PLC 1986

1986 PLP 773 (PLC)

MUHAMMAD SALEEM SH. Versus PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL and others

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore High Court
Decided Date
Writ Petition No. 2205 of 1984, decided on 4th February, 1986.
Honorable Judges
Muhammad Afza1 Lone and Muhammad Zafarullah, JJ.
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1986 PLP 773 (PLC)
Forum / Court Lahore High Court
Bench Members Muhammad Afza1 Lone and Muhammad Zafarullah, JJ.
Parties MUHAMMAD SALEEM SH. Versus PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL and others
Primary Law Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1986 PLP 773 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1986 PLP 773 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore High Court bench comprising: Muhammad Afza1 Lone and Muhammad Zafarullah, JJ..

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1986 PLP 773 (PLC) (MUHAMMAD SALEEM SH. Versus PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL and others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑

Representation

  • M. Farani for Petitioner.
  • Sardar Sami Hayat for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 4th February, 1986.
  • 5. We are unable to agree with this line of reasoning. It is to be noticed that as distinguished from mental and intellectual exercise, the manual work entails physical exertion. The soliciting the insurance business primarily involves the knowledge of the ins and outs of the insurance, business, ability to successfully advocate the benefits of insurance and persuade others to take the insurance policy. If in connection with such a business the petitioner had to move from one client to another that would hardly lend a complexion of manual work to his assignment. Further, the stand taken up by the company that the facility of using the car, was available to the petitioner, cannot be brushed aside readily. As regards the clerical work, there is a categorical admission of the petitioner that no such work was performed by him. The typing of any, done by him, was merely occasional and not a part of the duties assigned to him. We are also of the view that in the context of the nature of the duties of the petitioner, construing of the word "or" as "and" in the interpretation clause, in consonance with the enunciation made in the precedent aforesaid, does not advance his cause in any manner.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑West Pakistan Industrial and CommercialEmployment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1969), S. 2(i)‑‑"Workman"‑‑Branch Manager of Insurance Company provided with a car, a telephone, an office and typist‑‑Manual work, held, entails physical exertion as distinguished from mental and intellectual exercise‑‑Soliciting insurance business primarily involves knowledge of ins and outs of insurance, successfully advocating its benefits and persuading others to take insurance policy‑‑Moving from one client to another in connection with such a business, held, would hardly lend a Branch Manager of Insurance Company a complex on of "manual work" to his assignment‑‑Status of workman could not be granted to such employee‑‑Order of Appellate Tribunal being just could not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction of High Court.

Judgment & Decree

MUHAMMAD AFZAL LONE, J.‑‑The petitioner was working as a Branch Manager, with the respondent‑Company and drawing a consolidated salary of Rs.1,

273. His services were dispensed with. He called in question the termination of his services, on a number of grounds through a grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The petition was contested by the respondent inter alia on the plea that the petitioner held a supervisory position; he was not a workman and thus could not invoke the provisions of the I.R.O. and the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.

2. The Labour Court took the view that as the petitioner had to run for the Insurance business, to achieve a particular target, the nature of his duties was manual and not supervisory. With this view the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal did not agree and maintained that: ‑‑ .... He should have shown that he was covered by definition of workman given in section 2 (i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Going door‑to‑door and asking people to get themselves insured with the appellant‑company was neither a manual nor clerical work. Manual work is that which is done by hands. For clerical work a typist had been given to him. So he is not covered by the definition given in Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968." Accordingly by the Tribunal's order, dated 28‑3‑1984 the respondents appeal was accepted the order terminating the petitioner's services was restored. This order is under challenge in this writ petition.

3. Both the sides agree that the sole point falling for determination in this case, is, as to whether or not the petitioner is a workman with the meaning of clause (i) of section 2 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. This clause is reproduced below: ‑ "Workman" means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward." In order to qualify as a workman, the petitioner must show that he performed any "skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work." The evidence on the record, regarding nature of the duties performed by the petitioner, consists of his own deposition and that of Farhat Ullah Baig, Deputy General Manager of the respondent‑company. It is the statement of the petitioner that he had to visit his clients and go to the factories for insurance work. He admitted that he did not discharge any clerical duty; and a clerk and a peon were provided to him; the typing work was done by the clerk but if the latter was abgent or there was urgency the petitioner did the typing work himself. The Deputy General Manager deposed that a car, a telephone and an office with staff were placed at the petitioner's disposal; if and when the typist was absent, the petitioner got the typing work done through some other persons.

4. On behalf of the petitioner, the argument advanced before the Tribunal below, that the soliciting of insurance business constituted manual work has been repeated before us. On the authority of Zubair Ahmad v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi P L D 1985 Kar. 760 it is further submitted that the word "or" figuring in between the words, "manual" and "clerk" in the definition clause, is not to be read disjunctively. The argument is that the insurance business handled by the petitioner coupled with the typing work to which he had to resort occasionally, clothed him with the status of a workman for the purposes of Standing Orders Ordinance.

5. We are unable to agree with this line of reasoning. It is to be noticed that as distinguished from mental and intellectual exercise, the manual work entails physical exertion. The soliciting the insurance business primarily involves the knowledge of the ins and outs of the insurance, business, ability to successfully advocate the benefits of insurance and persuade others to take the insurance policy. If in connection with such a business the petitioner had to move from one client to another that would hardly lend a complexion of manual work to his assignment. Further, the stand taken up by the company that the facility of using the car, was available to the petitioner, cannot be brushed aside readily. As regards the clerical work, there is a categorical admission of the petitioner that no such work was performed by him. The typing of any, done by him, was merely occasional and not a part of the duties assigned to him. We are also of the view that in the context of the nature of the duties of the petitioner, construing of the word "or" as "and" in the interpretation clause, in consonance with the enunciation made in the precedent aforesaid, does not advance his cause in any manner.

6. There is no good reason to differ with the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, this writ petition is dismissed but with no order as to costs. A. E. Petition dismissed.