PCRLJ 1993

1993 P Cr (PLP)

MUHAMMAD YOUSUF — Applicant Versus THE STATE — Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1993 P Cr (PLP)
Forum / Court Karachi
Bench Members N/A
Parties MUHAMMAD YOUSUF — Applicant Versus THE STATE — Respondent
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1993 P Cr (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1993 P Cr (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1993 P Cr (PLP) (MUHAMMAD YOUSUF — Applicant Versus THE STATE — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Headnotes / Summary

Ss. 14 & 6

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.561-A

Quashing of proceedings

S.H.O. in his report did not state the acts with which the applicant was charged, and general repute of the applicant or any other allegation against him, as required by S.6 of the Act

Report of the S.H.O. was also against the spirit of S.14 of the Act which required frequent repetition of offences whereas applicant was shown to have been involved only in one pending case

Only police witnesses were cited against the applicant on whose evidence alone no order could be safely based

Proceedings pending against the applicant before the Magistrate were quashed in circumstances.

Judgment & Decree

(ii) the details of time and place of such acts, (iii) general repute of person complained or such other allegations made against him." .

4. The report filed by S.H.O. Gulbahar Police Station did not state

(i) acts with which the applicant is charged, (ii) details of time and place of such acts, and (iii) general repute of applicant or any other allegation against him. As observed in Jan Muhammad v. The State reported in P L D 1981 Kar. 682, the order of Tribunal based on such report-is without jurisdiction.

5. This question was also examined by me in Inayat v. The State reported in 1989 P Cr. L J 1115, and was answered in the following words:-- "Like proviso to section 5, the proviso to section 6 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act, 1975, was not really a proviso in the accepted sense, but an independent legislative provision laying down the contents of the report to be served upon the person proceeded against. On the face of it the report filed by S.H.O. Sujawal Police Station, against the applicant does not satisfy the requirements of the proviso to section 6 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act, 1975. The S.H.O. Sujawal Police Station, has tried to bring the case of the applicant within the mischief of clauses (xix), (xx) and (xxxi) of section 14 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act, 1975, but only vague allegations have been made with no details of time and place of such acts, as required under section

6. The report which is again the basis of proceedings under section 8 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act, 1975, is intended to give sufficient notice to the person against whom the proceedings arc drawn, of the accusation made against him. Therefore, the report must set forth the substance of accusation alleged against the person proceeded with. If this is not done, the person proceeded against, cannot know till he comes to Tribunal precisely what he is charged with, and as no charge is drawn up in such proceedings, he may not know till the final order is passed, what his alleged fault is." Thus, the proceedings drawn against the applicant are liable to be quashed on this score alone.

6. The perusal of section 14 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act, 1975, again makes it clear that the person complained against must act "frequently" or "habitually" in order to bring his case within the mischief of this provision of law. The word "frequently" as defined in the New Oxford Dictionary means habitually too. The words habitually" was examined in the case of Qasim and 2 others v. The State reported in P L D 1971 Kar. 473 and it was held that:-- "Habitually must be taken to mean repeatedly or persistently. Habit implies a tendency resulting from the frequent proof by adducing evidence of commission of a number of similar acts. It, therefore, follows that a stray act or two arc not enough in proof of habit."

7. The word "habit" was also interpreted in the case of Mazan alias Mazno v. the State reported in P.L.D 1975 Kar. 1035 and it was observed. "Habit implies a tendency resulting from repetition of the same acts. It connotes depravity of character as evidenced by frequent repetition or commission of offences of theft, receiving of stolen property, etc. It does not mean mere, inclination to commit such offences by temperament, but persistence capable of proof by evidence. Habit must be proved by aggregate instances and not on the basis of complicity in an isolated instance of theft or suspicion in respect of another such incident. Thus, it is necessary that there should be evidence by large number of persons in respect of definite instances of theft, etc. in which the person complained against was involved."

8. The word "habit" was again considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Aftab Alam alias Matoo v. Province of Sindh and 2 others, reported in P L D 1979 Kar. 645 and it was observed that:-- "The word `habitually' required a continuous and permanence of criminal tendency something that has developed into a propensity that is present from day to day. Its presence is demonstrated by the frequency of acts that by repetition have acquired the characteristic of being customary or usual behaviour that is to be regarded as almost inevitable when the appropriate conditions are present. In other words, a habitual offender or a person habitually addicted to crime repeats on committing offence/offences whenever appropriate conditions are present. It becomes habit on account of frequent repetition to commit offence."

9. The perusal of the report filed by S.H.O. Gulbahar Police Station also reveals that the applicant is involved in only one case which too is pending decision. Section 14 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act, 1975 requires frequent repetition of the offences and consequently the report submitted by S.H.O. Gulbahar Police Station, is against the spirit of section 14 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act, 1975.

10. The report filed by S.H.O. Gulbahar Police Station, also reveals that only four witnesses are cited against the applicant and incidentally all of them are police officials. No doubt, the evidence of general reputation is relevant in a case of this nature but it is highly unsafe to base order on such evidence alone. The weighty observations made by ZA. Channa, J. in the case of Mehar Khan v. The State reported in 1975 P Cr. L J 257 are relevant in this behalf.

11. Faced with the above situation, the learned counsel for State has also not supported the impugned action taken against the applicant. In this view of the matter, the application made under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is allowed and the proceedings pending against the applicant under section 14 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act, 1975, before the S.D.M./Tribunal, Nazimabad, Karachi, are hereby quashed.

12. The applicant who is in custody be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. N.H.Q./M-1816/K Proceedings quashed.