1991 PLC

698. In this case this Tribunal held that as the `appellant had put in more than three months' service, his services could not be terminated even if he had been employed to do work of temporary nature unless that work itself had been completed. As the order in writing terminating the services of the appellant did not show that work was of temporary nature therefore the termination order was held to be illegal and was set aside by this Tribunal. In the instant case the termination order R/2 does show that the temporary work, for which the appellant was appointed had been completed.

10. This is a case of termination simpliciter. No mala fides is alleged or proved against the respondent. There was no reason for the respondent to have terminated the services of the appellant for any ulterior motive.

11. For the aforesaid reasons I find no merit in this appeal and I dismiss it with this modification that the order of termination would take effect from 15-11-1988 and the appellant would be entitled to get salary and other dues accordingly within two months. H.B.T./1990/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.