1982 PLP 378 (SCMR)

The petitioner moved the Board for getting the plot in question trans ferred in the name of the Board to be used for goods service. The Board declined to do so on the grounds, firstly; that there was city bus stand at Rawalpindi which could be used for booking of goods, secondly, that "due to acute shortage of funds it is not desirable to invest more amount or purchase of such type of property to block our capital unnecessarily". On 10-5‑1962, the petitioner wrote a letter to the Chairman of the said respondent‑Board stating that as the respondent‑Board lacked funds to pay to the Settlement authorities on account of assessed transfer price (Rs. 5,760) of the aforesaid evacuee land in its name, he may be permitted to deposit the above sum in the Board's account when the transfer of the premises in question is sanctioned by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. He also undertook to keep the land in question with the respondents‑Board at the same rent as long as it may require for its use and that the property could be transferred in the name of the petitioner after the formalities of its transfer to the respondent‑Board are completed. On 21‑5‑1962, the Chairman of the respondent‑Board addressed a letter (Exh. P. 7) to the Secretary (Urban) to the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, for the transfer of the land in question in its favour. A copy of this letter was also endorsed to the petitioner which reads as follows: ‑ "A copy is forwarded to the District Manager, Government Transport Service, Rawalpindi with reference to his Memo. No. Stn/DM/1728, dated 10‑5‑1962. Chairman has been pleased to transfer this property in his favour on the condition that be will charge the same rent from the Board which is being paid at present to the Settlement Department. As soon as sanction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner is received, he shall be, advised to deposit the amount in the Board's account so that the payment may be made to the Settlement Department by this office." However, the request made by the Chairman of the respondent‑Board was acceded to by the Government of Pakistan vide letter, dated 26‑1‑1963 (Exh. P. 1) and the land in question was transferred to the respondent‑Board on payment of the prevalent market value to be determined by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Subsequently, the respondent‑Board refused to transfer the land in dispute to the petitioner on the ground that the same was required for its own purposes (Exhs. P. 6 and P. 8). On 27‑1‑1967, the petitioner feeling aggrieved of this refusal by the respondent‑Board, instituted a suit for the specific performance of agreement on the basis of the above‑mentioned endorsement. This was, however, not included in the letter addressed to the Secretary (Urban) to the Chief Settle ment and Rehabilitation Commissioner. The respondent‑Board resisted the pit and alleged that no agreement existed between the parties to sell the land in dispute to the petitioner and that its Chairman was not empowered to make any commitment for the sale of the land to the petitioner without having obtained the prior approval of the Board. On the pleadings of both the parties, the learned Senior Civil Judge framed the following issues: (1) Whether the defendant (respondent‑Board) agreed to sell the property in suit to the plaintiff (petitioner)? If so, what were the conditions of agreement ? (2) Relief. The learned Senior Civil Judge observed that the endorsement upon which the petitioner had based his case was not signed by the Chairman himself and that it was not addressed to the petitioner by name. On the basis of these findings, he, therefore, held that there was no agreement between the parties for the sale of the land in dispute to the petitioner and dismissed the suit with costs vide his judgment dated 29‑7‑1967. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District judge, who was of the view that there was nothing on the record to show that the person who had signed the endorsement was not competent to do so on behalf of the Chairman of the respondent‑Board; as the endorsement was in response to an oilier made by the petitioner in his personal capacity, the mere fact that it was addressed to the District Manager and not to him by name was of no consequence. In this view of the matter, he thought that a valid agreement existed for the sale of the land in dispute between the parties. Consequently, he set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge and granted a decree to the petitioner for the specific performance of the agreement by his judgment, dated 5‑10‑1967. The respondent‑Board, feeling dissatisfied with the above judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge approached the Lahore High Court, Lahore, by filing a Regular Second Appeal (No. 66 of 1967) which came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge, who after detailed discussion arrived at a conclusion that no valid agreement existed between the parties which could be enforced in a Court of law. Accordingly, he accepted the appeal of the respondent‑Board; set aside the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge and restored those of the learned Senior Civil Judge vide his judgment dated 1‑2‑1981. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, we are in agreement with the High Court that no valid agreement existed between the parties, which could be enforced in a Court of law. As pointed out by the High Court, the Chairman purported to transfer the land in dispute to the petitioner. However, when the Chairman was transferring the land to him it did not belong to the Board and was as still a part of the compensation pool and vested in the Central Government. The Chairman could not obviously transfer a property which vested in a stage and the transfer was, therefore, void. For our purposes we may observe that this is not a fit case for exercise of this Court's discretionary jurisdiction of granting leave to appeal. The petitioner was an officer of the Department and he was the moving spirit for obtaining transfer of the land in the name of the Board, which was writing to the relevant authorities that it required the land for its own needs. Yet, simultaneously, the Chairman directed its transfer to the petitioner, which appears to have been done to favour him. This is, therefore, not a fit case for interference. Petition dismissed.