1987 PLP 78 (PLC)

"You will be responsible for: (i) Receiving of mail of Manager Personnel. (ii) Putting up personnel cases to Manager Personnel. (iii) Vetting of employment applications. (iv) Maintenance of personal records, including seniority list and personal files. (v) Assistant Manager Personnel for duties as assigned by him from time to time." In my opinion, the nature of the above duties are clearly clerical in nature and of routine type. I regret that I am unable to concur in the view taken by the learned Labour Court that the performance of the above duties requires intelligence, initiative and drive. I fail to appreciate how receiving of mail of the Manager Personnel, putting up personal cases to the Manager, maintenance of record of assisting the Manager Personnel in the duties which he may be assigned from time to time require initiative, drive or any amount of intelligence. Any person with a modicum of intelligence could satisfactorily perform any of these duties.

5. Similarly, the nature of duties to be performed by appellant Syed Ansar Hussain, as Administrative Supervisor are detailed in the charter of duties, dated 27-10-1976. These are: "Mr. Syed Ansar Hussain Administrative Supervisor (1) Arrangement of Airport Entry Permit. (2) Checking of all documents concerning Personnel leaving for Abu Dhabi one day before the date of despatch. (This will include, Passports, Identity Cards, Embarkation Cards, Health Cards, Tickets, P.S.As., 'P' and T 1 forms) (3) Airport clearance and despatch of Personnel to Abu Dhabi. (4) Besides above, you will stay in the Head Office under Manager Personnel and deal with all correspondence concerning Abu Dhabi Cell. "

6. The learned Labour Court was of opinion that the performance of the above duties requires intelligence, initiative and drive. Again I regret that I find myself wholly unable to concur in his view. All the above duties are routine in nature and do not involve much initiative or drive or even any great intelligence. No decision making power is involved in the performance of the above duties.

7. Mr. Riffat Usmani, the learned counsel for the respondent, however, attempted to support the view of the learned Labour Court that the performance of the above duties involves intelligence and drive and that these duties whether in the case of appellant, S.M. Husnain or appellant, Syed Ansar Hussain, cannot be characterized as clerical. He sought support for `his contention from the case reported as Pakistan Paper Products Limited v. Muhammad Aqil 1975 PLC 436, decided by my learned predecessor on 6-4-1973. These facts of the reported case, however, are totally different. In that case, the person concerned was appointed as a Incharge Printing Section, with duties of production planning and supervision of the Section. His duties, also, included canvassing for and obtaining printing- orders. These duties I respectfully agree do involved initiative, drive and considerable intelligence. The nature of duties for which the two appellants were employed, however are totally of different nature.

8. Mr. Riffat Usmani also sought to rely on the decision of the learned Chairman, Appellate Tribunal Punjab in the case reported as Sultan Masud Tiwana v. General Manager, Dawood Hercules Chemicals Ltd. 1975 P L C

556. Apart from the fact that the said case was decided before the word "labour" appearing in the definition of workman in the Standing Orders was replaced by the much wider word "work" the implication whereof was explained by me in the case of Johnson & Jhonson v. Zubair Ahmad, decided on 10-10-1979. In the Tiwana's case it was found that the employee concerned was not only responsible for obtaining quotations for goods from the market but also it was his duty to purchase the same. The facts of the reported case are different from those of the present matter.

9. Now as regards the respective dates of appointment of the appellants, although their learned counsel contended that appellant, S.M. Husnain was first appointed in the respondent-Establishment on 18-8-1975 and appellant, Syed Ansar Hussain on 16-11-1975, it has been conceded by both the appellants in their respective grievance notice that they had resigned from service and were re-appointed with effect from 10-9-1976 and 16-9-1976 respectively. As such their seniority in the respondent-Establishment would count from the date of their respective re-entry in service. Although the appellants, in their grievance petitions, have named a number of employees, who according to them are junior to them in service, yet by reason of their resignation and subsequent re-entry in service it appears that only one employee namely Azhar Ali Bukhari was junior to them. His services also were terminated alongwith the services of the appellants, but the admitted position is that he was re-appointed.

10. It is contended by Mr. Riffat Usmani that the re-appointment of Mr. Azhar Ali Bukhari though it was within one year of the termination of services of the two appellants and was to a post similar to the one occupied by the appellants gives no right to the appellants to re-appointment, either under Standing Order 14 or any other law, as firstly, Mr.Azhar Ali Bukhari was not re-employed in the Doha Cell from where the services of the two appellants were terminated but in an altogether different project known as PASMIC Project, and secondly, the Management must have the right, in case of separate projects which are completed at different periods to re-employ people according to the requirements of the company. It would, however, appear that the appellants were not employed specifically for any project or cell and were taken up in general employment of the respondent-Establishment. The letter of appointment of appellant, S.M. Husnain, dated 10-9-1976, specifically provides that he was liable to be transferred anywhere in Pakistan in any Department/establishment. Similar is the position in respect of the appellant, Syed Ansar Hussain. That this was no mere formal provision in the appointment order is clear from the various subsequent appointment orders in respect of appellant. Husnain, which indicates that lie was transferred and posted from one place to another and to different projects and sections of the respondent-Establishment. The position in respect of appellant Syed Ansar Hussain is not different. Merely because the respondent-Establishment choose to call their different ventures as separate projects or cells does not mean that each cell or project was a water-tight section or department. In fact, as already indicated, transfer from one project to another and from one Department to another was a common practice in the respondent-Establishment. As such,if there is retrenchment in one project in one section, the employees C of that project or section would be entitled to appointment to vacancies in another project or section, provided that the vacancies are in the same category. As already pointed out, Mr. Azhar Ali Buk"ri, who is admittedly junior to both the appellants was re-appointed in somewhat similar post in the PASMIC Project. Since the appellants were senior to him his appointment is in violation of Standing Order

14. However, both the appellants obviously cannot be accommodated against one post held by Mr. Azhar Ali Bukhari. It appears that appellant S.M. Husnain is senior as his order of appointment is, dated 10-9-1976, while the order of appointment of Syed Ansar Hussain is, dated 16-9-1976. Mr. S. M. Husnain is, accordingly, in my view, to be appointed against the post held by Mr. Azhar Ali Bukhari.

11. For the reasons discussed by me above I would allow the appeal of Mr. S.M. Husnain, being Appeal No. KAR-579 of 1980 and would dismiss the appeal of Syed Ansar Hussain, being Appeal No. KAR-580 of 1980. The appellant, S.M. Husnain would be entitled to back benefits only from the date his junior Mr. Azhar All Bukhari, was re-appointed in the PASMIC Project. A. E. Order accordingly.