P L D 1981 Lahore 694 (PLP)

Learned counsel has, in support of this tenants' second appeal calling in question the eviction orders on ground of reconstruction, raised the argument that the property having been transferred to the respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, the appellants had statutory protection for six years. That being so, the respondent had no cause of action to institute the eviction application and the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to proceed with it. Learned counsel has in this behalf relied on Shabbir Ahmad v. Mst. Kabir-un-Nisa and others (P L D 1975 S C 58).

2. It was after the service of notice under section 30 that the proceed ings were commenced against the appellants. The grounds of eviction in the application, amongst others, included that of default in payment of rent.The questions relating to service of notice and the relationship of landlord and tenant were decided by the learned Rent Controller against the tenants. They challenged that decision in first and second appeals but without any success. See orders dated 1st April, 1969 in S. A. O. Nos. 88 and 89 of 1969. In any case, one of the grounds of eviction being default in payment of rent, it cannot be said that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction, on account of any bar in section 30, to proceed with the application and decide it on merits. This would be so even if the learned Rent Controller decided the issue relating to default in favour of the tenants. That decision would not render the earlier proceedings as without jurisdiction.

3. The application for eviction was filed in 1966. It was decided in 1972. The property, it is stated, was transferred to the respondent in 1965 and the notice under section 30 was served in 1966. If the appellants had any protection, it ended during the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller. The tenant challenged the order of the Rent Controller before the next appellate Court. On filing of this appeal, the case again got reopened. The appellate Court under the Rent Restriction Ordinance is also a Court of inquiry as, under subsection (3) of section 15 thereof, provision has been made for the appellate Court to bold further inquiry. Undoubtedly, period of six years passed during the pendency of the case and in the above circumstances, even if the cause of action matured during the pendency of these proceedings, order of eviction could be passed provided on merits the respondent's case was on strong footing. See Manzoor Ahmad Khan V. Syed Maqsood All (P L D 1975 Lab. 1521) wherein Akhtar Ali Parvez v. Altafur Rehman (P L D 1964 S C 106) and Abdullah Bhai and others v. Ahmad Din (P L D 1963 Lab. 390) were relied upon.

4. In so far as the bona fides and reasonableness qua reconstruction is concerned, there cannot be a stronger case than the present one. On a com plaint with regard to the dangerous condition of the structure, the Municipal Committee had launched proceedings against the owner as well as the tenants. Overwhelming evidence was available on the record to give a finding that the requirement for reconstruction was in good faith and reasonable. There is no justification for interference with concurrent findings of fact in this behalf. In fact, it has not been brought under challenge either, during the arguments. The ground for reconstruction is a continuing one. As soon as the cause of action matured for the first time and every day thereafter it arose; the respon dent had right to seek eviction of the tenants on this basis. There is another aspect of the matter. On account of amendment in the relevant law, no protection is now available to the tenants. If the case were to commence afresh after eleven years of litigation, the results on account of the accepted position with regard to the merits of the issue relating to reconstruction would not be different ; as the appellants will not be able now to take a plea with regard to any protection.

5. In the light of the above discussion, I do not find any force in the argument raised by the learned counsel. This appeal accordingly is dismissed in limine. K. M. A. Appeal dismissed.