1984 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

A. O. RAZIUR RAHMAN (MEMBER).‑The appellant, who was a Meter Reader in the Sultanpura Sub‑Division (E) of WAPDA Electricity Division in Lahore, was removed from service by an order, dated 10th April, 1982 under section 17(1‑A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, which was received by him on 27th April, 1982. He came to the Tribunal in appeal on 26th May, 1982. The appeal was heard on 9tb July, 1984 and is being disposed of by this order.

2. The case of the appellant is that he was appointed as Meter Reader, with effect from 7th June, 1965 and had put in 17 years of satisfactory service when be was suspended on 3rd March, 1982 on a specific charge of accepting illegal gratification. A criminal case had been registered against him on 2nd March, 1982 and the same is still pending. There has been no finding of guilt against him as yet and, therefore, his removal from service cannot be justified on merit. Moreover, when he was suspended on a specific charge of accepting illegal gratification, resort to sec tion 17(1‑A) was not a bona fide action, but one resorted to as a convenient device of avoiding the normal procedure.

3. As against the above, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it was not a fact that section ‑1.7(1‑A) was resorted to short‑circuit the normal procedure of disciplinary action, but that, the record of the appellant being unsatisfactory, it was decided to terminate his service under section 17(1‑A) of the Act. In this connection, he pointed out that the Appellant has worked in four Sub‑Divisions his explanation has been called about 15 times ; he has been charge‑sheeted about 7 to 8 times : and he has been punished at least 4 times. However, when he was asked to clarify whether the punishment had been upheld by the appellate authorities, he admitted that these had been set aside by the Labour Court.

4. So far as the stands of the two parties are concerned, it is clear that, if the appellant has been removed on the basis of the criminal case pending against him, the action cannot be justified, because the criminal case has not yet been decided nor have any departmental proceedings been conducted in the matter. Even if such proceedings had been con ducted, action could be justified only if the findings of such proceedings were against the appellant, but removal under section 17(1‑A) on the basis of the same charges, could not be justified. Section 17(1‑A) gives special powers to the Authority to remove an employee from service without assigning any reason. But, as we have held in a number of cases, although no reason need be assigned, action cannot be taken without any reason. If the Authority finds adequate reasons for actions it should be able to explain these reasons before us. So far as this Tribunal is concern ed, it has held that the principles laid down in the O. M. dated 17th April, 1982 containing instructions regarding the cases to be put up for action under section 17(1‑A) of the WAPDA Act, should be treated as the criteria by which the justifiability of action taken in a specific case should be determined. Taking the criteria into consideration, the action taken against the appellant could be justified, if it could be established that either the appellant had two or more punishments to his discredit and had not reformed himself or he had established reputation of being corrupt or was reasonably considered to be corrupt or was persistently inefficient. The learned counsel for the respondent was asked to give details which would show that the appellant had been punished more than twice and not yet reformed himself; or to show that he had either an established reputation of being corrupt or was reasonably considered to be corrupt, or was persistently inefficient. Reference made by him to the four punishments awarded did not meet the point, because all the punishments had been set aside. Similarly; with regard to the explanations called and the charge‑sheets served on him, since these did not result in any punishment, major or minor, or in a specific finding against the Appellant, they could not be counted against him for the purpose of establishing either his reputation for corruption or the inefficiency of the appellant or his reputation for corruption. He could not produce these at the time of hearing although since be was making a positive claim in this behalf, he should have come at the time of hearing equipped with the relevant documents. Nevertheless, he was given one day's time to produce these facts and figures and the relevant documents, as well as the A. C. R. dossier of the appellant, to enable us to determine how far the respondent's stand on this point was correct. He failed to produce the facts and figures asked for and the relevant documents, including the A.C.Rs. We have, therefore, no option but to hold that the respondent has failed to establish that action under sec tion 17(1‑A) has been taken in accordance with the criteria laid down for the purpose in the O. M., dated 17th April, 1982 referred to.

5. So far as we can see, the Appellant was arrested on a criminal charge, a criminal case was registered against him and it is still pending in the Court. The Department can either wait for decision in the case or take up disciplinary proceedings against the appellant on the specific charge of accepting illegal gratification. Neither of these two things has C been done, but, instead action has been taken under section 17(1‑A) which, as we have already seen, cannot be justified on the basis of the principles laid down in that behalf.

6. The result of the above discussion is that the impugned orderly cannot be sustained. We, therefore, allow the appeal and order that the appellant be reinstated in, service, with effect‑from the date of his removal. This, however, will not affect the suspension order, dated 3rd March, 1982 which was a sequel to his arrest on a criminal charge, in a case which is still pending against him.

7. No order as to costs. A. E. Appeal allowed.