PLC 1984

1984 PLP 1532 (PLC)

MUHAMMAD RAFIQ Versus SIND ALKALIS LTD. AND ANOTHER

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi High Court
Decided Date
Constitutional Petition No. 40 of 1980, decided on 1st December, 1983.
Honorable Judges
Abdul Hayee Qureshi, C J and Z. C. Valiani, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1984 PLP 1532 (PLC)
Forum / Court Karachi High Court
Bench Members Abdul Hayee Qureshi, C J and Z. C. Valiani, J
Parties MUHAMMAD RAFIQ Versus SIND ALKALIS LTD. AND ANOTHER
Primary Law Industrial dispute‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1984 PLP 1532 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial dispute‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1984 PLP 1532 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi High Court bench comprising: Abdul Hayee Qureshi, C J and Z. C. Valiani, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1984 PLP 1532 (PLC) (MUHAMMAD RAFIQ Versus SIND ALKALIS LTD. AND ANOTHER). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial dispute‑

Representation

  • Malik Saeed for Petitioner.
  • Kamal Mansoor Alam for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 1st December, 1983.
  • Learned Advocate for the petitioner in support of the above petition submitted as under: -
  • In view of the above submissions, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted, that the order, dated 10th October, 1979 of the learned respondent No.2 be declared as without lawful authority and illegal and consequently be set aside.
  • Learned Advocate Appearing for the respondent No.1 has submitted, that the definition of the workman, as given in the Standing Orders Ordi nance, 1968 or I. R. O., 1969 do not apply to the case of the petitioner. The Petitioner was engaged as apprentice only and as such his appointment cannot be considered, as probationer and or Badli. In support of this, the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 relied upon letters, dated 4th November, 1976, 14th January, 1977, 18th March, 1977 and 20th May, 1977 of the petitioner which were produced in evidence of the respondent No.1, before Labour Court and marked as Annexures `A' `B' 'C' and 'D'. in the R. & P. Learned Advocate further submitted, that it is clear from Annexure 'E', dated 13th June, 1977, that petitioner was relieved on completion of extended apprenticeship period and as such Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 or I. R. O., 1969 did not apply to the case of the petitioner.
  • We have carefully considered the above submissions made by learned Advocates before us and have gone through R & P of the learned Labour Court as well as impugned judgment.
  • It is admitted position, that petitioner was employed apprentice on 13th May, 1975 for one year by respondent No.1. However, according to res pondent No.1 period of petitioner's apprenticeship was extended at his request, to enable him to acquire perfection, which is evident from Annex ures `A', `B', `C' and `D', letters written by Petitioner, which are on record of learned lower Court in which he has described himself as Apprentice even if Exh. 8 alleged application of Petitioner is discarded from consideration as well as Exh. 8, by which said period is alleged to have been extended from 29th May, 1976 to 28th 1977. We find great force in this contention of the learned Advocate for respondent No.1. In order to appreciate the arguments Advanced before us by the learned Advocate, it is necessary to consider certain definitions of "Workman" in I. R. O and Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, which are reproduced here.
  • It is clear from letter of appointment, dated 13th May, 1975, Annexure `A', that petitioner was appointed as `Apprentice Fitter' on the terms and conditions mentioned in the said letter, which letter is in accordance with section 2‑A of Schedule to Standing Orders Ordinance. 1968. Petitioner has produced no letter for his alleged appointment as probationer and/or Badli, as required by section 2‑A of Schedule in question, to substantiate his allegations in this connection. Hence the question, that petitioner was appointed as probationer and/or Badli worker as defined in Schedule to the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, does not arise at all and as such we find no force in the contention of the learned Advocate for petitioner in this connection.
  • Petitioner's admitted letters, Annexures `A', `B', 'C' and `D' clearly show, that petitioner right upto 20th May, 1977 described himself as Apprentice Fitter and never claimed any other status. In view of this, even if Exhs. 6 and 8 correspondence alleged to have been exchanged for extension of period of apprenticeship are discarded from consideration, still petitioner cannot dispute his status, as given by him, in these letters, which are not disowned by petitioner. In view of this letter, dated 13th June, 1977 of respondent No.1 by which petitioner was released of his apprenticeship which was issued within two weeks of expiry of second year of apprentice ship, cannot be considered, as letter of termination of his service, as "Workman" either under the definition of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and/or I. R. O., 1969 and as such we see no reason to declare the impugned order of learned respondent No.2, as without lawful authority, on any grounds urged before us by learned Advocate for petitioner.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑Apprentice‑Not a "workman"‑Release of Apprentice after expiry of apprenticeship Does not amount to termination of service of a workman so as to be challenge-able under S. 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969‑West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. 2 (i) and Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss 2 (xxviii i & 25‑A.

Judgment & Decree

(b) That since admittedly Apprenticeship Ordinance, 1962 was not applicable to the respondent No.1 concern, the Petitioner ought to have been deemed to have been employed as probationer and consequently the period of such probation under Standing Order Ordinance, 1968 could not have been more than 3 months and as such on the expiring of the 3 months period, petitioner became a permanent workman, within the meaning of said order and conse quently the order, dated 19th May, 1979 passed by the Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court, Karachi, ought not to have been set aside by the learned respondent No.2. (c) Learned respondent No.2 has erred in coming to the conclusion, that the petitioner is not a workman under the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. In view of the above submissions, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted, that the order, dated 10th October, 1979 of the learned respondent No.2 be declared as without lawful authority and illegal and consequently be set aside. Learned Advocate Appearing for the respondent No.1 has submitted, that the definition of the workman, as given in the Standing Orders Ordi nance, 1968 or I. R. O., 1969 do not apply to the case of the petitioner. The Petitioner was engaged as apprentice only and as such his appointment cannot be considered, as probationer and or Badli. In support of this, the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 relied upon letters, dated 4th November, 1976, 14th January, 1977, 18th March, 1977 and 20th May, 1977 of the petitioner which were produced in evidence of the respondent No.1, before Labour Court and marked as Annexures `A' `B' 'C' and 'D'. in the R. & P. Learned Advocate further submitted, that it is clear from Annexure 'E', dated 13th June, 1977, that petitioner was relieved on completion of extended apprenticeship period and as such Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 or I. R. O., 1969 did not apply to the case of the petitioner. We have carefully considered the above submissions made by learned Advocates before us and have gone through R & P of the learned Labour Court as well as impugned judgment. It is admitted position, that petitioner was employed apprentice on 13th May, 1975 for one year by respondent No.1. However, according to res pondent No.1 period of petitioner's apprenticeship was extended at his request, to enable him to acquire perfection, which is evident from Annex ures `A', `B', `C' and `D', letters written by Petitioner, which are on record of learned lower Court in which he has described himself as Apprentice even if Exh. 8 alleged application of Petitioner is discarded from consideration as well as Exh. 8, by which said period is alleged to have been extended from 29th May, 1976 to 28th 1977. We find great force in this contention of the learned Advocate for respondent No.1. In order to appreciate the arguments Advanced before us by the learned Advocate, it is necessary to consider certain definitions of "Workman" in I. R. O and Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, which are reproduced here. Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 defines "Worker" and "Workman" as follows: ‑ "2 (xxviii) `Worker' and `Workman' means any person not falling within the definition of employer, who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, dis charged, retrenched, laid‑off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay‑off, or removal has led to that dispute (but does not include any person‑(a) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or (b) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding rupees eight hundred per mensem or performs, either because of the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature). Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 defines `Workman' as follows: --‑ 2 (i) `Workman' means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical (work) for hire or reward." Clarification of Workman as probationer and Badli as given in Schedule of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, reads as follows :‑ "(c) A `Probationer' is a workman who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy in a post and has not completed three months service therein. If a permanent employee is employed as a proba tioner in a higher post he may, at any time during the probationary period of three months, be reverted to his old permanent post. (d) A `badli' is a workman who is appointed in the post of a permanent workman or probationer, who is temporarily absent." It is clear from letter of appointment, dated 13th May, 1975, Annexure `A', that petitioner was appointed as `Apprentice Fitter' on the terms and conditions mentioned in the said letter, which letter is in accordance with section 2‑A of Schedule to Standing Orders Ordinance. 1968. Petitioner has produced no letter for his alleged appointment as probationer and/or Badli, as required by section 2‑A of Schedule in question, to substantiate his allegations in this connection. Hence the question, that petitioner was appointed as probationer and/or Badli worker as defined in Schedule to the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, does not arise at all and as such we find no force in the contention of the learned Advocate for petitioner in this connection. Petitioner's admitted letters, Annexures `A', `B', 'C' and `D' clearly show, that petitioner right upto 20th May, 1977 described himself as Apprentice Fitter and never claimed any other status. In view of this, even if Exhs. 6 and 8 correspondence alleged to have been exchanged for extension of period of apprenticeship are discarded from consideration, still petitioner cannot dispute his status, as given by him, in these letters, which are not disowned by petitioner. In view of this letter, dated 13th June, 1977 of respondent No.1 by which petitioner was released of his apprenticeship which was issued within two weeks of expiry of second year of apprentice ship, cannot be considered, as letter of termination of his service, as "Workman" either under the definition of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and/or I. R. O., 1969 and as such we see no reason to declare the impugned order of learned respondent No.2, as without lawful authority, on any grounds urged before us by learned Advocate for petitioner. Therefore, we find no merits in the above petition, which is dismissed, with no orders as to cost. A. E. Petition dismissed.