P L D 1962 W P, (Rev (PLP)

The case discussed by Mr. M. Z. Khan in his aforesaid ruling was one in which the donor was an orphan girl, who had been living with her uncle since the age of 3 and the donee was her uncle's son. Mr. M. Z. Khan allowed her petition on the ground that the donee's father (her uncle), was in a position to dominate her will and to exercise undue influence over her. As such he held: "It will not be safe for a Revenue Officer to decide that the transaction was free from such pressure and was valid. That being so this is a fit case in which the respondent should go to the Civil Court to discharge the burden of proof which lies heavily on him." With profound respect I must point out that the above ruling was run counter to the long line of decisions of the Financial Commissioner and the Board of Revenue, therein it has been laid down that it is the function of Civil Courts to adjudicate on intricate questions of law of this nature and that Revenue Officers are not expected in the summary mutation proceedings to adjudicate on these complicated issues, Miles Irving F. C's. ruling in P L D 1950 Pb. (Rev.) 144, quoted in para. 4 above also states that the Revenue Officer will presume at least between the parties to the registered deed that possession has passed as recited in it. Akhtar Hussain, F. C., in P L D 1954 Pb. (Rev.), 21 again re‑affirmed this view in the following terms: ‑ "Where the fact of possession having passed is recited in a registered deed, a Revenue Officer may properly act on presumption given by that deed: at any rate as between the parties to the deed." Mr. Akhtar Hussain in this ruling also re‑affirmed the following general principles as applicable to the R. O. and mutation proceedings: ‑ "a mutation should not be refused merely because it is claimed that the alienor has no right by custom or statute to make such an alienation. Such a transaction is a fact until it is set aside in due course of law. Mutations are simple proceedings and their procedure should not be made complicated by introducing such questions as determination of title or rights according to custom or Shariat or any other law. The scope of mutation proceedings should be very simple and they should be decided in accordance with section 37 of the Land Revenue Act, i.e., on the basis of facts proved, or admitted to have occurred, or such as are supported by a decree or order." I have in my ruling in R. O. R. No. 351 of 1960‑61 in case Mst. Jiwani v. Feroze Din and others also came to the same view after discussion of all the important rulings on the subject, including one or two in which there was the contrary suggestion that Revenue Officers could themselves refuse alienations, even these per registered deed. In so far as the present case is concerned, it does not happen to be an appeal from the original mutation No. 48 in which the donor has pleaded fraud, but is from mutation No. 120, in which the donor, who ceased to be a land‑owner, secured contrary to law and precepts, an entry of a new mutation altogether. The law as applicable to the facts of the case is quite clear. Section 37 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act lays down that "entries in the Record of Rights or in annual records should not be varied in subsequent records otherwise than by: ‑ (a) making entries in accordance with facts proved or admitted to have occurred ; and (b) making such entries as are agreed to by all the parties interested therein or are supported by a decree or order binding on those parties. In the present case the Patwari had no occasion even to enter up a mutation since the petitioner, after the decision of mutation No. 48e was no longer shown as owner of the land in dispute and could not be considered to be a `party' unless and until that mutation was set aside. The Revenue Officer had no right, whatsoever, to attest the mutation, as it was neither A in accordance with the facts proved or admitted to have accrued, nor were the entries agreed to by all the parties, interested therein. The lower appellate authorities have, therefore, rightly come to the conclusions arrived at by them. There is no force in any of the grounds of revision which is rejected. Before I conclude I must mention that it is disappointing that the Collector and the Commissioner have not taken to task the Revenue Officer and subordinates, guilty of this gross contravention of law and procedure. The action taken by the Patwari, in entering up the mutation, when the petitioner 'no longer was the owner of the land according to the record of rights, and of the R. O. in attesting it, could have been due either to incompetence or ulterior motives. The Board of Revenue have time and again emphasised that it is important duty of the appellate authorities to take cognizance of such irregularities and dereliction of duties on the part of their subordinates, when they come to notice. The Patwari . . . (sic.) as the Revenue Officer should be charge‑sheeted and suitably dealt with. The counsel for the petitioner has asked me to indicate what remedy is left open for him. He pleads that in the interest of justice, Government must provide refugee owner of evacuee lands some remedy in a case of this kind and the fact that property is shown as evacuee property, ought not to be stand in the way of their rights under the law of the land to avoid such transactions by proving fraud in civil suits. I am in full agreement with this view. I have conveyed the difficul ties being experienced by refugee land‑owners on this subject to the Resettlement Department and am informed that if necessary, the law will be amended in the very near future to enable all refugees of this category obtaining redress and adjudication of their grievance through Civil Courts. A copy of this order may, therefore, be forwarded to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan for favour of early necessary action. K. M. A. Petition dismissed.