P L D 1991 Karachi 355 (PLP)

This application filed under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. has given rise to interesting questions of law, but when the statutory provisions with which it is concerned are examined the decision does not present great difficulty. The facts arc simple and may be briefly summed up as follows The applicant who claims to be a Deputy Secretary‑General, Pakistan Telecommunication Union (Traffic) had invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Constitution Petition No.D‑350 of 1983, whereby the orders dated 26‑5‑1982 and 2‑2‑1983 passed by learned Single Member of the NIRC and by the Full Bench of the NIRC, respectively, were challenged. The petition was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 7‑3‑1989 and the case was remanded to Full Bench of NIRC, for re‑hearing of the appeal. On 15‑10‑1989 the respondent No.2 filed a complaint against the applicant before a Member NIRC for the offence under section 56 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, mainly on the ground that the applicant not being a Deputy Secretary‑General of the above Union was making false claim with a view to prolong the forthcoming referendum. On 17‑12‑1989, the learned Member NIRC proposed to dismiss the complaint under section 203, Cr.P.C. with the following observations: "The complainant was also directed to produce the judgment of the High Court. The judgment of the High Court reveals that the case was remanded to the Full Bench with the directions to decide the appeal after hearing both the parties on all the points which may be urged. Since the High Court has remanded the case to the Full Bench and the complainant has been given an option to agitate any point before the Full Bench, I, therefore, observe that without the determination and decision of the Full Bench no criminal proceedings can be initiated. The complaint is, therefore, premature, the same is dismissed under section 203, Cr.P.C. However, the complainant can urge this point before the Full Bench. where the appeal is said to be pending for disposal."

4. However, before the order could be signed and announced it was brought to the notice of learned Member NIRC that the Full Bench had dismissed the appeal filed by the applicant on 9‑10‑1989 for non‑prosecution and consequently a notice was ordered to be issued to applicant on the same day. It appears that the applicant avoided the attendance and consequently the case was brought on regular file and process was issued against him. It is in these circumstances that the applicant has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court seeking quashment of criminal proceedings pending against him in the Court of Member NIRC.

5. I have heard Mr.Suleman Habibullah, learned counsel for applicant, Mr.Khalid Ather, learned counsel for respondent No.2, and Mr. Salman Ansari, (earned counsel for State. Mr.Ansari has supported the prayer of the applicant made for the quashment of proceedings:

6. The learned counsel or applicant has confined his arguments to the following contentions: That the Member NIRC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance against the applicant for the offence under section 56 of the Industrial Rclatiow Ordinance, 1969, which in view of the provisions contained under section 35(5)(c) was triable exclusively by the Labour Court having jurisdiction. (ii) That the member NIRC was not competent to revise his own order dated 17‑12‑1989, in view of the bar contained under section 369, Cr.P.C.

7. The first contention is, however, effectively answered by the language of section 22‑A (8) (f) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which empowers the NIRC to try offences punishable under‑‑ (i) section 53, other than subsections (1) and (5) thereof; and (ii) any other section, in so far as they relate to employers or workers in relation to an industry‑wise trade union, a federation of such trade unions, a federation at the national level or officers of such union or federation.

8. The "Explanation" added to section 22‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in the following words makes the entire position clear:‑‑ Explanation.‑‑In this section and in succeeding provisions of this Ordinance, the expressions "industry‑wise trade union", "federation of such trade unions" and "federation at the national level" refer to a trade union the membership of which extends to establishments in more than one Province and a federation of trade unions whose membership extends to registered trade unions in more than one Province." The Pakistan Telecommuntcation Union ('traffic) is, therefore, covered by the above explanation and the Member NIRC had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint filed against the applicant under section 56 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Ltl. t here is ample authority for the proposition that powers of review are not available to a Criminal Court and the judgment or an order in the nature of judgment, when dated, signed and announced cannot be recalled. The following judgments lend support to this view:‑‑ (i) Raju and another v.Empcror AIR 1928 Lahore 462; (ii) Dahu Rant and others v:Emperor AIR 1933 Cal. 870; (iii) Rchmat Ali alias Lunda v. The State 1971 SCMR 513; (iv) Juan Sullivan v. The State 1971 SCMR 618 (v) Muhammad Khan v. Muhammad Aslam and 3 others 1971 SCMR 789; (vi) Khan Muhammad v. The State 1985 PCr.LJ 578 (vii) Rahim Jan v. Ahmed Jan and another 1986 PCr.LJ 122; (viii) Nazeer Masih v. The State 1986 PCr.LJ 1224; (ix) Faizullah and another v. Mst.Pervaiz Akhtar and 3 others PLD 1987 Azad J&K 29; (x) Niazi and 3 others v. Ghulam Dastgir and another 1987 PCr.LJ 1432, and (xi) Darya Khan v. The State PLD 1989 Karachi 115.

11. It is, however, established position of law that a judgment or an order is inoperative and is nothing but au expression of opinion till it is pronounced. It C can, therefore, be changed and altered before it is actually announced. The perusal of the record shows that the first order dated 17‑12‑1989 was not signed and announced, which fact finds place in the second order passed by learned D Member NIRC on the same day which is duly signed by him.

12. No illegality or irregularity was, therefore, committed while taking cognizance against the applicant. The application made under section 561‑A, E Cr.P.C. seeking quashment of proceedings pending against the applicant has got no merits and it accordingly dismissed. N.H.Q./M‑1409/K Application dismissed