1994 PLP 1390 (MLD)

Solitary point requiring determination in the revision petition was about parity of pre-emption qualifications of respective parties turning on interpretation of section 21-A of Punjab Pre.-emption.Act,;1913. It arises out of the facts and circumstances given below:

Ghulam Abbas was owner of 70 Kanais, 12 Marlas of agricultural land in revenue estate Sankhatra of Tehsil Narowal in the then District Sialkot. By a deed registered on 13-G-.1979, he sold above land to Muhammad Safdar, Abdul Amin sons of Budhay Khan, Shah Jahan, Amjad Ali sons of Muhammad Shafi for a sum of Rs.70,

000. Muhammad Sharif as plaintiff claimed pre-emption in respect of this sale and instituted a suit for pre-emption for it on 22-3-1980 in the Civil Court at Narowal. Superior right of pre-emption was asserted on the ground of being owner of the estate. Vendees contested the pre-emption suit filed against them and claimed parity of qualifications. It was asserted that they were also owners of the estate on account of gift of the land in their favour by a deed registered on 17-1-1980 and purchase of agricultural land by a sale-deed registered an 24-3-1980. Other issues were also raised. On 20-4-1983, the trial Court settled necessary issues for determination. Thereupon, it took evidence from the parties. Upon its review, on 22-4-1986, it decreed pre-emption in favour of plaintiffs, subject to their paying Rs.70,000 as sale price of the land to tine vendees-defendants on or up to 31-5-1986. Under issue No.3, the trial Court held that the gift evidenced by Exh. D4 was in reality a sale of the land and since a pre-emption suit filed regarding it was decreed, the defendants could not derive any benefit from it. As far the purchase of land through a deed registered on 24-3-1980, it took the view that since the sale-deed was registered after the institution of pre-emption suit, section 21-A of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 did not materially assist the defendants. . Defendants preferred an appeal to learned Additional District Judge, Narowal from the judgment and decree of the trial Court. It was allowed, on 28-9-1987, by him. His view was that the transaction in Exh.D4 was a gift which invested the defendants with the legal status of being owners of the estate and brought them at par with the plaintiffs. Consequently, the plaintiffs were not possessed of any superiority of right of pre-emption. Thereupon, the plaintiff came up in revision to this Court. It was admitted to hearing on 10-10-1987. As observed in the beginning, sole point for consideration in the civil revision was about the plaintiffs' superior right of pre-emption and the effect of improvement in the status of vendees-defendants in terms of section 21-A of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. At the hearing, the case took a complete turn which clearly obviated the consideration of the nature of transaction contained in Exh.D4, whether it was a gift immune from pre-emption or a sale subject to it. Sole ground taken to support pre-emption by the plaintiffs was ownership of the land in the revenue estate. There was no dispute that the plaintiffs were. owners of the estate as was evident from the entries in Exh.P5 and Exh.P

6. The question was, whether the defendants were also owners of the estate and when did they acquire this legal status. By a deed executed and registered on 17-1-1980, Alam Din had gifted 2-1/4 Marlas of land in Khasra No.164 to them. It was styled as an out-right sale by the plaintiffs and they claimed pre-emption in respect of it by instituting a pre-emption suit against the defendants on 22-3-1980. By a separate deed executed on 20-3-1980 and registered on 24-3-1980, Feroze Din sold his 97 Kanals of agricultural land at Mauza Sankhatra in Tehsil Narowal to the vendees-defendants for the sale price of rupees one lac. On the basis of sale-deed marked Exh.D3, vendee-defendants claimed the legal status of being owners of the -revenue estate before the institution of pre-emption suit against them. Lower Courts bypassed the sale-deed on account of its registration after the institution of pre-emption suit on account of a bar imposed by section 21-A of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 for .improvement in the status of vendees after the institution of pre-emption suit, except, through inheritance or succession. It was an agreed legal premise that the ownership of agricultural land conveyed .in EXh.D3 was not subjected to pre-emption and title to this piece of land held by the defendants was indefeasible. Learned counsel for respondents argued that in terms of section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, respondents shall be deemed to have acquired ownership of the land conveyed in Exh.D3 from the date of its execution and not from the date of the registration of the deed. In this behalf, learned counsel referred to the terminology of section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Naseer Ahmad and another v. Asghar All 1992 SCMR 2300. Observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court at page 2309 supported his contention. Dealing with section 47 of the Registration Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: "There is no controversy that the sale-deed in respect of this land was executed in appellants' favour on 8-9-1974 i.e. a day before the institution of the suit. It was presented for registration on 9-9-1974, but registered on 10-9-1974. In the opinion of the High Court, as the document was registered after the institution of the suit, the transaction was of no avail to the appellants. The view taken by the High Court is untenable. Section 47 of the Registration Act seemingly escaped notice of the learned Judges of the High Court, which provides that a document registered on a date subsequent to the date of its execution operates from the date of the execution. Obviously, therefore, the title to the land had passed on to the appellants on 8-9-1974, and they could justifiably bank on it to oppose the suit filed by the respondent". In Boota Ram v. Bagga Singh and another AIR 1948 Lah. 103, a Division Bench of this Court in similar situation observed that "Since the deed would be according to law operative from the date of its execution and not of its registration, the first point must be decided in favour of the respondent and he must be held to have acquired the land by gift before the institution of the suit. The provisions of Act 1 (I) of 1944 do not, therefore, stand in his way". It was not questioned that if this was the correct interpretation of section 21-A of the Registration Act, the respondents were also owners of the estate before the institution of pre-emption suit against them. In my view, lower Courts omitted to construe correctly section 47 of the Registration Act when they held that title to the land purchased by Exh.D3 shall pass from the date of registration only. Correct construction of this section would lead to an irresistible conclusion that the sale-deed shall take effect from the date of its execution. Upon this view, independent, of the finding on nature of transaction contained in Exh.D4, Exh.D3 had brought the respondents at par with the petitioner in the matter of superior right of pre-emption. Since both the parties enjoyed equal status and one was not superior 'to the other, the pre-emption suit instituted by the plaintiffs must fail on this ground and civil revision dismissed accordingly. In view of the aforesaid, civil revision fails with costs. Original records shall be returned. AA./M-1531/L Revision dismissed.