SCMR 1980

1980 PLP 156 (SCMR)

UMAR DRAZ CHEEMA-Petitioner Versus NAZAR MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS-Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal Nos. 987 and 1000 of 1979, decided on 18th December, 1979.
Honorable Judges
Muhammad Haleem and G. Safdar Shah, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1980 PLP 156 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Muhammad Haleem and G. Safdar Shah, JJ
Parties UMAR DRAZ CHEEMA-Petitioner Versus NAZAR MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS-Respondents
Primary Law (b) Interpretation of Statutes, (a) Punjab Local Government Ordinance (VI of 1979)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1980 PLP 156 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: (b) Interpretation of Statutes, (a) Punjab Local Government Ordinance (VI of 1979) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1980 PLP 156 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Muhammad Haleem and G. Safdar Shah, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1980 PLP 156 (SCMR) (UMAR DRAZ CHEEMA-Petitioner Versus NAZAR MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS-Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

(b) Interpretation of Statutes (a) Punjab Local Government Ordinance (VI of 1979)

Representation

  • Talib H. Rizvi, Advocate, S. Ali Imam Naqvi, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in C. P-. No. 987 of 1979).
  • Ch. M. Abdul Wahid. Advocate. Mahmood A. Qureshi, Advocate-on- Record for Petitioners (in C. P. No, 1000 of 1979).
  • Nemo for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing : 18th December, 1979.
  • Talib H. Rizvi, Advocate, S. Ali Imam Naqvi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner (in C. P‑. No. 987 of 1979).
  • Ch. M. Abdul Wahid. Advocate. Mahmood A. Qureshi, Advocate‑on- Record for Petitioners (in C. P. No, 1000 of 1979).

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 24th September, 1979 in W. Ps. 5019 and 5093 of 1979). -- S. 21. (f) read with S. 4 and Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order (5 of 1977), Arts. 1 (2) (3) & 10-Word "disqualified" in cl. (f) of S. 21 of Ordinance-Does not have any particular implication but signifies disability according to, particular language of provisions of other statutes--Hell : High Court was right in holding that such disqualifications, being an integral part of Ordinance, should be given full effect subject to limitation that they should not be inconsistent with disqualifications enumerated in S. 21 --Article 1 (2) (3) of Order 5 of 1977 cannot be taken into consideration for holding that disqualifications in Art. 10 could not be read into cl. (f) of S. 21 of Ordinance-- . Petition for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed. -- Provisions enacted have to be given fall effect-Extraneous considerations cannot be employed to make it redundant or to detract .. . it from meaning which it conveys.,

Judgment & Decree

MUHAMMAD HALEEM, J.‑‑‑This order will govern C: ‑ Ps. Nos. 987 Of 1979 and 1000 of 1979. They arise out of the common judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 24th of September, 1979', by which Writ Petitions Nos. 5093 and 5019 of 1979 were, dismissed. The petitioner in Civil Petition No. 987 of 1979 was in the employment of the Punjab Text Book Board, a statutory body, "owned and controlled" by the Provincial Government, and left the service on 4th of January, 1978. He filed his nomination paper to seek election for the membership of the Union Council, Talwandi Musay Khan, District. Gujranwala, on 14th of September, 1979, before the Returning Officer; and in spite of the objection that a period of two years had not elapsed since the petitioner had left his employment, his nomination paper was accepted and the objection over ruled. Against this acceptance of the nomination paper, a review petition was filed by the first respondent under section 17 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance. 1979, before the Punjab Election Authority which failed and was rejected on 21st of September, 1979. Aggrieved by it respondent No. 1 challenged this rejection in the High Court through Writ Petition No. 5093 of 1979 and succeeded In Civil Petition No. 1000 of 1979, the petitioners filed nomination papers for the membership of a Union Council in District Jhelum; and after the acceptance of their nomination papers, they contested the elections and were duly elected as members of the said local council. The result of the election was gazetted and they took oath of office and became full fledged members. Pursuant to the short order of the High Court dated 24th of September, 1979, in Writ Petition No. 5019 of 1979, respondents 1 and 2 herein filed election petitions against the petitioners before the Election Tribunal, Jhelum, to challenge their election ; and after hearing the petitioners on 4th of December, 1979, the Election Tribunal Jhelum, set aside their elections , and as they were prejudiced by the short order of the High Court, they filed this petition to seek redress although they were not parties to the petition in the High Court. In the High Court the controversy centred around the interpretation of clause (f) of section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance. 1979, read with section 4 of the said Ordinance. The Punjab Election Authority, in its order dated 21st of September, 1979, held that the disqualifications enumerated in Article 10 of Presidents Order No. 5 of 1977 could not be read into clause (f) of section 21 of the Ordinance, as clause (2) of Article 1 of President's Order No. 5 of 1977 was only meant for the "forthcoming elections" to the Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies to be held on 17th of October, 1977, as provided under Article 3 of the said Order. in other words, as it was intended to provide the disabilities for one election only, the disqualifications therein could not be read into the provisions of a permanent statute. It was further held that the Ordinance, being a special law, would override the other genera) laws by reason of section 4 of the said Ordinance as by it the provisions of the Ordinance had to be given effect to ; and lastly, while construing clause (f) of section 21, it held :‑ " . . . . The words is disqualified' means .he has been disqualified or stands disqualified and not can be disqualified'. Hence it means to the past and dot future. Thus clause (f), of, section 21 .has got limited scope anti applies to those, persons who already stand dis qualified for membership of the parliament or a provincial assembly under any law for the time being in force, Consequently, all dis qualifications under P: O. 5 or other statutes would not ipso facto apply ,under section: 21 of the Ordinance. The disqualifications which are not mentioned in. section 21 cannot be imported through the back door. " Before the High Court, the petitioners in these petitions, adopted the reasoning of the Provincial Election Authority in its order referred to above and it was urged on their behalf that clause (f) of section 21 of the Ordi nance disqualified a person from being a candidate for election to a Local Council if he was disqualified for membership of the parliament or a Provincial Assembly under any other law for the time being in force. In this behalf such laws which provided disqualifications were thus cited as Article 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan, section 99 of the Representation of Peoples Act No. LXXXV of 1976, section 5 of the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification of Membership) Act V of 1977, Article 10 of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order 5 of 1977 and para. 6 (3) of C. M. L. O. No. 47 ; and if under any one of these laws a candidate stood disqualified by 'an order of a compe tent authority then that would be a disqualification in terms of clause (f) of section 21 ; but not if a candidate ‑was only amenable to the disqualifi cation under any one of these laws. It was further contended that section 4 of the Ordinance rendered the application. of Article 10 of President's Order No. 5 of 1977 ineffective in view of its Article 1 (2). In a nutshell the contention was that unless there was a specific order of disqualification against a candidate, it could not be read as a disqualification in terms of clause (f) of section 21 of the Ordinance which enumerated the disquali fications. To press the effect .of section 4 of the Ordinance, learned counsel for the petitioners took pains to point out the inconsistencies in the several clauses of section .21 with those of Article 10 of the President's Order No. 9 of 1977 to persuade the High Court that for this reason section 4 will have an overriding effect so as to obviate the application of Article 10 of the Order. The High Court held that there was no conflict between section 21 and Article 10 of the President's Order so as to render effective the application of section 4 of the Ordinance. The High Court further held that the insertion of disqualifications in Article 10 of the Order into clause (f) of section 21 was a legislative act which made the disqualifications an integral part of the Ordinance and had to be given full effect. The result being that any disqualification, not enumerated in section 21 but provided by this Article, would be applicable subject, however, to the limitation that if it was inconsistent with the comparable disqualification in section 21, then to this extent only it could not be pressed into service by reason of section 4 of the Ordinance. This would equally be the role in the case of the disqualifications, provided by other laws. Lastly, the High Court repelled the contention that before clause (f) of section 21 could have application, the candidate should be disqualified by an order of a competent authority for in its opinion the disqualification became effective by operation of law, according to the tenor of clause (f) and not by an earlier determination of the disqualification. In seeking leave to appeal the petitioners urged the same contentions as were raised before the High Court. A plain reading of section 21 leaves no room for doubt that it is a residuary provision to cover those disqualifi cations, which are not enumerated in section

21. For reference sake it is reproduced as under :‑ `

21. Disqualifications of candidates and members.‑A person shall be disqualified to be a candidate or a member of a local council‑‑ (a) to (e) .. (f) if he, for the time being, is disqualified for membership of the Parliament or a Provincial Assembly under any law for the time being in force." According to its tenor it tends to bring the candidates for the local councils on the same footing as the candidates for the membership of the Parlia ment or the Provincial Assemblies by subjecting them to the same disquali fications in addition to those enumerated in section

21. The word `dis qualified' used in clause (f) has no particular implication but that it signifies the disability according to the particular language of the provisions o. other statutes. This becomes obvious if the word `disqualified' is read in conjunction with the words `under any law for the time being in force'. The High Court was, therefore, correct in holding that the implication or this word was not that, that a candidate should have been disqualified under any law for the time being in force by any specific order. Further, as this clause incorporates the disqualifications under other laws and, therefore, the High Court was right in holding that such disqualifications,, being an integral part of the Ordinance, full effect should be given to them subject of course to the limitation that they should not be inconsistent with the disqualifications enumerated in section

21. Again we fail to see hove Article 1 (2) and (3) of President's Order No. 5 could be taken into consideration for holding that the disqualifications in Article 10 could not be read into clause (f) of section 21 of the Ordinance when clause (f) itself incorporates disqualifications as provided by this. Article and the other laws. The principle of interpretation is that what is enacted has to be given full effect and extraneous considerations cannot be employed to make it redundant or to detract it from the meaning which it conveys. Therefore it would not be proper to read the words "by a specific order" in clause (f) for the Courts cannot provide the deficiency which can only be done by the Legislature. Accordingly, the order of the High Court is unexceptionable. The petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. Petitions dismissed.