1991 PLP 1914 (MLD)

Rs.3,000 (5) Deposited on 18-3-1990. Rs.3,260 (6) Deposited on 9-4-1990. Rs. 620 (7) Deposited on 10-5-1990. Rs. 620 (8) Deposited on 10-6-1990. Rs. 620 (9) Deposited on 2-7-1990. Rs. 600 (10) Deposited on 7-8-1990. Rs. 620 (11) Deposited on 8-9-1990. Rs. 620 (12) Deposited on 4-10-1990. Rs. 620 (13) Deposited on 8-11-1990. Rs. 620 Only the above deposits are relevant because the impugned order striking off defence of the appellant-tenant was passed on 17-11-1990. Because no deposits whatsoever were made in any Misc. Rent Case nothing could come up for adjustment towards the arrears as allowed by the learned Controller and all the deposits made upto 18-3-1990 being in the main Rent Case had to be considered towards arrears as well as the current dues upto that date. The deposit of arrears itself upto 18-3-1990 was within time because, in the absence of express words to the contrary, the two months' period contemplated in the order of deposit dated 18-1-1990 was to be counted from 19-1-1990 as the point of time from which the relevant period is to be reckoned would exclude the date of the order. This has to be so as in the Limitation Act, 1908, under section 12(1) thereof the day from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned shall be excluded. Likewise in terms of the Sindh General Clauses Act, 1956, per Section 8 thereof in a Sindh statute "it shall be sufficient, for the purposes of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word `from' and for the purpose of including last in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word `to'. No doubt we are not construing here a statute nor a period of limitation stictu senso but in the absence of guidelines in the relevant Rent Law the rule of beneficial construction has to be applied to acts done under the Rent Law, much the same way as equitable principles of the Code of Civil Procedure have been appropriately invoked, and in consonance with the rule the commencing day has to be counted out from the reckoning. Any other approach would be unfair and unjust. Another reason for this interpretation lies in the fact that section 16(2) is penal in nature and penalties are to be imposed only in a strict manner and beyond the scope of all doubts. In such behalf the Controller may have been within his powers to include the date of the order for the purposes of count but since he has not done so exclusion of such date in making deposit cannot attract penalties. Now for the period of 11 months i.e. February to December, 1989 at the permitted rate of Rs.600 per month plus Rs. 20 per month towards (approximate) electricity and water pump charges the amount comes to Rs.6,

820. Accruing dues upto and inclusive of February, 1990, i.e. for 2 months from January, 1990, at such rate would come to Rs. 1,

240. The two figures would add up to Rs.8,

060. Thus the total deposits as on 18-3-1990 were fully in consonance with the arrears and current dues. Further, there is no default in current dues, the payments of Rs.600 each on 20-9-1989, 26-11-1989 and 6-12-1989 (aggregating Rs.1,800) being also attributable to accruing dues up to and inclusive the month of February, 1990, since such could not be counted towards arrears alone as these were deposited in the main Rent Case and could also partly be treated as deposits in advance for accruing dues in relation to the months of January and February, 1990. Arrears as seen were already, in totality, deposited within the stipulated period of 2 months. There is, therefore, no default whatsoever. Subsequent payments for the month of March, 1990 and upto the relevant month of October, 1990, have also been deposited on or before the 10th of each succeeding month. The learned Controller seems to have thought that because the tenant had herself stated that she was making deposits in a Misc. Rent Case she was bound by that statement. The mistake could be of understanding only and no estoppel arises upon such plea. Besides, the Controller seems to have been of the view that the arrears could be deposited only by and upto March 17, 1990, as the period of two months from January 18, 1990 expired on that date. In both such respects the learned Controller was in error. Since the Controller did not advert to the foregoing relevant aspects, the impugned order striking off the defence or the appellant-tenant was not in accordance with law and must be set aside. Here it may be added that the tenant has alleged before me that the actual rate of rent to which the parties agreed was Rs.550 per month and she had deposited firstly Rs.50 per month additionally to cover the electricity and water pump charges, later, to be on still safer side, starting making additional payments of Rs.70 per month (bringing the amount to Rs.620 p.m) in the same context. This approach was an act in absolute good faith. Now, according to the definition of "rent" in Section 2(i) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, such "includes water charges, electricity charges and such other charges which are payable by the tenant but are unpaid". Ordinarily, electricity charges, which are in question here, are paid on receipt of relevant bills. Where such bills are addressed to the tenant-hold premises and there are no sharers in the liability, the position may involve little doubt as to obligations. Complications arise only when there are meters and sub-meters or liabilities are otherwise shared on apportionment. In such cases the tenant may be required to be notified in order to pin default both generally and, if relevant, in terms of section 16(1) and (2) of the Ordinance. It is not claimed that the tenant in question is a direct recipient of the electricity bills. Notice may, therefore, be a necessity on general principles. In any case, there being nothing to the contrary on the record, in order that the penal provision of Section 16(2) is attracted and applied due notice seems to have been necessary. Such notice could take any plausible form. Relevant to this it has not been shown that any verified electricity dues were notified to or claimed from the tenant. In the absence of due notice of actual electricity dues or claim to that effect no default on such account- can attach on the tenant moreso because it is section 16(2) of the Ordinance which is involved at this stage. Of course, the parties would be free to claim, adjust or pay i up the actual electricity or water pump dues at the time the Rent case proceeds to trial but this, as the Controller has rightly pointed out, shall be subject to KESC verification for which, all things being in place, as I have said, the requirement would be to put the tenant on due notice. Besides, the tenant states that there are some other receipts with her to show direct payments to the respondent-landlord and such would, according to her, indicate additional duplicate payments for which she has made deposits in Court as well. If this be so, she obviously can claim adjustment on that score at the time when the account between the parties be finally settled in Court or otherwise. In terms of the above, this appeal stands allowed but with no order as to costs. The case shall now go back and proceed on merits and according to law before the learned Controller. H.B.T./S-752/K Appeal allowed.