1999 P Cr (PLP)

3. Subsequently inquiries by complainant, however, revealed and surfaced the appellant as to aforesaid "A.S.‑I." and responsible for ugly act. After confirmation of his identity complaint Exh.P.A. was submitted to Director Anti Corruption Establishment Punjab, Lahore. Same alongwith letter Exh.P.C. was received by P.W.3 Muhammad Rafiq Shah, C.O./A.C.E. Gujrat. Upon final report vide letter Exh.P.D., registration of case was ordered on 25‑8‑1994 and formal F.I.R. Exh.P.E. was drawn/recorded. Necessary sanction for prosecution was accordedqn terms of Exh.P.F.

4. To substantiate the allegations and prove its case, as many as four witnesses, were examined by the prosecution. P.W.1, Muhammad Khalid Sheikh, re‑iterated the contents of complaint Exh.P.A. made on 12‑6‑1993, about 12 days after the incident alleged to have occurred on 31‑5‑1993. P.W.2, Muhammad Arshad, spoke in line of the complainant. P.W.3, Muhammad Rafiq Shah is C.O./A.C.E. Gujrat who recorded formal F.I.R. Exh.P.E. P.W.4, Mozaffar Hussain, located the accused on the basis of features disclosed to him by the complainant.

5. In his statement under section

342. Cr.P.C. the appellant denied all the incriminating circumstances figuring against him in the prosecution evidence and raised the plea of false implication. In 'his defence, he examined a solitary witness namely Abdul Ghani. However, he opted, not to appear as his own witness in disproof of allegations ac envisaged by the provisions embodied in section 340(2), Cr.P.C.

6. Terming the delay in reporting the matter as not to be fatal and believing statement of P.W.1, the complainant, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as indicated and stated above by judgment, dated 1‑4‑1996.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant has lambasted the verdict with the assertions that the same is based on solitary statement of complainant Muhammad Khalid P.W.1, no person in whose presence alleged incident had taken place was cited witness in the complaint and bare statement of complainant cannot be believed and given credence as Kashif was given up as having been won‑over. Delay of 12 days in reporting the matter has been termed to be serious, inordinate and unexplained so as to impair the prosecution case beyond repair.

8. Conversely, learned counsel representing the State has remarked that the complainant had neither any enmity with the appellant nor any cause for his false implication. Also it has been maintained that the delay in making the complaint stands duly explained as accused was to be located and his identity, as such, was to be confirmed.

9. Seemingly fauxpas was committed while appreciating prosecution evidence. By now it is settled that the testimony of a person, howhighsoever, he may be, must be taken with grain of salt so to say, that it cannot be treated as "gospel truth" unless corroborated by independent reliable evidence. Learned Trial Judge traversed on the periphery, rather, confined the whole exercise to a profile and did not bother to dive deep to sift grain from ch4ff and Kernel from husk, particularly when Muhammad Arshad P.W.2 was found to have been introduced subsequently and no significance could be attached to his testimony. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant P.W.2 and P.W.4 were not even present when the appellant allegedly deprived the complaisant of cash and drugs. Learned trial Judge seems to have fallen in ignoratio elenchi while treating the deposition of P.W.1 as apodictically as if he spoke as an oracle. The accused also deserved the same solemnity in speech vis a vis the complainant, who should have been taken at par with the accused and their versions should have been juxta‑posed in its true perspective. Learned counsel for the appellant has rightly pointed out various discrepancies in the evidence of P.W.2 to P.W.4, which, cut very root of prosecution case, as scrupulously conceded by learned counsel representing the State.

10. Be that as it may, these glaring discrepancies were sufficient to discard the veracity of P.W.1 Muhammad Khalid Sheikh (complainant) what to speak of borrowing "circumstantial corroboration". Saddle must be put on right horse, but, unfortunately, process of bringing home the guilt was evaluated with the help of those witnesses, who prevaricated with impunity. In nut‑shell, solitary statement of the complainant, without independent corroboration could not afford valid basis for the conviction, now sought to be impeached and set at naught. Verdict, dated 1‑4‑1996 is highly hypothetical and conjectural.

11. Undoubtedly, it is not a raid case. Delay in reporting the matter is also of considerable effect and significance. Very happening of incident in a swarmed Bazar in broad daylight in such a crude fashion/manner is palpably open to grave doubts. Thus, prosecution case is perfunctory on various counts.

12. Matter is liable to be analysed from entirely a different angle, which, however, has not been agitated. Very registration of the case is the outcome of naked and patent legal infirmity. Aggrieved could conveniently knock at the door of higher police heirarchy for redressal of his grievances. Without availing remedy, and observance of prescribed procedure he chose to put the "Cart before Horse". As such registration of a criminal case bemoaned loudly over contrivance apparently devised. If such practice is allowed to prevail, then, every employee would be prone to criminal action on flimsy allegations.

13. As a necessary corollary, conviction and sentence of the appellant, by virtue of impugned judgment, dated 1‑4‑1996 is not only laconic, but also, replete with legal infirmities. Hence, the same is unsustainable. Resultantly, appeal is accepted, conviction and sentence are set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charge levelled against him. Amount of fine, if realised, shall be refunded. 14: Appellant is on bail and is accordingly absolved of all his liabilities to the bail bonds submitted/furnished by him. N.H.Q./A‑341/L Appeal accepted.