P L D 1963 (W (PLP)

SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.‑The order in this petition will cover seven other writ petitions in which a similar point is involved.

2. Mubarik Ali was appointed a cleaner in the employ of the Road Transport Board at Lyallpur in 1955, the appointment having been made by Mr. Fayyaz Ali Khan respondent, District Manager. Later he became a conductor. On the 11th of Septem ber 1959, he received a notice of screening for unsatisfactory service, and the Screening Committee recommended him for removal. At the same time, according to the rules, he received a notice informing him that he could appeal to the District Manager. He did so but was removed from service by the District Manager on the 25th of September 1959.

3. Rule 6 of the Public Conduct Scrutiny Rules, 1959, requires that an appeal from the recommendation of the Screen ing Committee should be to the appointing authority. After amendment, this rule provided that where the appointing autho rity was himself a Chairman or Member of the Screening Com mittee, an appeal would lie to the next higher authority.

4. It is, therefore; contended for the petitioner that Mr. Fayyaz Ali Khan having himself been the Chairman of the Screening Committee, he could not hear the appeal. It is not denied that Mr. Fayyaz Ali Khan was Chairman of the Screening Committee and that he also heard the appeal. Even if there had been no such rule, the hearing of an appeal by an authority who has himself participated in the original proceeding is contrary, to the rules of natural justice. We have no doubt that the removal of the petitioner should be set aside on this ground.

5. It was also contended for the petitioner that Mr. Fayyaz Ali Khan was not a proper appointing authority. Under rule 7, sub‑rules (i) and (fi) of the West Pakistan Road Transport Board Rules, 1957, it is the Transport Board which appoints all officers except that in the appointment of the General Manager, the Chief Accountant and the Chief Technical Officer, the approval of the Government has to be obtained. Under rule 13, the Board may delegate any of its powers and duties to any officers or servants of the Board and this delegation was made on 25th January 1958. The order of removal of the petitioner having been made on the 25th of September 1959, Mr. Fayyaz Ali had power to appoint, and, therefore, to dismiss.

6. We do not agree that rule 13, which provides for delega tion, is ultra vires. In this behalf the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on Anwar Ali Shah v. Fiayaz Ali (1), but in that case the view is based on a quotation from a judgment in Writ Petition No. 934 of 1957, which we shall reproduce here :‑ "That rule empowers the Board to delegate any of its powers. But the delegation can only be of such powers as remain with the Board after rules have been framed by the Provincial Government. The rules give the power of dismissal of employees like the petitioner to the General Manager, and if a power is vested according to the rules, not in the Board itself but in the General Manager, the Board cannot grant that power to the District Manager. Neither under rule 18 nor under rule 19 can a regulation be framed which is in conflict with a rule framed by the' Provincial Government under section 43‑A (7)." 7: The argument in this case was that if according to the rules a certain power was not vested in the Board, but in the General Manager, the Board could not delegate it to the District Manager, for it could delegate only its own powers. This argu ment is not applicable in the present case. In this particular case, therefore, Anwar Ali Shah's case was wrongly decided.

8. Against the power of delegation there was a further argu ment that rule 7 of the West Pakistan Road Transport Board Rules, 1957, contains a bar in sub‑rule (v). It will be convenient to reproduce the entire rule 7 :‑ "

7. Officers of the Board.‑( P L D 1962 Lah. 483) The Board shall, with the prior approval of the Government, appoint officers to all post carrying the initial pay of Rs. 250 per mensem and above. (ii) The Board may appoint such other officers and servants as it may consider necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. (iii) The conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of officers and servants of the Board shall‑ (a) as respects the officers mentioned in sub‑rule (i) be such as may be prescribed by the Board with the prior approval of the Government; (b) as respects other officers and servants be such as may be prescribed by the Board. (iv) The officers and servants of the Board shall hold office at the discretion of the Board. (v) Subject to the provisions of sub‑rule (i), the power of appointing, promoting, suspending, fining, reducing, removing or dismissing for misconduct or granting leave to the officers and servants of the Board shall be exercised by the Board. (vi) An appeal shall lie to‑ (a) the General Manager (Traffic), or the Chief Technical Officer or the Chief Accountant, as the case may be, when the order is made by any officer subordinate to him; (b) the Chairman, when the order is made by the General Manager (Traffic), the Chief Technical Officer or the Chief Accountant; (c) the Board, when the order is made by the Chairman: Provided that no appeal shall lie against an order passed by the Chairman in second appeal: Provided further that in case of officers mentioned in sub- rule (i), an appeal against the order of the Board shall lie to the Government."

9. It is argued that since sub‑rule (v) expressly confers of the Board the power of appointment, removal, etc. and provides that these powers shall be exercised by the Board, no other authority could exercise them. If that were so and all orders of removal or dismissal could be made only by the Board, there would be no sense in providing for an appeal to the General Manager in sub‑rule (vi) from an order of an officer subordinate to him, the District Manager for instance. This should be enough to demolish the argument built on the opening words of rules 9 and 11, which purport to contain (in rule 9) "powers an duties of the Board" and (in rule 11) "powers of the Board". The argument is that the powers which can be delegated under rule 13 are the powers described in rules 9 and

11. We do not see how we can restrict the use of power to these two rules, parti cularly when sub‑rule (v) of rule 7 also relates to "the power" of appointing, promoting, etc. The further argument that rule 13 provides for delegation of powers "for the efficient carrying on of its day to day administration" by the Board, is not on any better, footing, for it is also conducive to efficiency to delegate powers of appointment or dismissal where by reason of heavy work the officer possessing them cannot attend to his work efficiently.

11. In Writ Petitions Nos. 229, 359, 394, 397, 398, 404 and 435, the same point is involved. The appellate authority was himself a member of the Screening Committee. The petitioners, therefore, had no chance of having their records examined by an authority independent of that which recommended their removal.

12. It was argued for the State that these petitioners having come to Court about 21 years after their removal, their petitions should not be heard. The reason why they had not come earlier is that according to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Mr. Zafar‑ul‑Ahsan's case, the High Court and the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions against orders of Screening Committees. A different view, however, was taken in a subsequent case which was published in the Law Reports sometime this year.

13. We accept these petitions with costs and set aside the order of removal in each case. A. H. Petitions accepted.