1993 PLP 752 (PLC(CS))

3. In this very context it might be mentioned that as per Written Statement filed therein and which has been placed on the record with the present case, there appears to have been a settlement dated 23‑2 1968 between the workers and the Management which was in the following terms: "It is agreed that all such workers who at the time of the employment slid not give a specific date of birth and only mentioned the year of birth shall be retired from company's employment on 30th of June of the year of retirement etc. etc. (Presumably none of the present respondents had given the exact date of birth and that accounts for their retirement on the 30th of June).

4. However, on the 1st of July, 1990 the respondents had again received a communication in identical terms which inter alia was in the following words:‑‑ "As you are not physically fit to continue in the employment of the company, this is to advise you that you are relieved of the company's employment with immediate effect. You will be paid one month's salary in lieu of notice of termination of employment under Standing Order 12(1) of the West. Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968."

5. This order which is the subject‑matter of the dispute here was again challenged before the Labour Court, but in this very context it might be mentioned that the earlier challenge to the termination of the services, was withdrawn from the Labour Court on 19‑9‑1990. (6). The petitioners had filed a joint petition alleging that the termination of their services was illegal and mala ride, as they had realised the tenuity of the earlier order of retirement on the ground of supperannuation. It was further alleged that the respondents had never bothered to refer them to any medical examination before the impugned letters were despatched.

7. The petition came to be resisted on the ground that the same was not maintainable as the respondents had to file individual grievance petitions. It was further stated that the earlier letter of termination was issued on the 31st of May, 1990 but could not be delivered in time and therefore by way of abundant caution, and to give a clear one month's notice another letter was issued on 1‑7‑1990 specifying therein the legal dues of the applicant including one month's notice pay. The two letters dated 31st of 1990 and 1‑7 -1990 are to be read in conjunction as they communicated one and the same subject‑matter clarifying the legal dues and the notice pay. The other contentions raised in the petition also came to be denied.

8. The petitioners were their own witnesses and Sardar Muhammad Khan, Manager Industrial Relations appeared on behalf of the respondent Company.

9. The Labour Court found that the two letters could not be read in conjunction and as neither the petitioners were sent for medical examination nor was there anything to suggest from the record that they were physically incapacitated to perform their jobs, the impugned letters were nothing but colourful exercise of the ‑powers and therefore not sustainable in law. It therefore ordered the reinstatement but did not award any back benefits as the petitioners in their grievance petition had not mentioned that they were jobless.

10. The contention raised on behalf of the employers that the joint petition was not in accordance with the requirement of section 25‑A of the I.R.O. is a weighty one. A plain reading of the Section 25‑A indicates the redressal of individual grievance; however, under subsection (10) of section 25‑A the workers having common grievance out of a common cause of action could make a joint application to the Labour Court.

11. To my mind the impugned orders constituted individual grievances. These were not in general terms to affect the workers as a class or group. Common has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary; as "Shared among several;" "owned by several jointly, belonging or pertaining to many or to the majority': Also usual, customary, and habitual, professed, or confessed and used indefinitely in various terms implying illegal or criminal conduct, such as common scold, common thief etc." The definition of similar is "nearly corresponding; resembling in many respects; somewhat like; having a general likeness." Also, sometimes, "cxactiy like; identical, etactly corresponding etc." The orders were to my mind similar or identical it, nature and not common orders as it adversely affected only 3 persons.

12. Mr. M. M. Jeelani learned counsel for the respondent referred to some citations but not directly dealing with cases under section 25‑A of the I.R.O.

13. It is to be seen that the grievance notice under the scheme of the law has to be addressed personally by the aggrieved workers and not through the instrumentality of a lawyer or an advisor. Similarly there are fetters on the powers of the CBA in making application under section 34 of the I.R.O. There being no clear pronouncement from our Courts whether section 25‑A in that context is mandatory or directory, I will keep the ratter open for some other occasion.

14. Adverting to merit it is admitted by all three these workers that they were duly retired on 30‑G‑1990. They had challenged the notice of retirement in a joint petition before the Labour Court but they had withdrawn the same on 18‑9‑1991.

15. The position therefore that emerges is that they ha d been duly retired from service on the completion of 60 years of their age and they were satisfied by the same. The letters of 1‑7‑1990 which are the subject‑matter of challenge in this appeal had been issued as according to the employers the earlier letters "termination dated 31‑5‑1990 were delivered late and did not give one month's clear notice to the workmen That was patently a mistaken view of the law. It was not a notice terminating a tenancy which as enjoined by law must give one clear month's time. It was a mere information. Therefore, the letters were rather gratuitous and otiose.

16. Be that as it may the admitted position is that the termination of the services of the workmen had been duly effected on the 30th of June, 1990. It is nobody's case that they had not reached the age of 60 years in 1990. They had challenged this retirement, but of their own free will and volition had withdrawn the petition from the Labour Court. They were not with the employers on the first of July, 1990. I agree that the letters lack legitimacy and are mere make‑believe in nature, but there appears to be no reason as to how they could be imposed on their employers three years after their superannuation only because of the flawed letters. They have had their innings and they have no claims moral or legal left under law as against their employers.

17. I am therefore of the opinion that the impguned order cannot be maintained. I will therefore vacate it and allow the appeal filed by the employers. As a carrollary the appeal in regard to the award of back benefits also stands dismissed. H.B.T./2197/Lb.S Order accordingly.