1992 PLP 125 (CLC)

‑‑‑‑S. 45‑‑‑Incorporation of time‑barred decree in revenue record‑‑‑Revenue Officer's obligation‑‑‑Revenue Officer was under obligation to correct and bring up to date revenue records in conformity with the binding adjudication of Civil Courts, who alone were arbiters of civil rights of the parties‑‑‑Provision of S.45, West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 provided that entries in record of rights would not be altered in subsequent record otherwise than by making entries in accordance with facts proved or admitted to have occurred; making such entries as were supported by a decree or order binding on those parties; and making new maps where necessary to make them‑‑‑Provisions of S.45. West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 being compulsive and mandatory provision of law, Revenue Officer was not authorised to review and scrutinise merits of decree of Civil Court and question its correctness‑‑‑Revenue Officer must accept decree of Civil Court and act upon it to give effect to it, in revenue record‑‑‑Revenue Officer had no domain to question decree of Civil Court or to say that same being time‑barred he would not act upon it; his jurisdiction being summary, in exercise of same, he was not allowed to by‑pass jurisdiction of Civil Court which was empowered to sit in judgment on the rights to property‑‑‑Simply because decree of Civil Court was time‑barred, same would not lose its utility‑‑‑Revenue authorities were under obligation to sanction mutation on basis of decree of Civil Court‑‑‑Decree in question, having apportioned respective shares of parties by giving them speed shares, same was binding upon the parties, and Revenue authorities were obliged to mutate the land in accordance with it. Ali Ahmad and another v. Muhammad Fazal and another P L D 1973 Lah. 207 and Ali Ahmad and another v. Muhammad Fazal and another 1972 SCMR 322 rel. Bashir Ahmad Shaikh for Petitioners. Writ application by the petitioners directed against a decision dated 9‑9‑1991 of learned Member (Rev.) Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore, raises purely a legal question regarding obligation of a Revenue Officer to correct entries in revenue records in accordance with terms of decree of the Civil Court binding upon the parties and arises out of the facts and circumstances enumerated below: Mehr Din, an Arain by caste, owned some agricultural land at Mauza Burewali, in Tehsd Narowal of District Sialkot. He died on 25‑12‑1945. On his death land owned by him was mutated in the names of his two surviving unmarried daughters, namely Mst. Sharifan Bibi and Mst. Fatima Bibi. They were married after enforcement of Shariat Law. Mst. Sharifan Bibi is alive whereas Mst. Fatima Bibi died in year 1954, and, is survived by petitioners Nos.1 to 9 as her heirs. In a civil suit (Civil Suit No.123/60) instituted by Ghulam Rasool regarding a share in the estate of Mehr Din, Civil Judge Narowal on 4‑12‑1961 found that two daughters of Mehr Din were entitled to inherit 2/3rd share in his estate and the remaining 1/3rd shall be distributed equally between his two equi‑distant collaterals namely Ghulam Rasool and Islam‑ud‑Din. Ghulam Rasool was plaintiff in the suit and Islam‑ud‑Din a defendant with two daughters of Mehr Din. Judgment of the Civil Court was not challenged by either party to the suit and thus it attained finality. Decree passed by Civil Court in pursuance of its judgment was not executed through it. Instead, an application for its implementation in revenue records was made to the Revenue Officer. By mutation No.88 sanctioned on 23‑4‑1986, Revenue Officer gave 2/3rd share of the estate left by Mehr Din to his daughters and distributed the remaining 1/3rd equally between Ghulam Rasool and Islam‑ud‑Din by giving 1/6th share each. Petitioners filed an appeal before Collector against the decision made on Mutation No.88. It was dismissed. Thereupon, they filed a revision before Additional Commissioner (Rev.) Gujranwala. It was allowed on 5‑4‑1988, and, mutation was remanded to the Revenue Officer for deciding it afresh. Upon remand, a fresh mutation bearing No.137 was entered. It was decided on 13‑8?1988 by the Revenue Officer who found that a time‑barred decree of the Civil Court could not be given effect to in revenue papers. Islam‑ud‑Din filed an appeal to the Collector against this decision of the Revenue Officer. It was dismissed on 16‑1‑1989 by maintaining the decision on Mutation No.137. Islam‑ud‑Din filed a further appeal before Additional Commissioner (Rev.) Gujranwala Division. It also failed on 19‑12‑1989. However, a further revision to the Board of Revenue succeeded on 9‑9‑1991, which gave effect to the decree of the Civil Court and distributed estate of Mehr Din between the parties in accordance with its findings. It is this decision of the learned Member, Board of Revenue that is being assailed in Constitutional jurisdiction. It is asserted that a time‑barred decree passed by a Civil Court could not be incorporated in revenue records, the same being neither binding on the parties to it nor on the Revenue Officer because it loses its efficacy and the results created by it are extinguished by law. It is further asserted that Islam‑ud‑Din was not a decree‑holder, and, at his instance the Revenue Officer could not mutate a share of land in dispute to him. It was also asserted that Islam‑ud‑Din being a defendant in the civil suit and siding with the petitioners was estopped to assert his right for a share in the land left by Mehr Din. I do not think either of the contentions has any force for avoidance of the impugned decision of learned Member, Board of Revenue. There is a clear obligation laid upon all the Revenue Officers to correct and bring up to date revenue records in conformity with the binding adjudications of the Civil Courts who alone are arbiters of civil rights of the parties. Section 45 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, provides that entries in record‑of‑rights shall not be altered in subsequent records otherwise than by‑‑ (a) making entries in accordance with facts proved or admitted to have occurred; (b) making such entries as are agreed to by all the parties interested therein or are supported by a decree or order binding on those parties; and (c) making new maps where it is necessary to make them. In face of the above compulsive and mandatory provision of law, it is not the function of a revenue officer to review and scrutinise the merits of decree of the Civil Court and question its correctness. All that the law says, he must do is, to accept it and act upon it to give effect to it in revenue records. It is not his domain to question it or to say that being time‑barred, he shall not act upon it. His jurisdiction is summary and in exercise of that jurisdiction, he is not allowed to bypass jurisdiction of the Civil Court which is empowered to sit in judgment on the rights to property. There may be some conflict of opinion in past as to whether a time‑barred decree of the Civil Court was of binding nature but at present there is none and the point is no more open to argument. In 'Ali Ahmad and another v. Muhammad Fazal and another' (P L D 1973 Lah. 207) a Division Bench comprising of two eminent Judges of this Court who later headed it as its Chief Justices had occasion to examine this question and found that Revenue Officers were under an obligation to give effect to decree of Civil Court and change entries in revenue records in accordance with the rights determined thereby and on their failing to do so, the High Court was competent to give direction to them for giving effect to the decree by sanctioning mutation. The view of law taken by the Division Bench was approved by the Supreme Court in 'Ali Ahmad and another v. Muhammad Fazal and another' (1972 S C M R 322). The Supreme Court observed that simply because the decree was time‑barred, it did not lose its utility and the Revenue authorities were under obligation to sanction mutation on the basis of the decree of the Civil Court. Perusal of the judgment of the Civil Court would reveal that it had apportioned the respective shares of the parties by giving them specified shares. Ghulam Rasool and Islam‑ud‑Din were found collaterals of Mehr Din and each entitled to a sixth share in his estate. It was a binding judgment between the parties and the Revenue authorities were obliged to mutate the land left by Mehr Din in accordance with it. Upon this view of the matter, I do not find that the learned Member acted wrongly so as to render his decision open to interference in extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Writ application is accordingly dismissed in limine. AA./K‑3/L?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Writ petition dismissed.