P L D 1964 Dacca 624 (PLP)

3. It appears that an ad‑interim order of injunction was passed by the learned Munsif against the defendants on 27‑3‑62 restraining them from proceeding with the re‑constitution and election of the Managing Committee till further orders. This order was made absolute after hearing of the parties on 12‑7‑62 and was affirmed by the learned Additional Subordi nate Judge on 7‑3‑63.

4. The proposed election was due to be held on 30‑3‑62 and the order of ad‑interim injunction was served upon the Sadar Sub‑Divisional Officer, the President, Ad‑hoc Committee, Rajgung H. E. School on 30‑3‑

62. In spite of the service of the order of interm injunction the election seems to have been held on that date. The grievance of the defendants, who are petitioners before this Court, is that the election had been held without knowledge of the passing of the order of ad‑interim injunction. The contention of the defendants was turned down in the Courts below.

5. Mr. Syed A. B. Mahmud Hussain, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendants petitioners contends that the law as it stood on 27‑3‑62, in view of the Civil Procedure and Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance IX of 1961) which was published in the Extraordinary Gazette of Pakistan dated the 6th of March 1961, required that the Court should in all cases before granting an injunction direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite‑parties. According to the contention of Mr. Hussain, the initial order as passed on 27‑3‑62 by the learned Munsif was without jurisdiction inasmuch as notice of the application for an order of injunction had not been given to the opposite‑parties before the order was passed.

6. Mr. Mahbubur Rahman, the learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs‑opposite‑parties Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8, contends that if it were the intention of the Legislature then there would be no chance of any party getting an order of ad‑interim injunction in any case. He further contends that whatever might be the position at the initial stage, the parties had notice of the application subsequently and the matter was finally heard and disposed of on 12‑7‑62 and, therefore, there could be no ground for grievance on the side of the defendants.

7. Without entering into other aspects of the question and without prejudice to the rights of the parties in regard to other points that might arise in connection with the prayer for temporary injunction, it will suffice to observe that the law, as it now stands, is that in all cases where an order of Injunction is sought for, the Court must direct notice of the application in such injunction to be given to the opposite‑party except in such cases as are covered by the provision in rule 3 of Order XXXIX, of the Code of Civil Procedure which may be quoted as follows: "

3. The Court shall in all cases, before granting an injunction, direct‑notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: Provided that, except in the case of sale of goods for default in payment, at the stipulated time, of a debt in respect of which the goods were pledged with any bank, the Court may, where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay, dispense with such notice." In view of this kind of the legal position it was the duty of the learned Munsif to give a direction for notice of the application to be served upon the opposite‑parties concerned before any order of ad‑interim injunction could be passed. As such, even though the parties got notice subsequently and the matter wail finally heard in the presence of the parties concerned anti disposed of on 12‑7‑62, yet the learned Munsif having no initial jurisdiction to make an order of ad‑interim injunction without notice of the application being given to the opposite‑parties seems to have acted without jurisdiction and the relevant order as passed on 27‑3‑62 seems to be bad in law and not sustainable The subsequent order making the initial order absolute cannot; therefore, cure the defect of jurisdiction.

8. This aspect of the question does not appear to have been considered presumably because no point was taken in that way by either side. Be that as it may, the defect of jurisdiction on the part of the learned Munsif cannot be said to have been cured due to the I aches of the parties concerned.

9. The result, therefore, is that this rule is made absolute and the impugned orders as passed by the Courts below are set aside. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, I do not make any order as to costs of this rule. The learned Munsif is, however, directed to hear and dispose of the suit expeditiously. Let the records go down without delay. S. Q. Rule made absolute.