P L D 1964 Dacca 125 (PLP)

(Sd.) N. Hossain, L. A. Collector, Dinajpur."

12. Now this plot No. 7054 measures 10'40 acres whereon stand at different places several Pucca buildings and structures. No indication whatsoever has been given in the order of requisi tion or in the notice that was served upon the petitioner as to wherefrom this 3.20 acres of land has been requisitioned and whether the said quantity of land has been requisitioned in one piece or in several pieces. It cannot be left to the sweet will of the officer going to take possession of the requisitioned property in pursuance of such an indefinite and vague order to carve out the 3.20 acres of land from the said C. S. plot No. 7054 in a manner that may seriously and vitally affect the enjoyment of the several Pucca buildings and structures on the plot. At any rate, the peti tioner must be apprised of such particulars of the land requisi tioned as will identify the land so as to enable him to make arrangements for making over possession of the same to the requisitioning authority. In the case of Mumtaz Begam v. Province of East Pakistan, it has been held thus by a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party "Mr. Hafez, who has appeared before us on behalf of the petitioner, has in the first instance, urged that the impugned order is void, illegal and inoperative inasmuch as it cannot ,be treated as‑ an `order' under section 3 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948 (Act XIII of 1948). He has argued that the power conferred to requisition a property necessarily postulates a define specified and identifi able property. He has pointed out that the order of requisition merely purported to requisition a vague, indefinite and un identifiable part of the petitioner's land. "No notice was given to her as to what portion and area of her lands he was required to make over under the said order. We uphold this contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner. In our opinion, the power to requisition a property postulates that such requisitioned property must be specified and capable of being identified at the time when the order is made. The said section 3 does not authorise the relevant authority to requisition a land the specification of which would be deter‑ A mined at some future date after a good deal of fluctuations in the mind of the authorities as to the location and the amount of land that would be required for a public purpose. The peti tioner is, therefore, entitled to succeed on this point."

13. On similar lines are two other decisions of this Court. In the case of Mansur Ali v. Province of East Pakistan (P L D 1959 Dacca 464), which is a case under the Town Improvement Act, 1958 (East Bengal Act XIII of 1958), the provisions of which so far as requisition is concerned, is more or less similar to section 3 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, a Division Bench of this Court observed thus "Such service of the order postulates that the order must convey to the affected person an idea as to what property is sought to be acquired from him and to what extent. It need not set out in any detail the particulars which may perhaps be required under subsection (4) (b) of section 93‑A of the Act, but sufficient particulars must be set out which will enable the person from whom the property is requisitioned, to identify the property and to ascertain the extent of such requisition. It is difficult to lay down the exact limits as to what those particulars should be, but the order must give sufficient notice to the person affected by it, setting out such particulars which would enable the person concerned to understand what has been acquired from him. "Learned Advocate‑General has pointed out that the order has specified the cadastral survey plot numbers of the lands which have been requisitioned and has contended that the same would sufficiently indicate to the petitioner what has been requi sitioned. The requisitioned lands can be identified with reference to the C. S. Plots as set out in the order. This argument is partially correct but not wholly so. "We have already quoted the plot‑numbers as specified in the order. Some part of the land which has been requisitioned has been described as "part of C. S. plots Nos. 67, 69, 73, 75, 78, 79, 83 and 89". This is undoubtedly vague and does not convey to the petitioner any idea of what part of the said plots and the amount of lands which have been requisitioned in the aforesaid plots."

14. In the case of Fatik Chandra Dey v. The Province of East Pakistan (not yet reported) another Division Bench of this Court, in circumstances similar to the present case, made the following observations "The next point urged by the learned Advocate for the peti tioner is that the notice served on his client is vague and indefi nite. On a reference to the notice, it is found that only the area of plot No. 2063 has been given in the notice. But no definite indication has been given as to from which part of that plot, area of land as requisitioned will be taken. Nor any mention of the pathway has been made in the notice. It is also not clear whether the area proposed to be taken will be of a B square or rectangular shape and for what purpose the area requi sitioned will be utilised. Therefore, the contention of the learn ed Advocate that it is not possible for his client to know from the notice as to which part of the plot has been requisitioned, is of substance and, we hold that the notice suffers from indefi niteness and vagueness. When somebody's property is sought to be taken, he should be given a precise notice of what is being actually taken from him. On this ground also the impugned order is liable to be set aside."

15. We, therefore, uphold this contention and hold that the impugned order of requisition suffers from indefiniteness and l vagueness and is not a valid notice of the order under the law.

16. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the area of the requisitioned land is in excess of the immediate requirement of the requiring body. The petitioner's case is that the requiring body, namely, the Post Master General of East Pakistan Circle, ultimately asked for only 1.60 acres of land for the construction of the Telephone Exchange building but that respondent No. 1, the Land Acquisition Collector, requisitioned 3.20 acres of land for the Telephone Exchange and the Head Post Office Buildings. This contention finds supports from the records of the case that have been placed before us by the learned Advo cate‑General and relied on by both the parties. An order dated 25‑6‑61 of respondent No. 1, the Land Acquisition Collector, reads thus "Seen P. M. G.'s Memo. No. 101/Reconstn., dated 12‑6‑61 intimating sanction of Rs. 9,327 and asking for land for Tele phone Exchange Site only (1.60 out of 3.20 acres) leaving aside the site of Post Office and saying that the payment of the cost of the balance amount Rs. 9,327 of land will be paid during the next financial year (1961‑62) under a separate project. "Discussed with D. C. about the requisition of part land belong ing to private individual. For Post and Telephone Exchange both an area of 3.20 acres is proposed for acquisition by the Site Selection Committee. Now P. M. G. has asked for land for Telephone Exchange only. Difficulty will arise to acquire the land in piecemeal. If the land is acquired partly, balance portion of the site may not be available later. The owner may block the vacant area of the site by constructing overnight which will create additional trouble. "So send a telegram to P. M. G. stating the point as discussed above (sic) with copy to Divisional Engineer. (Sd.) N. Hossain, 25‑6‑

61. L. A. C."

17. There is, therefore, no doubt that the requiring body, which is normally expected to know its actual requirement, wanted as an immediate requirement only 1.60 acres of land for the Tele phone Exchange building only. It did not think it necessary to ask for more, presumably, because the construction of the Head Post Office building had to be deferred on account of lack of funds. Be that as it may, the fact remained that in the ultimate resort the requiring body asked for only 1.60 acres of land for the Telephone Exchange only. On the facts and circumstances of the case, it can hardly be gainsaid that the 3.20 acres of land that have been requisitioned is in excess of the immediate requirement of the requiring body. As to the balance of 3.20 acres of land, it is patent that there is no immediate and pressing necessity for taking possession of the same.

18. It may be mentioned here that had the order of requisi tion not suffered from indefiniteness and vagueness and of the order requisition had been confined to the actual requirement of the requiring body, namely, 1.60 acres of land, we would have had no hesitation in upholding the impugned order of requisition. We, however, hold that the impugned order is illegal and, there fore, liable to cancellation on the ground that 3.20 acres of land have been requisitioned, whereas the necessity for immediate possession (justifying an order of requisition) has been established only in respect of 1.60 acres of land. Furthermore, there can be no public purpose behind an order of requisition in excess of land actually required. Public interest demands that an inch of land beyond the actual requirement for public purpose should not be compulsorily taken away.

19. For the reasons stated above, we make the rule absolute and direct the respondents to cancel the impugned order of requi sition dated the 3rd of July 1961, served upon the petitioner in L. A. Case No. 60/4 of 1960‑61 of Dinajpur District. The petitioner is entitled to costs of this application, which we assess at seven Gold Mohurs. MURSHED, J.‑I agree. s. B./K. B. A. Rule made absolute.