P L D 1969 Karachi 104 (PLP)
Mst. MANNI-Applicant Versus KARACHI CANTONMENT BOARD Respondent
| Citation | P L D 1969 Karachi 104 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Wahiduddin Ahmad, C J |
| Parties | Mst. MANNI-Applicant Versus KARACHI CANTONMENT BOARD Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1969 Karachi 104 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1969 Karachi 104 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Wahiduddin Ahmad, C J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1969 Karachi 104 (PLP) (Mst. MANNI-Applicant Versus KARACHI CANTONMENT BOARD Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Ashiq All Abdullah, for Petitioner. Mansoorul Arfin for Respondent. Date of hearing : 23rd January 1969.
Headnotes / Summary
Government servant-Dismissal from service of a Government servant or an employee of a statutory body-Civil Courts have jurisdiction to go into question whether services validly terminated or not-Suit for declaration that termination of service void, wrongful and inoperative-Cannot be termed as one for enforcing a contract for personal service and dismissed on that score-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 21 (a), (b)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.
9. High Commissioner for India and another v. I. M. Lall A I R 1948 P C 121 and Ram Kissendas Dhanuka and others v. Satya Charan Lal and others A I R 1950 P C 81 rel. JUDGMENT This revision is directed against the order dated the 24th of November 1965, of Mr. Ahmed Khan Barakzai, Civil Judge 1st Class, Karachi in Suit No. 10 of 1964. By this order the learned Civil Judge rejected the plaint of the petitioner under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. Code.
2. The facts giving rise to this revision are that the petitioner, Mst. Manni, who was in the employment of the respondent-Cantonment Board, filed the above suit for a declara tion that her services as a sweeper Here terminated by the respondent illegally and on unwarranted and unjustified grounds. She also claimed a mandatory injunction directing the respondent to re-instate her in the service. The learned Civil Judge, on an application made under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. Code, rejected the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred under section 21 (a) and (b) of the Specific Relief Act as, according to the learned Civil Judge, the relationship between the parties is based on a contract of personal service which cannot be enforced through the Civil Court. This order is being challenged in the present revision petition before me.
3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am satisfied that the view -taken by the learned subordinate Court cannot be upheld in these proceedings. The learned subordinate Court failed to notice that the petitioner was already in the service of the respondent-Board and it was not a case it which she was asking for specific performance of the contract which was entered into between the parties. Her grievance was that the germination of her service as a sweeper was illegal, unwarranted and unjustified. It was, therefore, a case in which the learned-subordinate Court was required to go into the legality of the order of termination of the services of the petitioner and to find out whether it was made in accordance with the rules and regulations which were applicable to the facts of the present case. Unfor tunately, the learned trial Court did not consider this aspect of the case and took the suit as one for specific performance of the contract.
4. This aspect of the case was put to the learned counsel for the respondent and he was unable to satisfy me that the suit filed by the petitioner was one for specific performance of a contract. There are a number of decided cases in which it has been held that where the services of a Government servant or of an employee of a statutory body are terminated, the civil Courts have got jurisdiction to go into the question whether their services have been validly terminated or not. In I.M. Lall's case it was held by the Lahore High Court that the Court can grant a declaration that the order of removal of Mr. I: M. Lall from the Indian Civil Service was wrongful, void and inoperative and that he was still a Member of the Indian Civil Service. On appeal, the Federal Court held that Mr. I. M. Lall was not entitled to the declaration prayed for and that the proper remedy for him was a suit for damages for wrongful dismissal. This view was not upheld by the Privy Council in The High Commissioner for India and another v. I. M. Lall (A I R 1948 P C 121) and their Lordships upheld the view of the Lahore High Court and granted the declaration to Mr. I. M. Lall which he had sought in his suit. In Ram Kissendas Dhanuka and others v. Satya Charan Lal and others (A I R 1950 P C 81) a Company removed their managing agent by an ordinary resolution at a general meeting, contrary to the articles of association, and the Court came to the conclusion that the removal was illegal. On these facts it was held by the Privy Council that the decree as between the Company and the Managing agent did not have the effect of enforcing a contract of personal service. It, therefore, seems to me that the declara tion sought by the petitioner was not in the nature of enforcing a contract but was merely one that her services were wrongly terminated. This declaration, in my opinion, can legitimately be claimed by an employee of a statutory body.
5. In that view of the matter I would hold that the learned subordinate Court had fallen in error and the impugned order is, therefore, set aside. The case is remanded back to the trial Court with the direction to dispose of the suit in the light of the discussion made above. In the result, the revision petition is allowed, but the parties are left to bear their own costs. K. B. A. Petition allowed.
Judgment & Decree
This revision is directed against the order dated the 24th of November 1965, of Mr. Ahmed Khan Barakzai, Civil Judge 1st Class, Karachi in Suit No. 10 of 1964. By this order the learned Civil Judge rejected the plaint of the petitioner under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. Code.
2. The facts giving rise to this revision are that the petitioner, Mst. Manni, who was in the employment of the respondent-Cantonment Board, filed the above suit for a declara tion that her services as a sweeper Here terminated by the respondent illegally and on unwarranted and unjustified grounds. She also claimed a mandatory injunction directing the respondent to re-instate her in the service. The learned Civil Judge, on an application made under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. Code, rejected the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred under section 21 (a) and (b) of the Specific Relief Act as, according to the learned Civil Judge, the relationship between the parties is based on a contract of personal service which cannot be enforced through the Civil Court. This order is being challenged in the present revision petition before me.
3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am satisfied that the view -taken by the learned subordinate Court cannot be upheld in these proceedings. The learned subordinate Court failed to notice that the petitioner was already in the service of the respondent-Board and it was not a case it which she was asking for specific performance of the contract which was entered into between the parties. Her grievance was that the germination of her service as a sweeper was illegal, unwarranted and unjustified. It was, therefore, a case in which the learned-subordinate Court was required to go into the legality of the order of termination of the services of the petitioner and to find out whether it was made in accordance with the rules and regulations which were applicable to the facts of the present case. Unfor tunately, the learned trial Court did not consider this aspect of the case and took the suit as one for specific performance of the contract.
4. This aspect of the case was put to the learned counsel for the respondent and he was unable to satisfy me that the suit filed by the petitioner was one for specific performance of a contract. There are a number of decided cases in which it has been held that where the services of a Government servant or of an employee of a statutory body are terminated, the civil Courts have got jurisdiction to go into the question whether their services have been validly terminated or not. In I.M. Lall's case it was held by the Lahore High Court that the Court can grant a declaration that the order of removal of Mr. I: M. Lall from the Indian Civil Service was wrongful, void and inoperative and that he was still a Member of the Indian Civil Service. On appeal, the Federal Court held that Mr. I. M. Lall was not entitled to the declaration prayed for and that the proper remedy for him was a suit for damages for wrongful dismissal. This view was not upheld by the Privy Council in The High Commissioner for India and another v. I. M. Lall (A I R 1948 P C 121) and their Lordships upheld the view of the Lahore High Court and granted the declaration to Mr. I. M. Lall which he had sought in his suit. In Ram Kissendas Dhanuka and others v. Satya Charan Lal and others (A I R 1950 P C 81) a Company removed their managing agent by an ordinary resolution at a general meeting, contrary to the articles of association, and the Court came to the conclusion that the removal was illegal. On these facts it was held by the Privy Council that the decree as between the Company and the Managing agent did not have the effect of enforcing a contract of personal service. It, therefore, seems to me that the declara tion sought by the petitioner was not in the nature of enforcing a contract but was merely one that her services were wrongly terminated. This declaration, in my opinion, can legitimately be claimed by an employee of a statutory body.
5. In that view of the matter I would hold that the learned subordinate Court had fallen in error and the impugned order is, therefore, set aside. The case is remanded back to the trial Court with the direction to dispose of the suit in the light of the discussion made above. In the result, the revision petition is allowed, but the parties are left to bear their own costs. K. B. A. Petition allowed.