P L D 1959 (W (PLP)

The mere fact that a statute makes the same act an offence which is already an offence by virtue of some law, does not create an inconsistency between the two provisions. Muhammad Hayat Junejo for Appellant. Muhammad Halim for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th November 1958. This is a reference by the Ist Additional Sessions Judge Karachi recommending that the proceedings under section 430, P. P. C., against Syed Nazeer Hussain Puri be quashed. The applicant, Nazeer Hussain Puri, is the owner of Nazir Manzil which is occupied by a number of tenants. On 8th December 1957, one of the tenants sent a complaint to the Superintendent, C.

1. D., alleging that the landlord was interferring with the supply of water to the tenants of Nazir Manzil. After investigation the police challaned the applicant under section 430, P. P. C. The ground on which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has recommended the quashing of the proceedings is that the act of the applicant in respect of which he is being prosecuted, constitutes an offence under sections 11 / 13 of the Rent Restriction Act and that these being special provisions would repeal section 430, P. P. C. to the extent to which they cover a. case. In order that the point may be appreciated some facts relating to the charge against the applicant have to be stated. The water which is used by the tenants of Nazir Manzil is supplied by the Karachi Municipal Corporation. This water is received in the first instance in a tank. By means of a pump it is taken, to a cistern from where it is distributed to different tenants. The pumping and the distribution is done by the land lord. The act attributed to the landlord which constitutes the mischief is that he closes the valves through which the water is supplied to the tenants. That such an act would be mischief under section 430, P. P. C. cannot be denied. That section covers every case where there is an act by which supply of water for food or drink is diminished. The water in the present case was being used for drink. Learned counsel for the applicant has put forward an argument that if the act of the applicant in closing the valves was held to fall under section 430, P. P. C., then, if the applicant were simply not to pump the water to the cistern at all or if he were to leave the place without making full arrangements for the supply of‑ water, he would be guilty under section 430, P. P. C., and he contends, it is not a reasonable view to take that he should be guilty just because he was negligent. I do not see why a case of negligence also should not fall within section 430, P. P. C. and should not be punishable. Section 430 speaks of an act. An act includes an illegal omission. If the applicant was by law bound to do an act, and he failed to perform it he would be liable in the same way as he would be for a positive act. Of course he may show that the circumstances were such that he was unable to do that which he had undertaken to perform. He may not for instance, have the money necessary .for making an arrangement for supply of water in accordance with agreement. But barring some such justification the criminal liability will remain. The only point to be considered is whether section 11 of the Rent Restriction Act impliedly repeals ‑ section 430, P. P. C. Section 11 runs :‑ "No landlord or his contractor, workman or servant shall, without the previous written consent of the Controller or save for the purpose of effecting repairs or computing with a Municipal requisition, wilfully disturb any convenience or easement annexed to the premises, or remove, destroy or render unserviceable anything provided for permanent use therewith or discontinue or cause to be discontinued any supply or service comprised in the fair rent." That this section may apply to a case which is covered by section 430, P. P. C. is obvious. The case before me is an instance. Here the facts are covered by both sections. However, the mere fact that an act or series of acts which is declared to be an offence under a statute is an offence already by another statute does not imply that the first statute is repealed to the extent t which the second statute applies. This is quite clear from section 26 of the General Clauses Act according to which for an act of omission which is an offence under more than one provision of law the offender cannot be punished under more than on provision although he can be prosecuted for all. In view of this section it is not a possible argument that a later penal statute which applies to a set of circumstances covered by a provision in ‑in earlier statute has the effect of repealing an earlier statute protanto. In fact learned counsel who appears for the applicant is forced to accept that the mere existence of section 11 of the Rent Restriction Act will neither have the effect of repealing' section 430, P. P. C. nor will it bar a trial tinder that section. He relies, however, upon section 26 of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act which runs :‑ "The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment for the time being in force." Learned counsel argues that as in accordance with this section the Karachi Rent Restriction Act is to apply to the exclusion of an inconsistent provision, therefore, section 430, P. P. C. stands repealed. The argument is obviously fallacious. Section 26 of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act will only apply in a case where there is an inconsistency between two provisions. But to assume that there is an inconsistency is to beg the question. The mere fact that a] statute makes the same act an offence which is already an offence, by virtue of some law, does not create an inconsistency between' the two provisions. There is no better proof of this than section 26 of the General Clauses Act according to which all such provisions can stand together. Even prosecutions can be launched under all provisions though punishment can be only under one. There is no force in the contention of learned counsel for the applicant. The applicant has to stand his trial tinder section 430, P. P. C. This reference is rejected. K.B.A./A. H. Reference rejected.