1968 SC M R 493 (PLP)

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.-This is a petition for special leave to appeal from the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dismissing a writ petition filed in 1961 under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, to challenge the validity of an order passed by the Chairman, Town Committee, Alipur, under section 64 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960. This order directed the petitioner to discontinue, within three months, a private market established by him, in premises No. F. 73, Sadar Bazar, Alipur. This house belonged to the petitioner and he was there carrying on the business of a commission agent dealing in vegetables, fruits and sugarcane, since 1948, under a licence granted by the Town Committee. This licence, it appears, was cancelled in 1954, but the petitioner challenged the competency of the Town Committee to do so, by a suit. This was decreed by the trial Court but on appeal, the decree was set aside and the suit was dismissed with costs on 8-10-1956. The petitioner did not appeal from the said decree but continued to carry on his business without any licence. Subsequently, he again applied for a licence in 1960 but the Committee refused the same and proceeded to take action under section 64 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, alleging that the petitioner was running a "private market" within the meaning of the definition of a "market" given in clause (22) of section 3(1) of the Ordinance. This definition is as follows:- " 'market' means a place where persons assemble for the sale and purchase of meat, fish, fruit, vegetable, or any other article of food or for the sale and purchase of livestocks or animals and includes any place which may be notified as a market in accordance with the rules," Subsection (1) of section 64 of the Ordinance provides that "No private market for the sale of articles of food or drink or for the sale of animals shall be established or maintained within a municipality except under a licence granted by the Municipal Committee, and in conformity with the conditions of such licence." In view of the above provisions, the High Court held that the action of the Town Committee was lawful since the petitioner was on his own showing clearly "carrying on wholesale business in fruits and vegetables by way of auction and otherwise". He was, therefore, within the meaning of the Ordinance, running a "market" which he could not do by reason of the provisions of subsection (1) of section 64 without a licence. His complaint that no show cause notice had been given to him before the cancellation of his licence was held to be of no consequence as he must have been fully aware of the nature of the dispute between him and the Town Committee since he was, from 1954, running the business without any licence. The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal and the main contention advanced on his behalf is that the premises could not have been treated as a market within the meaning of the Ordinance. In support 'of this contention reliance has been placed pp two decisions of the Bombay High Court. The first is in the case of Queen Empress v. Mogan Harivan and another (I L R 11 Bom. 106) the other Ass is in the case of Bombay Municipality v. Yenkanna Ellappa Balaram (AIR 1928 Bom. 413). Neither of these cases is, however, applicable, for, neither in the Bombay Municipal Act of 1873 nor in the Bombay City Municipal Act of 1888 was the term "market" defined. It was for this reason that the Bombay High Court thought that the ilfa market" was incapable of definition in the true sense of that word which according to its dictionary meaning contemplated "concourse of buyers and sellers periodically assembling at a certain of for the purpose of retail business". The position here is different for the Ordinance has defined a market and the question is whether the place where the petitioner was carrying on his business was a lace were "persons assembled for the sale and purchase of fruits, vegetables or other articles of food". Certainly they did and, therefore, the premises concerned was the premises concerned was rightly treated as a market. The petitioner has also contended that the failure to give a show cause notice was fatal in the present case but we are unable to agree for the Town Committee had actually given him three months time to vacate. He could well have within the said three months lodged a protest or made a representation. He did not do so but after the expiry of the period, came to the High Court on 17-1-1961. He had, therefore, also failed to demand justice from the Town Committee itself. In the circum stances the comment of the High Court that he well knew as to what the nature of the case was against him and that no prejudice had been caused to him owing to this fact appears to be justified. He had ample opportunity to make a representation but he did not avail of this opportunity. He cannot now complain on account of the want of notice. No other ground is urged in support of this petition. We see no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.