2015 PLP 2294 (YLR)

MAHMOOD AHMED BHATTI, J.

Husnain Akhtar, the petitioner has filed this petition to question the legality and correctness of the order dated 8-11-2013 passed by an Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Offico Justice of Peace, Mianchannu, District Khanewal, whereby he allowed the application of Haji Fazal Karim, respondent No.3 moved under section 22-A, Cr.P.C. The operative part of the impugned order reads as under:-- "Under the law, every information in respect of commission of crime whether cognizable or non-cognizable, shall be reduced into writing under section 154 or 155, Cr.P.C. by the Officer Incharge of P.S. concerned. The provisions of section 154 or 155, Cr.P.C. are mandatory in nature and the local police has no option but to comply with the mandate of law, as such, the petitioner is directed to appear before the SHO concerned who shall entertain the application of the petitioner and then proceed further with the matter strictly in accordance with law. With these observations, petition in hand stands disposed of."

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that Haji Fazal Karim, aforementioned has already instituted a civil suit for the recovery of Rs. 92,47,697 which is pending adjudication in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Mianchannu, District Khanewal. He postulates that after the institution of the Civil suit, a criminal case is not to be allowed to go to trial on the basis of the very same averments and allegations. In support of this, he places reliance on the cases reported as 2012 YLR 2745, PLD 2006 SC 573, and 2010 SCMR 1835. He argues that the complainant has already lodged another complaint against the petitioner, and the petitioner has been behind the bars because of that case. He implies that the application made by the complainant under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. is just a pressure tactic, besides being a device and contrivance to disgrace, humiliate and degrade the petitioner. He points out that the petitioner and the complainant are brothers-in-law inter se. He also questions the manner in which proceedings were conducted by learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, who first called for a report from the SHO, Police Station City Mianchannu, District Khanewal, but without waiting for the same respondent No.1 proceeded to pass the impugned order. Towards the end of his submissions, he urges that the complainant is not to be allowed to approbate and reprobate. He attempts to show that the complainant and the petitioner tried to resolve the dispute between them through a Punchayat/Arbitration Council. Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of respondent No.3 to turn round and to launch a criminal prosecution against the petitioner.

3. Mr. M. Shafique Alyana, Advocate, counsel for Haji Fazal Karim, respondent No.3 rebuts, refutes and controverts the arguments made by learned counsel for the petitioner. He argues that under Section 154, Cr.P.C., SHO Police Station City Mianchannu, District Khanewal, respondent No.2 was duty bound to register the case and he was not vested with any authority to refuse to register the complaint made on behalf of respondent No.3. He submits that resort was made to learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Mianchannu, respondent No.1 only when respondent No.2 failed to discharge his duty under the law. He is at pains to explain that civil and criminal proceedings can be conducted at one and the same time, and that the institution of a civil suit is no bar to the starting of the criminal proceedings. He makes the submission that learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Mianchannu was not required to call for a report from the SHO Police Station concerned. As for the other FIR lodged by Haji Fazal Karim, the aforementioned, he argues that it related to another occurrence and each and every occurrence would give rise to an independent FIR.

4. Learned AAG supports the order passed by learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, respondent No.1. He stresses that any number of FIRs might be registered against a person in respect of different/ various occurrences and this is no ground at all to refuse to register second FIR against the culprit (s).

5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned AAG, learned counsel for respondent No.3 and perused the record.

6. The arguments addressed by learned counsel for the petitioner carry no weight at all in view of the latest pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported as 2014 SCMR

83. I can do no better than reproduce Para 15 therefrom:-- "Case should have been registered under section 154, Cr.P.C. when matter was reported, the police administration is bound to follow the dictate of law, which has been explained by this Court time and again. Reference may be made to the following paras of the judgment in the case of Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt. (PLD 2007 SC 539):--

27. The conclusions that we draw from the above, rather lengthy discussion, on the subject of FIR, are as under:-- (a) No authority vested with an Officer Incharge of a Police Station or with anyone else to refuse to record an FIR where the information conveyed, disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence. (b) no authority vested with an Officer Incharge of a Police Station or with any one else to hold any inquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the information which is conveyed to the SHO for the purposes of recording of an FIR. (c) any FIR registered after such an exercise i.e. determination of the truth or falsity of the information conveyed to the SHO, would get hit by the provisions of section 162, Cr.P.C. (d) existence of an FIR is no condition precedent for holding of an investigation nor is the same a prerequisite for the arrest of a person concerned with the commission of a cognizable offence; (e) nor does the recording of an FIR mean that the SHO or a police officer deputed by him was obliged to investigate the case or to go through the whole length of investigation of the case mentioned therein or that any accused person nominated therein must be arrested; and finally that (f) the check against lodging of false FIRs was not refusal to record such FIRs, but punishment of such informants under section 182, P.P.C. etc. which should be, if enforced, a fairly deterrent against misuse of the provisions of section 154, Cr.P.C."

7. I cannot see eye to eye with the argument advance by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the criminal prosecution is not allowed to be launched or gone ahead when a civil suit regarding the very same matter is pending adjudication. Such an argument has been repelled repeatedly by the Superior Courts. In this respect, reference may well be made to the judgments reported as PLD 2000 (Lahore) 246), "M. Aslam Zaheer v. Ch. Shah Muhammad" (2003 SCMR 1691), "Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf and others" (2006 SCMR 1192), "Rafique Bibi v. Muhammad Sharif and others" (2006 SCMR 512) and "Shakeel Ahmad v. S.H.O. 2007 PCr.LJ

381. Therefore, civil and criminal proceedings can be carried out simultaneously.

8. This brings me to the other limb of the argument advanced by learned counsel for the a complainant that once the parties had a recourse to Punchayat/Arbitration Council, respondent No.3 stood precluded from approaching the police or learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Mianchannu for getting his grievance redressed. Suffice it to say that the law of the land does not countenance/approve of deciding criminal cases through the intercession of the Punchayats/Arbitration Councils. Even otherwise, it is tantamount to bypassing and short-circuiting the procedure provided for under the law. This is not to say that there is any proof of the convening of Punchayat/Arbitration Council to settle the controversy between the parties. I have dealt with this argument made by the petitioner's side just to impress upon the petitioner that he is mistaken in his approach to get out of the trouble.

9. I am of the view that keeping in view the complaint made on behalf of respondent No.1, learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace passed the impugned order in accordance with law. It cannot be faulted on any ground. Seemingly, no illegality, infirmity or material irregularity was committed by respondent No.1, Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Mianchannu in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon him. The impugned order being unexceptionable, there is no merit in the writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. ZC/H-11/L Petition dismissed.