P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

BASHIR AHMED, J.‑The appellant is lessee‑landlord of a shop in Cowasjee Building situates on Plot No. A. M. 330, Preedy Street, near Regal Cinema, Karachi, and the respondent was his tenant at a rental of Rs. 37‑1‑0 per mensem. The landlord applied under section 10 (2) of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act (VIII of 1953), (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), for a certifi cate on the allegation that the tenant had erected unauthorised and permanent structures on the tenanted premises and also that he required the premises for his bona fide use. The Rent Controller refused the application on the finding that the landlord had come late with an application for relief on that basis and also that it was not a permanent structure but was just a temporary shed. There was no specification of the personal need of the landlord nor was there any proof, and in consequence the certificate was refused. On revision, the Chief Judge of the Karachi Small Causes Court upset that finding. He con sidered an inspection of the site necessary and after inspection he reached the conclusion that a permanent structure had been built by the tenant on the premises and also that the landlord had required the premises bona fide and reasonably for his personal use; the need expressed by the landlord was to settle two of his nephews who were without a business. The certificate was accordingly granted. On an application by the appellant before the Chief Judge of the Karachi Small Causes Court, an order directing the ejectment of the respondent was made on the 30th of September 1954.

2. The tenant brought a suit for trespass under section 24 of the Karachi Small Causes Court Act (Bombay Act IV of 1929) and challenged the order of ejectment on the ground that the impugned order was illegal and ultra vires, inasmuch as the inspection of the site by the revisional authority was in excess of its jurisdiction, and since the order rests mainly on the impression gathered by the revisional authority on an inspection of the site, the order has no legal validity. In the second place it is contended that there is no finding that the premises are reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own use or for the benefit of any person for whose benefit the premises are held within the meaning of clause (c) (ii) of subsection (2) of section 10 of the Act.

3. On the pleadings, the trial Judge struck the following issues: (1) Whether Rs. 18/4/0 per month is paid by the plaintiff to the landlord the defendant as premium? (2) Has the defendant committed trespass as alleged in para graph 7 of the plaint ? (3) Is the defendant not entitled to have an order of ejectment passed against the plaintiff on the ground alleged in paragraph 8 of the plaint ? (4) Has the defendant committed trespass in obtaining an order of ejectment against the plaintiff ? (5) Is the plaintiff entitled to Rs. 100 or any amount as damages and is the plaintiff put to any loss by the defendant filing genuine application against the plaintiff and is the plaintiff deprived of his earnings and put to other unnecessary expenses physical and mental troubles on account of defendant's filing application for ejectment against the plaintiff ? (6) Is the defendant justified in executing the writ of ejectment validly passed against the plaintiff by the learned Chief Judge, Small Causes Court ? (7) Has any cause of action arisen against the defendant on the 30th of September 1954 (8) Can the order passed by the learned Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, be challenged in any Court, if so, what is the effect ? The learned trial Judge found for the plaintiff on issues Nos. 2 to

5. Issue No. 6 was answered in the negative. On issue No. 8, the learned trial Judge reached the conclusion that the order dated the 14th of May 1954 passed by the learned Chief Judge was open to challenge in the present suit and on the finding that the order was illegal and ultra‑vires the claim of the tenancy was decreed. The learned Counsel has now come up to this Court in appeal against that order.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant has confined his challenge to two points only. It is contended by the learned counsel that two of his nephews, aged 19 and 21, respectively, had lost their father and the anxiety of the appellant was to make a provision for their livelihood and that he could thus claim the benefit of item (c) (ii) of subsection (2) of section 10 of the Act which merely provides that the landlord should reasonably and in good faith require the premises for his own use or for the use of any person for whose benefit the premises are held. The case of the appellant is that the desire of settling his nephews could reasonably be construed as requiring it for his own use. It would be straining the language of the statute to produce any such result. The use contemplated by the provision is either the personal use of the landlord or for the beneficiaries of the premises. The case falls in neither of these two categories. We have no hesitation, therefore, in upholding the decision of the learned trial Judge that the reason for the certificates so far as this part of the case is concerned is not covered by the provisions of the statute.

5. It is next contended that the revisional authority was quite competent to inspect the site and the decision based on such inspection should carry greater conviction rather than being repelled. The point, however, has been noticed in a Division Bench ruling reported as Ahmad v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court and others (P L D 1958 Kar. 42) which has taken the view that the revisional authority under the Act is a special Tribunal created for the purposes of the Act and does not possess any inherent power as the Courts of law possess to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of admini stration of justice. It was further held that in order to find out what are the powers of the revisional authority one has to look to the statute itself and if no power of inspection is conferred on it, it cannot be deemed to exist under the principle of ex debato justitiae. No such power is conferred on the revisional authority. This conclusion is supported by a reference to section 19 of the Act which permits the Rent Controller to make a local inspection. The practice of making an inspection itself as the foundation of a judgment was also disapproved, the purpose of the inspection merely being the understanding of evidence adduced before the authority. The order of the revisional authority in that case was reversed by the Court in the exercise of its power to issue a writ of certiorari. The order of the learned trial Judge is based on this enunciation of the law by the Division Bench of this Court which fully applies to the facts of the present case. It is no doubt true that under section 17 of the Act an order made by the Central Government under subsection (1) or subsection (2) of section 15 of the Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. The Chief Judge of the Karachi Small Causes Court was exercising the power of the Central Government as its delegatee. The order passed by him, however, will be conclusive if it falls within the powers conferred upon him by the statute. If the order exceeds such powers, it could not be described as an order passed under the Act so as to attract the provisions of section 17 of the Act. Any controversy bearing on this point has been set at rest by two pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as Abdullah Baloch v. Adam Ali (P L D 1961 S C 28) and M. M. Ispahani Ltd. v. Haji Muhammad Sultan (P L D 1961 S C 76). The conclusion reached by the learned trial Judge is, therefore, sound and calls for no interference. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. S. B. Appeal dismissed.