2013 CLC 74 (PLP)

IBAD-UR-REHMAN LODHI, J.

The ejectment petition was filed by respondent No.1 on 22-4-2009 on the ground of default in payment of rent and expiry of tenancy agreement. The tenant, when appeared, failed to apply for leave to contest within the prescribed period of limitation and, therefore, the learned Special Judge (Rent) ceased of the matter at the relevant time refused to grant such leave.

2. The appeal preferred against such refusal of leave was allowed and the matter was remanded back to the learned Special Judge (Rent) for proceeding with the ejectment petition on merits.

3. Even such remand order was not accepted by the tenant, whose appeal was allowed and he challenged the findings of the same in constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by way of Writ Petition No.11853 of 2011, which was dismissed on 10-11-2011.

4. It is pertinent to mention here that during pendency of appeal before the learned First Appellate Authority and the constitutional petition here in this Court, the proceedings before the learned Special Judge (Rent) were never stopped by any order.

5. The learned Special Judge (Rent), who continued with the proceedings, has taken up the leave petition on 13-5-2011 and when no-body appeared to prosecute the said leave petition, the same was dismissed for want of prosecution. The tenant/petitioner by means of a petition dated 29-6-2011 applied for restoration of the same by taking a plea that he only became aware of dismissal of his leave petition on 13-6-2011 and thus within a period of 30 days, as provided in section 21(8) of New Rent Laws, the petition was within time. The learned Special Judge (Rent), before whom such petition was moved seeking restoration of leave petition, proceeded to dismiss the same on 22-11-2011 being barred by limitation.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner impugns such findings of the learned Special Judge (Rent) arrived at on 22-11-2011, mainly on the ground that with regard to order dated 13-5-2011, he only became aware on 13-6-2011 and, therefore, from such date of knowledge the petition moved on 29-6-2011 was within time.

7. I have gone through the relevant provisions of law. Only one starting point from where the limitation to file an application for restoration of the earlier dismissed application in default is given as the date when dismissal order was passed and from that point of time a period of 30 days was provided to the person seeking restoration. Unlike other matters, for a petition to be moved under section 21(8) of Rent Laws, no date of knowledge is made basis as a starting point for counting limitation to enable a person to move restoration application. Therefore, in the present case the limitation started on 13-5-2011 and it was incumbent upon the petitioner to move application for restoration of his dismissed petition within 30 days of such dismissal. The application moved on 29-6-2011 is, therefore, on the face of it filed beyond such period of limitation. Even if the date of 13-6-2011 is taken when according to the petitioner he acquired the knowledge for the first time regarding dismissal of his leave petition, the petitioner in that case was bound to give plausible explanation of each and every day falls in between 13-6-2011 and 29-6-2011, which explanation is conspicuously missing.

8. The conduct adopted by the tenant in this case and noted in a number of rent cases to the effect that by deviating the proceedings they succeeded in getting time beyond one prescribed in Special Law, which is a clear negation of section 27 of The Rent Ordinance/Act, which provides that Special Judge (Rent) shall pass a final order on an application as expeditiously as possible, but not later than 4 months from the date of filing of the application and in case of failure by the Rent Tribunal in observing such time limit, it is then a duty of the Tribunal to conduct the proceedings on day-to-day basis. Neither the applications moved under the Rent Laws are decided within a period of 4 months nor in case of failure on the part of the Tribunal to adhere to such time limits, the subsequent proceedings are carried out on day-to-days basis.

9. The District Judges in their supervisory jurisdiction are supposed to look into the matters as to why the mandatory provisions of law are not being complied with in their letter and spirit.

10. The result is that the petition having no force is dismissed.

11. A copy of this order be transmitted to the learned Member Inspection Team of this Court, who will take up this matter with all the District Judges and to report compliance of the said directions to this Court. KMZ/M-206/L Petition dismissed.