P L D 1954 Azad J (PLP)

ABDUL MAJID, C. J.‑This is a second appeal by the defendant arising out of a suit for a declaration that mutation made in her name of one half of the land alleged to have been left by her deceased mother Mst. Fazlan was ineffective. Mst. Fazlan's husband was Fazal Din who died long ago leaving about 65 kanals of land. On his death the land was mutated in the name of Mst. Fazlan who according to custom had life interest in the property left by her husband. After Mst. Fazlan had succeeded to the property left by her husband she made a gift of 16 kanals and 16 marlas of land and a house in favour of the defendant. This happened in the year 2,000 Bikrami. The gift was challenged by the plaintiff‑respondents who are the reversioners of Fazal Din in the Court of Munsiff Mirpur. The suit brought by the plaintiff‑respondents was compromised in the month of Maghar, 2003. The parties to the compromise were plaintiff‑respondents on one side and Mst. Fazlan deceased, the defendant and the defendant's husband on the other side. According to the compromise which was embodied in the decree of the Court the defendant agreed to have 11 kanals out of 16 kanals and 16 marlas of land gifted in her favour and gave up her claim with respect to the remaining land and a house. Mst. Fazlan relinquished all her rights in the landed property of her deceased husband and admitted that the plaintiff‑respondents had been in possession of the land left by her husband since the year 1986 Bikrami. After decree had been passed on the basis of this compromise an exchange of the disputed land also took place between the defendant and the plaintiff‑respondents. Mst. Fazlan died in the year 1951. By that time the Azad Kashmir Government had passed Muslim Personal Law Application Act. According to it in respect of immovable property held by a Muslim female as a limited owner under the customary law succession was to open out on the termination of her limited interest to all persons who would have been entitled to inherit the property at the time of the death of the last full owner lead the Muslim Personal Law been applicable at the time of such death. The result was that on the death of Mst. Fazlan cane half of the landed property left by her husband was mutated in tile name of the defendant. The plaintiff respondents then insti tuted a suit challenging the mutation on the basis of a com promise decree. The suit was resisted by the defendant who pleaded that she was entitled to inherit one half of her father's estate according to Shariat Act which come into force before her mother died. The trial judge overruled her plea and deiced' the suit. Against this judgment she filed an appeal in the Court of the District judge which was also dismissed. Hence this second appeal. Both the Courts below have held that the defendant appel lant was estopped from challenging the compromise on the basis of which a decree in the previous suit was passed and consequently the mutation of land effected in her name was ineffective. Reliance was placed in this respect on A I R 1924 Cal. 380 and A I R 1935 Mad. 295 in which it was held that a party who has adopted an order of the Court and acted under it cannot after benefit has been enjoyed under the order contend that it is valid for one party and invalid for another party. At the time the decree in the previous suit was passed the defendant appellant had no right whatsoever to inherit the property left by her deceased father'' under the custom. The right to inherit her deceased father's property was conferred on her by the Shariat Act which came into force long after the passing of the decree in the previous suit. The defendant appellant wants to take advantage of a sta tutory provision and it is settled principle of law that there can be no estoppel against the Act of the Legislature. The lower Court's decision, therefore, that the defendant appellant is estopped from challenging the validity of the decree passed in the previous suit on account of her conduct is erroneous and deserves no consideration. The real question in this case is whether Mst. Fazlan mother of the defendant‑appellant who had admittedly a limited interest under the customary law in the land in dispute is .to be deemed as holding that interest up till her lifetime in spite of the fact that she had renounced her rights therein long before the Muslim Personal Law Application Act was enacted. It is clear from the petition of compromise Exh. P. A. that Mst. Fazlan had relinquished all her rights in the land left by her deceased husband in favour of the plaintiff respondents and the defendant‑appellant. It is also clear from this petition that all the land left by Mst. Fazlan's husband had been in possession of the plaintiff‑respondents ever since the death of her husband. In other words the petition Exh. P. A. indicates that by giving up her rights in the land by her deceased husband which were limited only to her lifetime she accelerated the succession of the plaintiff‑respondents who were reversioners of her deceased husband to the land which under the customary law she was entitled to hold till her lifetime. The petition of compromise did not require registration under section 17 (b) of the Registration Act and was admissible in evidence because (a) it was a mere applica tion to the Court informing it of the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties out of Court and as such neither created nor declared rights so as to require registration and (b) it was submitted to and acted upon judicially by the Court and was itself a step for judicial procedure not requiring registra tion. A I R 1917 Lah. 282 (2) is clear authority on the point. In this petition a reference was made to a document Exh. P. B. by which Mst. Fazlan had surrendered major portion of her widow estate in favour of the plaintiff‑respondents on account of their discharging the debts of her deceased husband. Both these documents Exh. P. A. and P. B. point out that Mst. Fazlan had surrendered her limited interest in the property of her deceased husband in favour of the plaintiff‑respondents and in this way accelerated their succession to her deceased husband's estate. The defendant‑appellant and her husband were also parties‑to the petition Exh. P. A. If Mst. Fazlan had brought a suit to challenge her own action on the ground that the documents Exh. P. A. and Exh. P. B. were invalid for want or registration then she would have been defeated by the doctrine of part performance described in section 53 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act. We are, therefore, of opinion that the family arrangements made by the parties among themselves as to the land left by the deceased husband of Mst. Fazlan long before the Shariat Act came into force destroyed the limited interest which Mst. Fazlan had in her husband's estate under the customary law and it cannot pos sibly be deemed that she had any interest in it when the Shariat Act was enforced and consequently the succession to Mst. Fazlan's husband's estate did not open on her death as held by the Revenue authorities. The mutation in question is thus in our opinion not validly effected in favour of the defendant appellant. The result is that we uphold the decision of the Courts below on a different ground and dismiss the appeal. As the question involved in the appeal was somewhat complicated, we consider that the cost of the appeal should be borne by the parties. We order accordingly. Pleader's fee shall be Rs.

20. A. H. Appeal dismissed.